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INTRODUCTION 
In an open society with most of the democratic institutions 
defunct or in disarry, the citizen has very few avenues open 
to him for exercise of his constitutional rights, protection 
of life and property and redressal of his grievances. Where 
the government fails to govern, the civil service is neither 
civil nor a service, the police is more an oppressor than a 
guardian of law, the judiciary in India remains the last hope 
for the people. It is good to see the courts admonishing the 
politicians, warming the police and dispensing justice to 
people who could never afford the luxury of litigation„ 
Judicial review is not only a boon for the citizen, it is 
also the only ray of hope in a sky filled with black clouds. 
The Supreme Court which resolve many of the most 
important and controversial issues in the country is now 
undergoing a fundamental change and emerging as one of the 
most significant forces shaping policies that touch the daily 
lives of all people. Through its interpretation of law, the 
Supreme Court plays a critical role in the policy making 
system of the government.. 
Whatever the skeptics might say, the Supreme Court's 
achievement as regards the promotion of social justice 
through public interest litigation, has been impressive. Of 
late, the scope of public interest litigation has been expan-
ded. Any public spirited individual or voluntary organisa-
tion can get any public infury rectified through "public 
interest" petitions. Cleaning up of the public administra-
tion through some recent judgements has been the most strik-
ing achievement of the Supreme Court. 
A couple of months ago, the Railway lodged FIR with 
Haryana Railway Police at Faridabad. The gist of the FIR was 
that certain persons had wrongly taken delivery of steel 
strips worth lakhs of rupees on the basis of forged documents. 
The investigation was on when the matter took a new turn. A 
petition was moved before the Chief Justice of India alleging 
that the Haryana Railway Police had eb iucted two persons from 
Agra to secure the surrender of one of their relatives, 
wanted in the case. These two persons were alleged to have 
been kept in illegal confinement for about three weeks. The 
court directed the Director-General of police, Haryana, to 
conduct an inquiry and file an affidavit. The D-GP threw a 
bombshell when he admitted that the two persons picked up by 
the police at Agra were actually kept in illegal confinement. 
This angered the Chief Justice, who told the counsel of the 
State Government that unless things improve in the state as 
regards the actions of police, the court will say "that the 
constitutional machinery in the state has broken down." 
Ofcourse, the aggrieved person got instant relief. 
What is most significant about judgement is the judi-
cial pronouncement that holders of public offices big or 
small, civil servents and politicians, must behave. "it is 
highly regrettable" the court said "the holders of public 
office have forgotten that the offices entrusted to them are 
sacred trust", Cases of maladministration and misuse of 
public offices by politicians and bureaucrats have been 
legion, diiring the last three decades. But in deference to 
the principle of judicial restraint, the court had not so far 
gone beyond recording its disapproval or at the outset admin-
istering a wild rebuke to the executive. It is plain that 
the judicary is the least competent to function as a legisla-
tive or the administrative agency. For one thing, courts 
lack the facilities togather detailed data or to make probing 
enquiries. Reliance on advocates who appear before them for 
data is likely to give them partisan on inadequate informa-
tion. On the other hand if courts have to rely on their own 
knowledge and research it is bound to be selective and sub-
jectiveo Courts also have no means for effectively supervis-
ing and implementing the aftermath of their orders, schemes 
and mandates. Moreover,- since courts mandate for isolated 
cases, their decrees make no allowance for the differing and 
varying situations which administrators will encounter in 
applying the mandates to other cases. Courts have also 
method to reverse their orders if they are found unworkable 
or requiring modification
Scheme of Chapterisation; 
The entire study has been divided into the following 
five chapters:-
Chapter I: Chapter I defines in details the concept 
of Judicial Review. In the words of Smith & Zurcher^ "The 
examination or review by the courts, in cases actually before 
them, of legislative statutes and executive or administrative 
acts to determine whether or not they are prohibited by a 
written constitution or are in excess of powers granted by it 
and if sO; to declare them void and of no effect". Edward S. 
Corwin opines that judicial review is the power and duty of 
the courts to disallow all legislative or executive acts of 
either the central or the state government, which in the 
courts opinion transgresses the constitution„ 
The interpretative function of the courts is referred 
to as 'Judicial Review' which can be direct as well as 
indirect. The direct judicial review involves the court to 
declare a legislative or executive act as null and void 
because it is unconstitutional- This type of judicial review 
is rather important. In the other type of judicial review, 
which is termed indirect, the court attempts to give such 
interpreation to the impugned statute so that it may be held 
constitutional. Such a situation can arise only in those 
cases where a statute is susceptible of double meaning- one 
which would make the statute unconstitutional and the other 
which would steer clear the element of unconstitutionality 
and in such a situation the court would be prove to adopt 
that construction of the statute which would save it from 
being held unconstitutional. Douglas characterises this 
practice as 'tailoring an Act to make it consitutional'. 
The American judicial review is a peculiar Governmen-
tal feature among the nations of the world. The judicial 
review is not the judicial supermacy but judicial nationalism 
to bring about all round progress of the country. This power 
of the courts to interpret and enforce constituional clauses 
is not explicity granted in the American Constitution. It 
has been inferred by the courts from the existence of the 
constitutional restrictions. 
The historical background of Judicial review in 
America can be devided into the following periods: 
(i) The Pre-Marshall Age (Pre-Constitution to 1800 A.D.) 
(ii) The Age of Marshall (1801-1835). 
(iii) The Age of Taney (1836-1864). 
(iv) The Age of judicial constitution-Making(1865-1932 ) . 
(v) New Deal or Period of Unconstitutionality(1933-36). 
(vi) The Court Packing Plan or the year of Revenge(1937). 
(vii) The New Era (1938 to the Present) 
The institution of judicial review is attributed to 
Chief Justice John Marshall of United States Supreme Court 
who for the first time laid it down in Marbury v. Madison. 
Chapter-II: This chapter deals with the evolution of 
judicial review in India. The doctrine of judicial review 
took a firm position in India after passing through various 
stages which are explained below. 
(i) 1858 : Government of India Act of 1858 imposed some 
restrictions on the powers of the Governor-General in council 
in enacting laws, but there was no provision of judicial 
review. The court had such power only by implication. 
(ii) 1861 : The Indian Councils Act of 1861 provided that 
measures passed by the Governor-Generals legislative council 
were not to become valid unless the assent of the Governor-
General was receivedo It also contained constitutional 
restrictions against the making of any law or regulation 
which might have the effect of repealing or in any way 
affecting the provisions of Indian Council Act. 
(iii) 1877 : The case of Emperor v. Burah and Book Singh 
ILR^ Cal.63(1877) was decided in the Calcutta High Court in 
which it was held that the aggrieved party had right to 
challenge the Constitutionality of a legislative Act enacted 
by the Governor-General in Council in excess of the power 
given to him by the Imperial Parliament. 
(iv) 1913 i In Secretary v. Moment, ILR 40 Cal.391 at 
p.401(1913) the Privy Council held that any legislation to 
take away the right of the Indian subject to seek relief in 
the civil court was in contravention of section 65 of the 
constitution Act of 1858 and was ultra vires. 
(v) 1918; In Annie Besant v^ Governor of Madras^ A.I.R. 
1918 Mad<1210 at pp.1232-33, the Madras High Court held 
that any legislation of Indian legislature in violation or in 
excess of the power conferred by the Imperial Parliament is 
ultra vires. 
(vi) , 1930; Col. K.N. Haskar and K.N. Pannikar wrote in 
their book 'Federal India' that the Supreme Judicial autho-
rity in India should be invested with the power to declare 
ultra vires measures which would go against the constitution. 
(vii) 1935: Government of India Act of 1935 which came 
into operation in 1937 embodied a federal constitution., The 
federal court gave numerous decisions regarding the consti-
tutionality of legislature and executive Acts. The federal 
court impliedly got power of judicial review to maintain 
federal balance.. 
(viii) 1950; The Republican Constitution of India adopted 
in 1950, which has specifically provided for judicial review 
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regarding the infringement of Fundamental Rights and the 
Indian Courts have powers of Judicial review regarding cons-
tutional violations of the distribution and seperation of 
powers and other constitutional restrictions. Arts.13, 32 
and 226 expressly provide for and envisage Judicial review. 
Chapter III: Chapter III defines in details of 
Judicial .review of Administrative actions through writs. 
Article 32 and 226 of the Indian Constitution makes provi-
sions for the system of writs in the country. Under 
clause(2) of Article 32 the Supreme Court is empowered to 
issue appropriate directions, orders or writs including writs 
in the nature of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, Quo-
warranto and Certiorari for the enforcement of any Funda-
mental Rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. By 
this article the Supreme Court has been constituted as a 
protector and guarantor of the Fundamental rights and once a 
citizen has been shown that there is infringement of his 
Fundamental right the court cannot refuse to entertain 
petitions seeking enforcement of Fundamental Rights. 
Article 226(1) employers every High Court, notwith-
standing anything in art. 32,- throughout the territories in 
relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any 
person or authority, including in appropriate cases any 
government, with those territories directions, orders or 
writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, 
mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition and Certiorari for the 
enforcement of Fundamental Rights or for any other purpose. 
The writ habeas corpus is used primarily to secure 
the release of a person who has been detained unlawfully or 
without any legal justification. The great-value of the writ 
is that it enables immediate determination of the right of a 
person as to his freedom. The writ of mandamus is an order 
by a superior court commending a person or a public authority 
to do or for bear to do something in the nature of public 
duty or in certain cases of a statutory duly. The writ quo-
warranto is used to judicially control executive actions in 
the matter of making appointments to public offices under 
relevant statutory provisions. The writ is also used to 
protect a citizen from the holder of a public office to which 
he has no right. The writ Certiorari is a judicial order 
operating in personam and made in the original legal proceed-
ings, directed by the Supreme Court or High Court to any 
constitutional statutory or non-statutory body or person, 
requiring the records of any action to be certified by the 
court and dealt with according to law. It is a remedy opera-
ting in personam, therefore writ can be issued even where the 
authority has become functus officio, to the keeper of the 
records. A writ of Prohibition is issued primarily to 
prevent an inferior court to tribunal from exceeding its 
jurisdiction or acting contrary to the rules of natural 
justice. 
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Chapter IV: Chapter IV entitled as Judicial response 
to Presidential rule,. Art. 356 of the Indian Constitution 
confers a very wide power on the President to dismiss demo-
cratically elected governments and impose central rule in the 
states. In this Chapter an attempt is made to examine the 
questions and issues relating to justiciability of Art.356 
and to see how Indian judiciary has responded to use/abuse of 
Presidential power over the years ultimately leading to the 
latest pronouncement by a Constitutional Bench. 
Provisions of the Article 356, which were expressed 
in the Constituent Assembly debates, as a necessary evil & 
which should be used to establish the constitutional 
goverance in the country have been used for achieving the 
political ends. Since India a democratic polity 'Presidents' 
rule' has been used about 95 times during past 44 years. 
The majority consisting of Justices Pandian, Sawant, 
Kuldip Singh J Jeevan Reddy and Agarwal, enlarged the scope of 
Judicial review. It held that the validity of the Presiden-
tial proclamation is judicially reviewable to the extent of 
examining whether it was issued on the basis of any material 
at all or whether the material was relevant or whether the 
proclamation was issued malafide or was based on wholly 
irrelevant and extraneous grounds- The Apex Court or a High 
Court can compel the Union government to disclose material on 
whose basis President's rule is imposed on a state. 
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Chapter V : The concluding Chapter V is the summary 
and contains observations based on the study. If these 
observsations along with the other ones given in the preceed-
ing chapters are taken seriously, it may likely to give an 
effective check on malafide actions of executives. It has 
been widely accepted that Supreme Court which resolves many of 
the most important and controversial issues in the country is 
now undergoing a fundamental change and emerging as one of 
the most significant forces shaping policies that touch the 
daily lives of all people. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Judicial Review : The Concept 
Evolution of Judicial Review 
Ilarbury Vs Medison. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW: THE CONCEPT 
Judicial review is the power of the courts to 
determine the constitutionality of legislative acts. It 
determines the ultravires or intravires of the Act 
s 
challenged before it. In the words of Smith & Zurcher, "The 
examination or review by the courts in cases actually before 
them, of legislative statutes and executive or administra-
tive acts to determine whether or not they are prohibited by 
a written constitution or are in excess of powers granted by 
it and if so, to declare them void and of no effect."^ 
Edward S.Corwin opines that judicial review is the power and 
duty of the courts to disallow all legislative or executive 
acts of either the central or the state government, which in 
the court's opinion transgresses the constitution.^ 
Judicial review is not an expression exclusively used 
in Constitutional Law. Judicial review, literally means the 
revision of the decree or sentence of an inferior court by a 
superior court. Under the general law, it works through the 
1. Edward Conard Smith & Arnold John Zurcher, Dictionary of 
American Politics, Barnes & Noble,New York, 1959, p.212. 
2. Edward S. Corwin, A Constitution of Powers in a Secular 
State. The Michie Company, US, 1951, pp.3-4. 
remedies of appeal, revision and the like, as prescribed by 
the procedural laws of the land, irrespective of the 
political system. 
Judicial review has however, a more technical 
significance in public law, particularly in countries having 
a written constitution where the courts perform the role of 
expounding the constitution and excercise power of declaring 
any law or administrative action which may be inconsistent 
with the constitution as unconstitutional and hence void. 
This judicial function stems from a feeling that a system 
based on a written constitution can hardly be effective in 
practice without an authoritative, independent and impartial 
arbiter of constitutional issues and also to restrain 
govermental organs from excercising powers which may not be 
sanctioned by the constitution. 
A federal constitution effects division of powers -
legislative, executive and in some cases judicial also 
between the General and Regional Governments established 
under it and which according to the true federal principles 
are coordinate and independent of each other in the areas 
allotted to them by the constitution. The two goverments thus 
operate simultaneously upon the same people and territory. In 
view of the distribution of legislati\)'e powers which are 
strictly defined and limited in relation to the two 
governments, it is quite likely that the areas and limits may 
be mistaken or forgotten, such constitution, although not 
required is strict theory, is invariably a written 
constitution. 
The distribution of legislative powers, which is the 
hall-mark of a federal constitution, quite often presents an 
important question as to who is to decide in case of a 
dispute as to whether the law made by the state legislative 
encroaches upon the area assigned to the central legislature 
or vice versa. The question referred to above is not 
necessarily limited to strictly federal systems but may also 
crop up in a constitutional set-up like ours, which, 
according to many^, is not federal. For the purpose of 
resolving such disputes, the power is given to the courts and 
they are vested with the power of JUDICIAL REVIEW, as to the 
validity of the laws made by the legislature. The power of 
judicial review is not limited to enquiring about whether the 
power belongs to the particular legislature under the 
constitution. It extends also as to whether the laws are made 
in conformity with and not in violation of other provisions 
of the consitution. For example in our constitution, if the 
courts find that the law made by legislature - union or state 
1. e.g. Dr. K.C.Wheare observesThe Indian Constitution has 
established a form of Government which is at the most 
quasi -federal, almost devolutionary in character, a 
Unitary State with subsidiary federal features rather than 
a federal state with subsidiary unitary features, 48 
Allahabad Journal p-21. 
.is violation of the various fundamental rights gurantee<in 
Part III the law shall be struck down by the courts on uncon-
stitutional under Article 13(2). Similarly where the courts 
find that the law is violation of Article 301 which makes 
available to all persons the freedom of trade, commerce and 
inter-course throughout the territory of India, the law shall 
be struck down. Again where the courts find that there has 
been excesive delegation of legislative power a particular 
case, the parent Act as well as the product, i.e. delegated 
legislation shall be struck down as unconstitutional^. 
The interpretative function of the courts is referred 
to as 'Judicial Review' which can be direct< as well as 
2 
indirect . The direct judicial review involves the court 
to declare a legislative enactment or an executive act as 
null and void because it is unconstitutional. This type of 
judicial review is rather important. In the words of Dowling^ 
"indeed the study of constitutional law .... may be described 
in general terms as a study of the doctrine of judicial 
review in action". 
1. In Hamdard Dawakhana V. Union of India, A . I 1 9 6 0 g-C. 
554; the Supreme Court for the first time struck down as 
unconstitutional an Act made by Union Parliament on the 
ground of excessive delegation. 
2. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 1974, p.755. 
3. Cases on Constitutional Law, 20 (1954). 
In the other type of judicial review^ which is 
termed indirect, the court attempts to give such interpreta-
tion to the impunged statute so that it may be held consti-
tutional. Such a situation can arise only in those cases 
where a statute is susceptible of double meaning- one which 
would make the statute unconstitutional and the other which 
would steer clear the element of unconstitutionality and in 
such a situation the court would be prove to adopt that 
construction of the statute which would save it from being 
held unconstitutional. Douglas characterise this practice as 
'tailoring an Act to make it constitutional'. 
The constitutions of Canada, Australia and U.S.A. do 
not contain any provisions for direct judicial review, but it 
has become an integral part of the constitutional law of 
these countries. It is realised that mere are not suffice to 
check abuse of power; these "a dependence on the people", 
Medison says in the content of USA "is, no doubt, the 
Government, but experience has taught mankind the necessity 
of auxiliary precautions". So our government is kept within 
bounds not only by the limitations set by the electoral 
process but also through separation of powers, federation, 
due process of law and the wellneigh doctrine of judicial 
, 1 
1. Mason and Beaney: American Constitutional Law, 1960,pp.5-6 
If the court wants to ignore any law on the ground 
that it violates the constitution, declaration by the court 
of its constitionality is essential. "Even though a law 
becomes void automatically under Art. 13, without the nece-
ssity of any decleration by a court, a decleration that a law 
has become void is necessary before a court can refuse to 
take notice of it. The voidness of law is not a tangible 
thing which can be noticed as soon as it comes into 
existence, a decleration that it is void is necessary before 
it can be ignoredi<^ The court does not Suo moto decide 
unconstitutionally in the present system of Judicial review 
in India or in America, unless moved by an aggrieved party 
and, also, unless the determination of unconstitionality be 
necessary for the decision of the case. The legislature 
itself being the maker of law is not competent to determine 
the constitutionality of any legislative Acts. An 
unconcerned, independent and impartial body like the court is 
the porper authority to look into legilative lapses. This is 
necessary for the maintenance of the spirit of democracy. 
Where Parliamentary sovereignty prevails and the 
legislature enacts atrocious, tyrannous and unjust laws or 
laws in violation of the constitution, the remedy available 
to the people is to remove the Government itself, or to get 
1. Mohd. Ishaque V. State; A.I.R. 1961, All, 522. 
such law repealed by constitutional agitations, or to attract 
the mind of the legislatures by strong public openion to 
amend or repeal such laws. But where the constitutional 
supermacy is in force, people have another effective remedy 
also, i.e. of challenging the legality of the law in law 
courts and in such case, they may not have any necessity of 
ending the Government itself. The English constitutional 
philosophers envisage only the first kind of remedy as 
Parliamentary Sovereignty prevails there "Democracy provides 
a peaceful way of getting rid of governments which fail to 
convince a majority of their adult subjects that they have 
lively concern for the interest of the governed".^ But in 
India, as in America, the aggrevied citizens have' personal 
rights to challenge the validity of law in law courts also. 
The decision of the question of constituionality of a 
legislative Act is the essence of the judicial power under 
2 
the Constitution of America . Judicial review in its 
broadest context is the self-assured right of the court to 
pass upon the constitutionality of legislative acts.^ 
1. S.I. Beun & R.S.Peters, 'Social Principles and Democratic 
State, George AlJ^n « Unwin Ltd.-, London 1965, p.355. 
2. Bernard Schwartz, The Powers of Government, Volume I, 
The Macmillan Company New York, 1963.p. 
3. Stephen K. Bailey, Howard D.Samuel & Sidney Baldwin, 
'Government in America', Holt Rinehart & Winston, New York 
1961, p.49. 
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Judicial review of the constitionality of statutes is a pecu-
liary American phenomenon which has been coped with varying 
degrees of success by other nations also.^ 
The American judicial review, however, is a peculiar 
2 
Governmental feature among the nations of the world. It is 
a limitation on popular government and is a fundamental part 
of the Constitutional Scheme of America.^ The concept of 
Judicial Review has its foundation on the doctrine that the 
constitution is the supreme law. It has been so ordained by 
the people, and in the American conception, it is the ulti-
mate source of all political authority. The constitution 
confers only limited source powers on the legislature. If 
the legislature consciously or unconsciously oversteps these 
limitations there must be some authority competent to hold it 
in control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and thus 
to indicate and presence inviolate the will of the people as 4 expressed in the constitution. The judicial review is not 
1. Martin Shapire, "The Supreme Court and the Administrative 
Agencies", The Free Press, New York, 1968, p. 22. 
2. Wilfred E.Binkley & Malcoln C. Moos,'A Grammer of American 
Politics", Alfred A.Knopf. New York, 1951,- p,517 
3. Richard Hofstadter, "Great Issues in American Politics", 
Justk:e Frankfurter in Gobitis case (1940) pT49 
4. Rocco J. Tresolim, American Constitutional Law, The 
Macmillan Co., New York, 1965 r~pT51 
the judicial of supremacy but judicial nationalism to bring 
about all round progress of the country. This power of the 
courts to interpret and enforce constitutional clauses is not 
explicity granted in the American Constitution. It has been 
inferred by the courts from the existence of the 
constitutional restrictions^. 
In this connection Merril Jensen observes, "by August 
28,(1787) the convention had agreed on all the essentials of 
the judiciary as it appeared in the final draft of the cons-
titution, and it did so with remarkably little disagreement. 
Neither then nor later did the delegates suggest that the 
supreme court be expressly authorised to rule 
on the constitutionality of state and federal laws. They took 
2 it for granted that it should and would do so" . 
The courts protect the legislative powers against 
their encroachments by other agencies. They defend the Union 
against the exaggerated claims of the states. They protect 
the public interests against the interests of private 
individuals. They conserve the spirit of order against the 
1. Encyclopaedia - Britamca, Volume VI, J'rinted in U.S.A. 
195^, 
2. Merrill Jenson, The Making of the American Constitution, 
^urasia Publishing iiouse (P) Ltd., Ramnagar, 
New Delhi (1966) p.110 
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innovations of excited democracj^. Timothy Walker argues 
"one cannot easily conceive of a more sublime excercise of 
powers, than that by which few m«a,1: through the mere force of 
reason, without soldiers, andruwithout tumult, pomp, or 
parade, but calmly, noiselesslyriand fearlessly, proceed to 
get aside the acts of either Government, because repugnant to 
2 
the constitution" . Judicial review is the last word, 
logically &nd historically speaking, in the attempt of a free 
people to establish and maintain a non-auto-cretic 
government. Justice Goldberg alsa remarks " Judicial review 
is not a usurped power but a parrt of the grand design to 
ensure the supermacy of the constitution"^. Judicial review 
means that non-elective and noo-removable ' branch of the 
Government, has rejected decisions reached by the two 
elective, removable branches. As: John P. Roche says-" The 
principle of equilibrium required that Judges be more than 
Puppets of a legislature. In thje aconstitutional scheme of 
things, it was imperative that tsbme institution exist to 
protect the fabric of the constitution to ensure that a 
legislature and an executive woufei jiot connive together, to 4 break the equilibrium of forces" . 
1. Willis, Constitutional Law ofsUnited States, The 
Principia Press, Bloomingdon Ihc-;, 1936 'p. 114 
2. Elizabeth Kelley Bauer, Commentaries on the Constitution 
C:oumbia University Press, New Yfirk, 1952,1790-1860., p.304.< 
3. Arthur J. Goldberg, The Defences ,of Freedom, Harper 
& Row, Publishers, New York,1966. p.149 
4. John P. Roche, Courts and Constitution, Random 
House, New York, 196^^ p.22 
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To take recourse to judicial review is the evolution 
of the mature human thought. Law must be in conformity with 
the constitution. If law exceeds in its limit, it is not law 
but a mere pretence of law. Law must be just, virtuous and 
capable to bringing human prosperity and not arbitrary, 
unjust and in violation of the constitution. Judicial review 
is a great weapon through whicn arbitrary, unjust harassing 
and unconstitutional laws are checked. Judicial review is the 
cornerstone of constitutionalism, which implies limited 
Government^. 
In this connection K.V. Rao remarks - "In a democracy 
public openion is passive, and in India it is still worse, 
and that is all the reason why it is imperative that 
judiciary should come to our rescue. Otherwise the 
constitution becomes ill - balanced, and leans havily on 
Executive Supermancy, and tyranny of the majority and that 
2 
was not the intention of the Makers" . The concept of Judi-
cial review has its foundation on the following constitu-
tional principles. 
(a) The Government that cannot satisfy the governed of the 
legitimacy of its action cannot expect to be considered legi-
timate and democratic, and such government also cannot expect 
1. S.C. Dash, The Constitution of India, A comparative Study Chailanga Publishing House, Allahabad,1960. p.334 
2. K.V. Rao, Parliamentary Democracy of India, The 
World Press Pvt. Ltd., Calcutta, 1961. p.213 
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to receive the confidence and satisfaction of the governed. 
(b) The government in a democracy is a government of limited 
powers, and a government with limited powers has to take 
recourse to a machinary or agency for the scrutiny of charges 
of legislative vices and constitutional disobedience, and 
such act of scrutiny can be done impartially and urbiasedly 
only by the court. 
(c) Each citizen in a democracy, who is aggrieved of a legis-
lative Act on the ground of constitutional violation, has to 
inherent right to approach the court to declare such legisla-
tive Act unconstitutional and void. 
(d) In a federal state, judicial arbitration is inevitable in 
order to maintain balance between the Centre and the State. 
(e) Where the constitution guarantees the fundamental rights, 
legislative violations of the rights can be scrutinised by 
the court alone. 
(f) The legislature being the delegate and agent of the 
sovereign people has no jurisdiction and legal authority to 
delegate essential legislative function to any other body. 
In the democratic state the court is the essential 
organ for maintaining the fundamental object of the 
constitution and for keeping the legislature within the 
limits assigned to its authority by the constitution for 
saving the people from the dangers of democratic tyranny and 
13 
for materialising the aim of the constitution of establishing 
a harmonious and cohesive society based on ideal common 
morality. In this way the court is a real participant in the 
living stream of national life. 
Constitutional protection can be available to that 
person only who in fact is aggrieved. A person who desires to 
assert his constitutional rights must show that his rights 
are affected and infringed. The court, by evolving the rules 
of conduct for judicial review, has adhered to the principle 
that the person who challenges the constitutiionality of a 
legislative Act must show that his right has really been 
infringed. One of the cardinal limitations on the courts 
power of judicial review of legislation on constitutional 
grounds is that it will decide only a ripened controversy in 
which the results are of immediate consequence to the 
parties^. Willis has said - "In general, it may be said that 
appropiate person to raise a tax question is one whose taxes 
will be increased, an eminent Domain question, one whose 
property is being taken; a police power question, one whose 
2 
personal liberty is being delimited" . Modern democracy 
demands that if any legislative Act is challenged by an 
1. E. Allan Farnsworth, An Introduction to the Legal System 
of the U.S. Parker School of Foreign & Comparative 
Law, Columbia University Press, 1963. p.145 
2. Hugh Evander Willis, Constitutional Law of the United 
States, The Principia Press Bloomingdon, 1963. p.92 
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aggrieved person in the court of Law, the validity of the Act 
has to be tested objectively. The Supreme Court of India has 
laid down that the court has abundant power to look into the 
validity of law, and the scrutinize if the legislature has 
over-stepped the field of compelency even indirectly by way 
of device^. 
It is not open to the Legislature to contravene and 
flout the provisions of Part III of the constitution by 
asking shelter behind the plea that the infringement was 
2 
accidental and not deliberate . In the case where the impug-
ned provision is held to have violated a fundamental right, 
it is the bounden duty of the court to give redress to the 
party even if that involves the striking down of the provi-
sions of a law enacted by the Parliament^. It has been 
further said that the court is under a duty, imposed by 
Articles 13 and 14 of the constitution, to act as a sort of 
constitutional censor of all legislations and to scrutinise 
at the instance of any aggrieved citizen any law, or 
executive act, to examine its legality and thus ensure that 
no unconstitutional legislation or illegal state actions 4 slips from its vigilant scrutiny . Judicial Review imprint 
1. G. Nageshwar Rao V. APSRT Corporation AIR 1959. 
2. Deoman Upadhyaya V.State; AIR; 1960 Para 51. 
3. Manilal Gopalji V. Union of India, AIR; 1960 Bombay 83 
Para 5. 
4. U.P. Shramik Maha Sangh V. State of U.P.A^;1960 All.45 
Para-18. 
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governmental action with the stamp of legitimacy. It check 
the political branches of Government, when these encroach on 
the ground forbidden to them by the constitution as 
interpreted by the Court. 
Judicial review relieves the legislature of great 
responsibility and strain. Through the view expressed by the 
courts in t h ^ process of judicial review regarding the 
constitutionality of any legislature Act, the legislature 
recieves great inspiration, and arouses alertness and caution 
to rectify mistakes and it creates tendency of conformity to 
the constitution. James Madison spoke on Saturday July 21, 
1787, in the constitutional convention, "It (Judicial review) 
would moreover be useful to the community at large as an 
additional check against a pursuit of those unwise and 
unjust measures which constituted so great portion of our 
calamities"^. Thus, if the legislature becomes alert and 
cases to consider the judicial v^i;^ict future constitutional 
lapses can easily be avoided, which may relieve the legisla-
ture of a great strain. Judicial review of legislation, has 
been combined with the theory to set up an effective system 
of checks and balances to restrict majority rule in favour of 
interests of minorities . By judicial review the legislature 
1. Adrienne Koch, The American Enliqhtment George 
Brazille, New York , p.4yi 
2. Charles Grove Hames & Foster H.Sherwood,The Role of the 
Supreme Court in American Government and Politics, 
Barkloy and Sons Anglos . 1 957 . 1835-1864 , pp .. 287-288 . 
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realises its lapses and becomes alert against future lapses. 
Existence of judicial review on this consideration is also 
very essential. 
It is " now well-settled that the judicial 
interpretations create precedents and make new laws. Such law 
is judicial Legislation. It has not the sanction of the 
established legislature, but has the sanction of the people 
itself. The Judges in the process of judicial review are 
governed by the beliefs and feelings of the time, the current 
economic and social thoughts, constitutional mandates and 
intellectual and moral tone of nation, and are guided by the 
high judicial standard of reasoning, aim and philosophy of 
life and as such the constitutional decisions handed down by 
the Judges have legislative value. In England, "Judicial 
legislation, extending over more than two centuries, worked 
out an extra-ordinary and within certain limits a most 
effective reform which was logical, systematic and effectual, 
just because it was the application to the actual and varying 
circumstances of a clear and simple principle"^. 
In America, judicial review has rendered great service 
to the nation. Though on occasion,' there were determined / 
attempts to curtail its powers but the nation as a whole has 
accepted it.In India too judicial review has created a very 
healthy judicial legislation,which can be a perenial guide to 
the nation. 
I- A.V.Dicey,Law and Public Openion in England, Macmillon 
& Co. Ltd., London p,395 
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EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The United States of America gave to the world a new 
gleam of judicial review. The concept of judicial review as 
evolved in America was the result of continuous thinking and 
growth. It had the heritage of Plato and Aristotle, inklings 
of Mague Carta and the Cockeian theory of Common right and 
reason and the assimilation of the practical philosophy of 
Locke and other legal thinkers of Europe. Megna Carta yielded 
a great influence on Coke and Locke and it gave a great 
heritage to America for judicial review- The impact of Magua 
Carta on the American Social Life was so great that the revolt 
against legislative tyranny was a common phase of the 
Americans since the time of the Colonial rule. As J.C.Holt 
remarks- "And just as the Charter was claimed by the English 
Radicals as a natural birth right, so in America some of its 
principles came to be established as individual rights 
enforceable against authority in all its forms, whether 
legislative, executive or judicial...."^. Before the Federal 
Constitution was enacted in the United States of America James 
Otis, a constitutional lawyer of extraordinery flexibility of 
mind argued in 1761 in Panton's case on the precedent of 
Dr. Bonham's case decided by Chief Justice Coke in 1610. "As 
1. J.C. Holt, Magua Carta, Cambridge University Press 
1965 • p.15. 
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to Acts of Parliament, an Act against the constitution is 
void. An Act against natural equity is void"^. Justice Gray 
has said that "Otis argued that the Parliament was not final 
arbiter of its own Acts and contended that the validity of 
statutes must be judged by the courts of justice. This 
argument of Otis foreshadowed the principal of American cons-
titutional law that it is the duty of the judiciary to 
2 
declare unconstitutionaly statutes void" . In America judicial 
review has tended to evolve the national outlook to a great 
magnitude. It (Judicial review) has guided the development of 
a very brief constitution of agrarian origins into a great 
body of constitutional doctrine for the goverance of a highly 
technical industrial civilization. This in itself is a great 
achievement. 
The doctrine of judicial review of the United States of 
America is really the precursor of judicial review in other 
constitutions of the world which evolved after the 18th 
century and in India also it has been a matter, of great 
inspiration. 
The Americans have always pleaded for limited 
1. Bernard Schwartz, The Reins of Power, Hill & Wang, New York, 1963 - p.7 
2. Cortez A.M.Ewing & Jewell Cass Phillips, Essentials of 
American Government, American Book Co, New York, 
1962 .p.242 
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sovereignty which means that the law-making function of the 
legislative organ is governed by the fundamental rights of the 
people and other constitutional limitations. No law can be 
framed which snatches away the constitutional rights of the 
people . " If sovereignty is considered to be all-powerful ;and 
uncontrolled any person or party which can acquire by whatever 
means the happenings of sovereignty can make binding commands, 
and law would then rest on force and chicanery, which makes 
nonsense of the normal meaning of law".^ 
Retrospect : 
The historical background of Judicial Review in 
American can be divided into the following periods: 
1. The Pre-Marshall Age(Pre-constitution Period to 1800 A.D.) 
In Bonham's case of Lord Chief Justice Coke is said to 
be a great heritage to the American System of judicial review. 
Willis remarks "Dr.Bonham's case was soon repudiated in 
England, but the doctrine announced in Coke's dictum found 
fertile soil in the United States and sprouted into such a 
vigorous growth that it was applied by the United States 
Supreme Court in the decisions of cases coming before it".^ 
1. Ronald Young, American Law & Politics, Harper & Law 
Publisher, New York, 1967 -p.151 
2. Willis, Constitutional Law of the United States, 
The Princepia Press, Bloomingdon, Inc. 1936 p. 76 
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This much is certain that the doctrine enunciated in Bonham's 
case by Chief Justice Coke laid on unshakeable foundation of 
judicial review in America. Carl J. Friedrich also supports 
the view that Coke laid down the foundation of the American 
System of judicial review".... one can see here clear basis 
for judicial review of legislature Acts as it later became 
reality under the written Constitution of the United States"^ 
The doctrine of Common Rights and Reason propounded 
by Chief Justice Coke and Blackstone's commentaries combined 
with the philosophy of Locke that the legislature was a were 
trustee of the sovereign people and has no right to enact law 
in derogation of the interest of the people, created a 
congenial atmosphere for judicial review. Colonial 
decisions, argument of Otis Hamilton Federalist, some Pre-
Marshall decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States 
of America all fostered a broader scope for judicial review 
of legislative Acts. 
The various events leading to the evolution of judicial 
review in the first period are: 
(a) In three colonial decisions between 1630 to 1776, 
Colonial Acts were declared void and unconstitutional by the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Premise upon 
which unconsti-tutionality was determined was that the 
1. Carl J. Fredrick, The Philosophy of Law in Historical 
Properties, Phoentx Broks . The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago 1965 p,78. 
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colonial legislature was subordinate to the British 
Parliament and any subordinate legislation enacted by the 
subordinate legislative body of the colonies in contravention 
of the Parliamentary Acts was void and unconstitutional. This 
colonial practice of judicial review afforded a background 
for the federal supreme court of America which assumed the 
power of judicial review. It appears that the colonial courts 
and on appeal, the Privy Council of England had the power to 
declare legislative acts void if in conflict with colonial 
charters. 
(b) The argument by James Otis at Boston in February 
1761 in the writs of Assistence case was a substantial step 
in the evolution of judicial review. The question involved 
was whether Panton and other British custom officials should 
be furnished with general search warrents enabling them to 
search smuggled goods. It was opposed for the Boston 
merchants mainly by Otis, who argued such an act of 
Parliament would be "against the Constitution" and "against 
natural equity" and therefore void. Crown says - "Otis 
doctrine met with a degree of success enough at least to make 
it a permanent memory with the men of the time"^. James Otis 
was Advocate - General under the Crown. He resigned his 
1. Edward S. Corwin, Doctrine of Judicial Review 
Peter Smith , 1963, p.31 
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office in 1761 in protest against the Writs of Assistence 
which authorised officers to enter any house without warrant 
to search for smuggled goods. He grounded his case on 
'natural right' and argued that any act of Parliament against 
this was automatically null and void. Marjorie G. Fribourg 
remarks - "Otis did not win his case, but he did win the 
ever-growing support of his countrymen"^. 
(c) The judge Gushing of Massachusetts on the eve of 
Decleration of Independence in 1776 charged a Massachusetty 
Jury to ignore certain acts of Parliament as void and inope-
rative on the Gokeian doctrine of Bonham's case (Rep.107,118) 
(1610) if the Parliament Act was against common right and 
reason. 
(d) The state courts in several cases declared state 
Acts void which were contrary to the State Gonstitution on 
the natural right" dictum of Coke. 
(e) In 1780 in the case of Holmes V. Walton the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey refused to carry out a State Act 
which was enacted in conflict with the provision of the state 
constitution. The state Act provided a trial of specified 
class of offenders by a jury of six where as the state 
constitution provided such trial by a jury of twelve. Thus 
the Act was enacted in direct conflict of the constitutional 
1. Marjoni G. Fribourg, The Bill of Rights, Macrae 
Company, Philadelphia"^ 1967 #p. 38 
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provision and intention^. 
(f) Justice Blair of the Virginia court of Appeals 
concurring with other Judges held in the case of Commonwealth 
V. Caton in 1782 - "that the court had power to declare any 
resolution or Act of the legislature, or either branch of it, 
to be unconstitutional and void". (Thayer - Cases in Consti-
2 tutional Law, Volume I, p.35) . 
(g) Travett V. Weeden was decided by the state 
Supreme Court in 1786, which held that the law was out of 
harmony with the Rhode Island Charter and therefore unconsti-
tutional. This decision also created a suitable background 
for future evolution of the doctrine of Judicial review. 
(h) Marshall spoke in the Virginia Ratifying Conven-
tion of 1787 urging to approve the constitution: "If they 
(Congress) were to make a law not warranted by any of the 
power enumerated, it would be considered by the Judges as 
infringement of the constitution which they are to guard. 
They are to guard. They would not consider such a law as 
coming under their jurisdiction. They would declared it 
1. Edward S. Corwin, American Constitutional History, 
Harper Torch Books, New York, 1964 ,p.lO 
2. Charles Austin Beard, The Supreme Court and the Constitu-
tion, Prentice Hall Inc., U.S.A., 1962 ,p.48 
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void"^. The creation of national supreme court in the United 
States of America from the very begining was intended to 
settle constitutional disputes regarding the 
constitutionality of legislative Acts either Congressional or 
enacted by the states. 
(i) In Bovrnicin V. Middleton, Bay (SC) 252 decided in 
1792 the South Carolinia Supreme Court declared an earlier 
colonial statute to have been void abinitio being controry to 
"Common Right" and Magna Carta". 
(j) In 1794 United States V. Yale Todd was decided by 
the Supreme Court of the United States of America in which 
Act of March 23, 1792 of Congress was declared 
unconstitutional. It is said that this was the first case in 
which the Supreme Court of America declared a statute of 
Congress unconstitutional and Marbury V. Madison was the 
second. 
(k) In 1796-1798 the Supreme Court gave the decisions 
asserting the powers of the court for judicial review. 
In 1796 Chief Justice Chase remarked in Hylton V. 
United States (3 Dall 171)- "It is unnecessary for me to 
determine whether the court constitutionally possesses the 
1. Samuel J. Konefsky, John Marshall and Alexander Hemilton, 
The Macmillon Company, New York, 1964 ,-p.84 
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power to declare an act of the Congress void on the ground of 
its being contrery to and in violation of the constitution, 
but if the court has such powers, I am free to declare it but 
in a clear case". 
In 1798 again Chief Justice Chase in Calder V. Bill 
3US, 386, 395 observed - "I will not decide any law to be 
void, but ,in a very clear case". 
(1) Madison when submitting the national constitution 
for ratification to state conventions said - "A law violating 
a constitution established by the people themselves would be 
considered by the judges as null and void". 
(m) The Federal Convention was much concerned with 
the problem of keeping of the powers of congress within cons-
titutional bounds. Chief Justice Marshall before he expressed 
his view on judicial review in Marbury V. Madison spoke in 
the capacity of a delegate to the Virginia Convention. "If 
they (the legislative) were to make a law not warranted by 
any of the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the 
judges as an infringement of the constitution which they are 
to guard. They would not consider such a law as coming under 
their jurisdiction. They would declare it void"^. 
1. Robert K. Carr, The Supreme Court and Judicial Review, 
Renehart & Company Inc., New York,1942.p ^ 
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It is now the confirmed majority view in America that 
the constitution - makers themselves intended judicial review 
of the legislative Acts and Constitutional Supermacy which 
was further strengthened by the interpretations of Hamilton, 
Marshall and Taney. 
Reviewing the constitutional literature in America on 
this point, it appears that judicial review of legislative 
Acts in the American Constitution was certainty. It unavoi-
dably needed. It progress was natural. Its tendency was 
inherent. Its application was the victory of democracy. Laski 
observed - "The Supreme Court by exercising this power of 
judicial review, is in fact a third chamber ' in United 
States" .. 
(ii) The Age of Marshall.(1801-1835) . 
John Marshall was appointed the fourth Chief Justice 
of America in 1801, and he continued in his exalted office 
till 1835. This was a glorious period in the American 
Constitutional history for the evolution of the doctrine of 
Judicial review. His historic decision in jVIarbury V. Madison^ 
was preceded by the famous judiciary debate in the senate in 
which the power of the judges for judicial reviewl was 
vigorously asserted. 
1. 1 Cr. 137 (1803). 
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In 1803 Marshall wrote the decision of Marbury V. 
Madison in which he declared that the legislature has no 
authority to make laws repugnant to the constitution and in 
the case of constitutional violation the court has absolute 
and inherent right to declare the legislative act void. By 
Marbury decision Marshall did not invent the system of 
judicial .review which was already in the process of 
evolution, but by this decision he strengthened the system to 
a remarkable extent^. Benard Schwartz says - "From a 
historical point of view Marbury V. Madison is of crucial 
importance as the first case establishing the power of the 
2 
Supreme Court to review constitutionality" . The system of 
judicial review thereafter became the integral part of the 
American constitutional jurisprudence. Marshall was 
threatened openly by the Republicans of ousting him from 
office if his verdict were to go in favour of judicial 
control of legislative Acts. The threat was also a threat of 
impeachment. The highest judiciary of the country was 
overawed by the political party. But Marshall had a great 
sense of nationalism and he posessed extra ordinary strength 
of mind and coolness of temper and without being perturbed by 
1. Fred V. Cahill, JR, Robert J. Steamber, The Constitution 
Cases and Comments, The Ronald Press, Company, 
New York,1959 ^ P-22 
2. Bernard Schwzarts, The Reins of Power, A constitutional 
History of the United States, Hill & Mang, New 
York, 1963 ' P-^ -^ -
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the threatening given to him he gave the solemn decision of 
Marbury V. Madison establishing constitutional supermacy. By 
his judicial decision he nurtured in the American mind a 
great unifying nationalism. 
Thus, Marshall brought to the supreme court of 
America a sense of dignity and honour. Jerre S. William 
remarks - " In case after case, he had been building the 
constitutional structure with consistent plan and 
imperishable materials. The political winds blew and always 
against him. But Marshall withstood and built on and on"^. 
On the whole, Marshall had a congenial back-ground 
for the establishment of judicial review through his 
constitutional decisions. The doctrine of judicial review 
established by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury V. Madison 
is still vibrant and its force stands unabated, although it 
has everbeen criticised. By 1803 judicial review had a long 
history in America. 
Marshall's theory of judicial review mostly depended 
upon his own personal view which he had held long before he 
became the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of America. But 
he was also inspired in his view by Alexender Hemilton who 
through his essay in 'the Federalist' (1788) had sought to 
1. Jerre S. Williams, The Supreme Court Speaks, Uni-
versity of Texas Press"^ 1956, p. 29 . 
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establish the theory of judicial review. Hamiltons concept of 
Judicial Review has become a source of great inspiration in 
the Indian constitutional working. Marshall after Hamilton 
played a very significant part in the development of American 
democracy through judicial review. 
The American Bav played a very substantial part in 
the development of the doctrine of judicial review and cons-
titutional interpretations were due to the able and vmstinted f 
co-operation given by the members of the bar who possessed 
extra-ordinary forensic-merits^. However, Marshall's concept 
of judicial review had a limited scope. His philosophy of 
judicial review was that a legislative Act in violation of 
the constitution was void. He did not envisage that even an 
arbitrary and unjust legislation would be considered to be 
the legislation against the will of the sovereign people for 
which the sovereign people did not delegate power to the 
legislature and as such the law should be void. This 
development took place later on the enactment of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
(iii) The Age of Taney (1835-1864) 
Marshall was succeeded by Taney as Chief Justice of 
1. Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison.The American Cons-
titution (Its Origins and Development) ^ W.W. Harton 
& Co.Inc., U.S.A., 1967 p.274 
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America. Chief Justice Taney also made a great contribution 
to the system of judicial review by upholding the supremacy 
of the constitution. He observed that "as the constitution is 
the fundamental and supreme law, it appears that an Act of 
Congress if not persuant to and within the limits of the 
power assigned to the Federal Government it is the duty of 
the courts of the United States to declare it 
unconstitutional"^. Chief Justice Taney was born in the tra-
dition of the landed aristocracy. His judicial career has two 
important features in the constitutional interpretation: 
(a) Extreme conservatism, and 
(b) Personal conviction in the judicial decisions. • 
In the Dredscott case he was much swayed by the 
social philosophy of the time which treated the slaves as 
chattels and declared the Missorie compromise Act of 1820 
void on the ground that it did not provide for compensation 
to the slave-owners for freeing the slaves. Taney on account 
of his conservatism did not allow the basic liberty to the 
slaves. 
Though the decision of Dredscaff case was against the 
nations spirit and Civil liberty it considerably advanced the 
cause of judicial review. Francis H. Heller traces the 
1. Dredscott V. Sanford, 19 How 393 (1857). 
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evolution of judicial review in three stages. The first stage 
according to him was the decision of Marbury V. Madison. The 
second stage in the development of the power of judicial 
review was reached in the Dredscott case decided in 1857. 
This case represented an important enlargement of the scope 
of judicial review over the doctrine of Marbury V. Madison. 
The court took up the task of determining whether congress 
has exercised power which the constitution had not delegated 
to it. The third stage in the development of judicial review 
starts with the emergence of the court's modern doctrine of 
Due Process of Law^. In Ableman V. Booth decided in 1859 
Taney enhanced the power of the Supreme Court. Chief Justice 
Taney observed - "No power is more clearly conferred by the 
constitution and laws of the United States, than the power of 
2 
this court (the Supreme Court)" . On the death of Taney 
congress refused to pass a bill providing funds for a Taney 
bust in the courtroom. Charles Summer spoke on the Senate 
floor - "He administered justice at least wickedly, and 
degraded the judiciary of the country, and degraded the 
age"^. But in recent years Taney's contribution to Judicial 
1. Francis H. Heller, Introduction to American Constitutional 
Law .-Harper & Brothers, Publishers, New York, 1952 ,p. 46 ' 
2. Ableman V. Booth, 21 How 506, 16 Le^.169 (1859). 
V 
3. Rocco J. Tresolini, Justice and the Supreme Court, 
Quotation of Charles Summer at p.8, J.B. Lippincott 
Company, Philadelphia, U.S.A.,1963. 
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Review has come into conspecious prominance. Eminent persona-
lities like Chief Justice Hughes and Chief Justice Warren 
eulogised the contribution of Taney to the field of 
constitutional jurisprudence. Rocco J. Tresolini remarks: 
"Recent Scholarship has demonstrated that Taney was a much 
better Chief Justice than his critics would have us 
believe"^. 
(iv) The Age of Judicial Constitution - Making (1865-1932). 
The fourth period began with the constitutional 
agitation, which brought into existence in 1868 the 
Fourteenth Amendment by which principle of Due Process of Law 
was introduced. The Fourteenth Amendment came into existence 
as a result of constant thinking and necessity. No one, 
infact, was wholly satisfied with the constitution. It was a 
patchwork of compromises, a delicate adjustment of checks and 
2 
balances " . The growing dissatisfaction with the 
constitution urged the United States Supreme Court to create 
a new constitutional horizon through judicial review. The 
year 1868 was a critical year in the development of the 
constitutional law of America. The phrase 'Due Process of 
Law' is an equivalent of the phrase "the law of the land" in 
1. Rocco J. Tresoline, Justice and the Supreme Court, p. 8 
Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, U.S.A., 1963. 
2. Nathan Schachner, The Founding Fathers, Capricorn 
Books, New York, 1961,p.5. 
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Magna Carta. In America the "Due Process of Law" became a 
bulwork against arbitrary legislation. It imposes a 
limitation upon all the powers of government legislative 
executive and judicial. Thus the Due Process clause was a 
great weapon for the enforcement of judicial review in 
America. G.G. Venkata Subba Rao says - "Due Process is thus a 
formula which means that a legislation would be struck down 
as unconstitutional if in the openion of the Supreme Court it 
imposes unreasonable restrictions upon vested rights or upon 
liberty"^. 
The Dredscott case decided by Chief Justice Taney had 
created great reaction in the minds of the American people 
and the Fourteenth Amendment introducing Due Process Clause 
was intended to give wider power to the Supreme Court in 
judicial review. 
2 
In 1874 the Supreme Court in Loan Association case 
adopted the Cokeian doctrine of Bonham's case that the 
statute was void being against common right and reason. It 
was doctrine different from Marshall's dictum of constitu-
tional supermacy. In the Cokeian doctrine adopted in Loan 
Association case the Judges had greater freedom in voiding a 
1. G.C. Venkata Subba Rao, Legal Pillars of Democracy, 
The Madras Law Journal Press Madras,1956 ,p.80 
2. Loan Association V. Topeka, 20 Wall 655.(1874)
34 
legislative Act. The doctrine of constitutional supermacy 
enunciated by Marshall and Taney demanded that a statute can 
be declared void and refused to be enforced only when it is 
repugnant to the constitution. But the Supreme Court of the 
United States of America in some later decisions have also 
taken the view that the legislative Acts which are arbitrary, 
unjust and anti-social are also void. These decisions are 
founded on the theory that the legislature is a mere agent of 
the people and as such the legislature has no authority to 
make such laws which are not for the public good. 
T 
In 1905 in Lochner's case the Supreme Court 
invalidated a New York statute which limited employment in 
Bank to a maximum of sixty hours a week and ten hours a day. 
The supreme court held that there was a deprivation of 
liberty without due process. In this case the objective 
standard of invalidating the statute was not the 
constitutional violation but arbitrary laws violating the 
personal liberty of a man and this was the guiding principle 
in many cases. 
The court's attention during the periods of Marshall 
and Taney was confined to the doctrine of the constitutional 
supermacy, expansion of Federal powers and strengthening of 
government and the expansion of trade and commerce etc. The 
1. Lockner V. New York, 198 US (1905). 
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individual liberty was ignored. But in this period the 
Supreme Court applied its mind in constitutional policy-
makingfor the safety of individual liberty. A number of laws 
dealing with the question of legal tender, child labour, 
minimum wages etc. were declared void. The Supreme Court 
took a wide view in voiding the legislative Acts. 
The period of judicial review from 1865-1932 was 
seriously engrossed with the policy-making and had a great 
impact on the American National System. The justices in 
deciding the questions of constitutionality of a legislative 
Act had to look to the social and economic conditions of the 
country in order to judge whether the statute is in 
confirmity with the constitution. The Judges of the Supreme 
Court of the United States of America in this period always 
attempted to go by the current of time and their decisions do 
not react merely the personal feelings of the judges but they 
are based on social and economic visions of the great country. 
(v) The Era of New Deal or the Period of Unconstitutionality 
(1933-36) 
Between January 7, 1935 and May 25, 1936, the Supreme 
Court of America declared 
acts of Congress unconstitutional 
in twelve decisions, dealing with the New Deal Legislation. 
Five entire Acts of the New Deal Legislation were declared 
uncostitutional. The speed of declaring the congressional 
Acts unconstitutional was abnormally high and alarming. The 
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previous history of declaring congressional and State Acts 
unconstitutional was most normal which did not cause any 
concern in the American life. But in the new deal period a 
new situation grew up and the unprecedented action of the 
Supreme Court in the process of judicial review evoked an 
alarming political sentiment causing a great concern to the 
President and it created an epoch in the history of judicial 
review of'America. 
President Roosevelt assumed his office on March 4, 
1933. America was in the grip of great depression when 
Roosevelt became President. He promised to take bold steps 
to end the depression. President Roosevelt introduced 
certain new legislative measures which were characterised as 
"New Deal" and it occupies an astounding position in the 
constitutional history of America. He said, "The New Deal 
implied a new order of thing designed to benefit the great 
mass of the farmers, workers and businessmen would replace 
the old order of special privilage".^ 
President Roosevelt was confident of success in his 
plan by his new socio-economic policy. A large number of 
Socio-Economic enactments in the field of industry, 
agriculture and labour were brought into existence to remove 
the economic depression. But out of ten New Deal measures 
the Supreme Court declared eight statutes unconstitutional. 
1. Louis E.Koening, The Chief Executive, Harrourt 
Brace & World, Inc., New York, 1964.,p"632 
37 
It is said that the court had wrecked the New Deal in the 
Shoals and Rocks of unconstitutionality, and by nullifying 
the New Deal measures the court destroyed the heart of the 
New Deal Programme. The Supreme Court held that New Deal 
measures were unconstitutional on the ground that they 
involved an unwarrantable use of the taxing powers of the 
Federal Government and violated the rights of the individual 
States. 
The supporters of the New Deal contended that the 
test laid down in Lochner case^ was to be rigidly applied in 
this period. The constitutional violation could not be the 
guiding principle. The test adopted was whether the 
legislation was arbitrary, unnecessary and unreasonable. It 
was asserted that the court assumed the legislative function 
and acted as "super legislature". But really the Court was 
dominated with the social feeling that the New Deal 
legislations vitally affected the economic liberty of the 
governed and they are vitally against the spirit of the cons-
titutional guartantee. 
(vi) The Court-packing Plan or the Year of Revenge ( 1937). 
President Roosevelt was re-elected in 1936 by the 
largest electoral majority. He had a great prejudice against 
those Judges of the Supreme Court who had opposed the New 
1. Lochner V. New York 19a U.b. 45(1.905). 
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Deal legislation. On February 5, 1937 he made his proposals 
to reorganise the judiciary, that is, to "pack the court". 
Six judges at that time were aged about 70. The President 
planned that if they did not retire, the Preisdent would 
increase the number of judges to fiteen by appointing six 
more judges. There were already three judges who were 
supporting the legislation. 
In'this connection the President openly stated that 
the old judges on account of their cloistered existence had 
lost with the spirit of the time and so he wanted retirement 
of judges who had reached the age of 70. 
The Court packing programme became very much 
debatable and could not go through. The Bar Association of 
America seriously opposed it by launching agitations against 
the plan and defended the judiciary. Alphens Thomas Mason 
says- "The Court packing plan itself left judicial power 
intact. The judicary retreated, it did not surrender."^ 
But inspite of all attempts to pack the court, 
Roosevelt failed to subjugate the judiciary. There was a 
great public agitation against the court-packing plan and the 
American people did not support this plan of President 
Roosevelt. 
1. Alphens Thomas Mason, Security Through Freedom, 
Cornell University Press, New York, 1955 ,, p.123. 
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But one thing is very significant. The court packing 
plan had a great slackening effect on the progress of 
judicial review in the United States of America^ as for 
several years no legislation of congress was invalidated by 
/ 
the Supreme Court. " Mean while, the Supreme Court began to 
find constitutional support for later New Deal Laws. No act 
of congress was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court from 1936 untile 1952"^. 
(vii) The New Era (1938 to the Present) 
From 1938 a new era emerged in the constitutional 
history of the United States of America. The remarkable 
feature of this period is that there grew up a tendency in 
the judicial atmosphere of the Supreme Court to show a great 
restraint in invalidating the laws either enacted by 
congress or the state legislatives. It is said that though 
the justices of the Supreme Court have not abrogated the 
power of judicial review, but there developed a marked change 
in their judicial approach. "The tendency of the court to 
uphold legislative enactment expansive of national power 
probably reflected judicial aguiescence in these policies 
rather than retirement from the umpire's role. In sum, the 
1. Raymond M. Lahr. & J. William Theis, Congress, 
Allyn & Bacon. Inc., U.S.A. 1967 , p-221 
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Supreme Court's policy of selective self-restraint, which has 
been so much in evidence since 1937, ought not be mistaken 
for abandonment of its determinative role as federal 
arbiter. For rather than an indication of abdication, such a 
policy is manifestation of the Supreme Court's continued 
exercise of the power as guardian of American federalism."^ 
The year 1954, is a remarkable year of the American 
Constitutional jurisprudence. On May 17, 1954 Chief Justice 
2 
Warren gave majority decision in Brown's case. It was in 
that year that the Supreme Court of America attempted to 
establish through the process of judicial review the long-
craved social equality. Thus in America in judicial review, 
the Judges have been mostly governed by the impulse of the 
time and the constitutionality of a legislative Act has been 
determined after consideration of the social, economic, 
religious and moral sentiments of the people. The period of 
Chief Justice Earl Warren is to be in gold in the annals of 
the Constitutional history of the world. 
In Ferguson's case the Supreme Court of America 
through Mr.Justice Black expressed the majority openion that 
the Supreme Court cannot strike down a law which is not in 
1. John R.Schmidhauser, The Supreme Court as Final Arbiter 
in Federal State Relations 1789-1957,' University of 
North Carolina Press, 1958 ; p.213 
2. Brown V. Board of Education of Topekha, 347US483 (1954). 
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violation of some specific constitutional prohibition. But 
Justice Black's view in the present American Society can not 
claim to have much effect on the judicial environment of the 
United States of America, and it also can not be claimed to 
be the representative view of the American Judicial 
temparament and environment. 
The Supreme Court of America in this new era though 
not consistent in opinion on some points, has functioned as 
the 'living voice of the Constitution', as Lord Bryce 
characterised it. "The Supreme Court is the Chief Protector 
of the constitution, of its great system of balances, and the 
people's liberties. It may have retreated even yielded to 
pressures now and then, but without its vigilance of 
liberties would scarcely have survived"^. 
l.Hewry J. Abraham, The Judicial Process, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1962 ,p,327 
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MARBURY Vs MADISON 
The institution of judicial review is attributed to 
Chief Justice John Marshall of U.S. Supreme Court who for the 
first time laid it down in Marbury V. Madison^. The 
circumstances in which that decision was given were somewhat 
remarkable' and require a brief analysis. Marshall belonged 
to the Federalist party and was Secretary of state in the 
Cabinet of President Adams, who succeeded Washington as the 
President of the United States. He was nominated by President 
Adams to the additional office of Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court in January, 1801. He held both offices during 
the final weeks of the Adams administration. In November, 
1800, Adams was defeated in the Presidential election and 
Jefferson, author of the decleration of American Independence 
and leader of the Republican party was elected as President. 
The Federalists who had been the ruling party in control of 
the destiny of the country till then faced a future in which 
the country was no longer to be theirs to rule. They still 
had a card uptheir sleeves. Untill the inauguration of the 
New President on 4th March, Adams would still be President 
and congress would still be Federalist. Congress hastily set 
about providing for the future of many faithful Federalists. 
Following a plan of Hemilton the mastermind of the 
1. (1803) 1 Cranch 137=2L.Ed.60. 
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Federalists, they passed a law creating many new Federal 
Districts courts. The Judges were to be appointed for life, 
so that they could not be removed by the incoming Republican 
administration. As Jefferson, still sitting at the head of 
the Senate pointed out there were at that time already more 
Federal Courts than the country needed, but that had nothing 
to do with ohe plan. The main purpose was to fill the new 
posts with Federalists. The law was hurriedly passed and the 
judges were appointed. Time was passing swiftly and by the 
evening of 3rd March, several of the commissions had not yet 
been signed. Late into the night. Chief Justice Marshall, 
acting as Secretary of state, sat at his desk filling out 
the commissions and signing them. Jefferson chose Levi 
Lincoln as his Attorney - General, gave him his watch and 
ordered him to take possession of the state Department on the 
stroke of midnight when Jefferson would become President. At 
midnight, Lincoln dramatically entered Judge Marshall's 
office. "I have been ordered by President Jefferson" he said 
solemnly" to take possession of the office and its papers". 
"Why, Mr. Jefferson has not yet qualified," exclaimed that 
startled Chief Justice and Secretary of State. "It is not yet 
twelve O'clock" and he draw out his watch. Thereupon Levi 
Lincoln drew out his and showed it to Marshall. "This is the 
President's watch", he said," and rules the hour." 
John Marshall looked longingly at the unfinished 
commission on his desk. But in his pocket he had a few of the 
commissions and the men who finally received them were called 
"John Adams, midnight Judges". Among papers left on the table 
were seventeen commissions as Justices of the Peace, which 
had been duly sealed by John Marshall as Secretary of State. 
John Madison, the new Secretary of state refused to deliver 
them after the close of the Adams administration. William 
Marbury was one of these midnight appointees and he brought 
an action invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court to secure a writ of mandamus to compel Madison to 
deliver his commission. The writ of mandamus was the usual 
remedy to compel executive officers to perform ministerial 
acts. Thus arose the case of Marbury V. Madison^, the most 
famous case in American Judicial annals. 
Marshall made up his mind to give effect at the 
earliest opportunity to the power of judicial review 
proclaimed by the Federalists. That opportunity came to him 
in Marbury V.Madison. It might be supposed that John Marshall 
who as Secretary of state had been responsible for the 
failure to deliver the commission, would refuse to sit on the 
case because of his personal connection weith 
it.Nevertheless, with characteristic boldness, he proceeded 
to seize the opportunity believing as he did that 
constitutional opportunity knocked but once. He held, first, 
1. (1803) 1 Cranch 137=2L.Ed.60. 
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that Marbury had a right to the Commission because the 
appointment was legally completed with the signing and 
sealing of the commission and that the Government was acting 
illegally in withholding it. Secondly^ he held that mandamus 
was unquestionably the appropiate remedy. Thirdly, he held 
that under S.B of the Judiciary Act of 1789, invoked by 
Marbury, the Court had been expressly granted jurisdiction to 
issue the writ of mandamus to any person holding office under 
the authority of the United States and so to the Secretary of 
State who definitely came within that description. He then 
proceed to observe that "if this court is not authorized to 
issue a writ of mandam'U3 to such an officer, it must be 
because the law is unconstitutional and so void". He than 
argued that the constitution prescribed specifically the 
Supreme Courts' original jurisdiction, that this jurisdiction 
did not include the power to issue .writ of mandamus to 
federal officers and that congress had no power to alter this 
juridiction. Therefore, the attempt of congress in the 
judiciary Act of 1789 to give the supreme court authority to 
issue writs of mandamus to public officers" appears not to be 
warranted by the constitution". Consequently, Marbury's 
application for a mandamus was dismissed. Thus while the 
application before the court was dismissed, an Act of 
congress, the supreme legislative body of the nation, had be 
pronounced unconstitutional and void. John Marshall had 
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proclaimed the power of judicial review while deciding 
immediate issue in favour of the administration. In order to 
appreciate fully the origin of the doctrine of judicial 
review, it would be better to reproduce the openion of Chief 
Justice John Marshall in Marbury V. Madison (1803) which runs 
as under: 
"The question whether an Act repugnant to the consti-
tution can become the law of the land, is a question deeply 
interesting tp the United gtates) but, happily, not of an 
int^ieaey proportioned to iti interegt., it seems only 
necepaary to recognise certain principles, supposed to have 
been long and well-established, to decide it. That the people 
have an original right to establish, for their future 
government, such principles as, in their openion, shall most 
conduse to their happiness, is the basis on which the whole 
American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this 
original right is a very great exertion; nor can it; nor 
ought it to be frequently repeated. The principles, 
therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental and as the 
authority from which they proceed is supreme, and can seldom 
act they are designed to be permanent. 
"This original and supreme will organise the 
government and assigns to different departments their 
respective powers. It may either stop here, or establish 
certain limits not to be transcended by those departments. 
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The government of the United States is of the latter 
description. The powers of the legislature are defined and 
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or 
forgotton, the constitution is written. To what purpose are 
powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation 
committed to writing if these limits may, at any time, be 
passed by those intended to be restrained. The distinction 
between a government with limited and unlimited powers is 
abolished, if those limits do not confi-ne the persons on whom 
they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are 
of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be 
contested that the constitution controls any .legislative act 
repugnant to itj; or that the legislature may alter the 
constitution by an ordinary act. 
"Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. 
The constitution is either a superior paramount law 
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with 
ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable 
when the legislature shall please to alter it. If the former 
part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act 
contrary to the constitution is not law; if the latter part 
be true, then written constitutions are absurbed attempts, on 
the part of the people to limit a power, in its own nature, 
illimitable 
"Certainly, all those who have framed written 
constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and 
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paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of 
every such government must be, that an act of the legislature 
repugnant to the constitution is void. This theory is 
essentially attached to a written constitution, and is, 
consequently, to be considered, by this court, as one of the 
fundamental principles of our society. It is not, therefore, 
to be lost sight of in the further consideration of this 
subject. 
"If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the 
constitution, is void, does it, not withstanding its 
invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it 
effect? or ir^  other words though it be not law, does it 
constitute a rule as operative as if it v^ as a law? This would 
be to overthrow, in fact, what was established in theory, and 
would see at first view, an absurdity too gross to be 
insisted on. 
"It shall, however, receive a more attentive 
consideration. 
"It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply 
the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and 
interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, 
the courts must decide on the operation of each. So, if a law 
be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and 
constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court 
must either decide that case, conformably to the law, 
disregarding the constitution, or conformably to the 
consitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine 
which of these conflicting rules governs the case; this is 
the very essence of judicial duty. If then the courts are to 
regard the constitution and constitution is superior to any 
ordinary act of the legislatures the constitution, and not 
such ordidnary act, must govern the case to which they both 
apply. 
"Those then who controvert the principle that the 
constitution is to be considered in court as a paramount law, 
are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must 
close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law. 
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all 
written constitutions. It would declare that an act which 
according to the principles and theory of our government is 
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entirely void, is yet, in practice, completely obligatory. It 
would declare that if the legislature shall do what is 
expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express 
prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to 
the legislature a practical and real omnipottence, with the 
same breath which professes to restrict their powers within 
narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that 
those limits may be passed at pleasure. That it thus reduces 
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to nothing, what we have deemed the greatest improvement on 
political institutions,' a written constitution, would, of 
itself, be sufficient, in America, where written 
constitutions have been viewed with so much reverence for 
rejecting the construction 
"There are many other parts of the constitution which 
serve to illustrate this subject. It is declared that no tax 
or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state' . 
Suppose a duty on the export of cotton, of tabacco, or of 
flour; and a suit instituted to recover it. Ought judgement 
to be rendered in such a case? Ought the judges to close 
their eyes on the constitution, and only see the law. 
"No person' says the constitution' shall be convicted 
of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the 
same overt act, or on confession in open court. 
"Here, the language of the constitution is addressed 
specially to the courts. It prescribes directly for them a 
rule of evidence not to be departed from. If the legislature 
should change that rule and declare one witness or a 
confession out of court, sufficient for conviction, must the 
constitutional principle yield to the legislative act? 
"Frome these and many other selections which might be 
made, it is apparent that the framers of the constitution 
contemplated that instrument as a rule for the government of 
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courts, as well as of the legislature. 
"It is also not entirely unworthy of observation that 
in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the 
constitution itself is first mentioned: and not the laws of 
the U.S. generally but those only which shall be made in 
pursuance of the constitutions have that rank. 
"Thus the particular phraseology of the constitution 
of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, 
supposed to be essential to all the written constitutions, 
that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that 
courts as well as other departments are bound by that 
instrument". 
C H A P T E R 
NATURE OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
T 
V? 
O 
Emergence of Judicial Review in India. 
Judicial Review under the Constitution of India 
Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendment. 
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EMERGENCE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN INDIA 
The land-mark decision of Chief Justice John Marshall 
in Marbary v. Madison (1803) thus established fully and 
finally the doctrine of judicial review as a necessary coro-
llary of a written constitution. Since our constitution is 
also a written federal constitution like that of the United 
States, it applies with equal forces under our constitution 
also. For this reason "if the courts in this country face up 
to such important and none too easy task, it is not out of any 
desire to tilt at legislative authority in a crusader's 
spirit, but in discharge of a duty plainly laid upon them by 
the Constitution". So observed Patanjali Sastri, J., in State 
ofMadras v. V.G. Rao^. Mr.Justice H.R. Khanna, former Judge 
of the Supreme Court of India has in his book "Judicial Review 
or Confrontation" made the following remarks in this connec-
tion. 
"Judicial review has thus become an integral part of 
our constitutional system and a power has been vested in the 
High Court and the Supreme Court to decide about the 
2 constitutional validity of the provisions of Statutes" . 
1. (1952) S.C.R 597=(1952) S.C.J.253= A.I.R.1952 S.C.196. 
2. Constitutional Law of India, Vol.II,(1976) p.1200. 
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According to Dr.M.P.Jain, the Indian Constitution 
expressly provided for the doctrine of judicial review in 
Articles 13, 32, 131 to 136, 143, 226 and 246 which in the 
words of Sri M.C. Stalvad^ is the outstanding feature of our 
constitution. 
The laws may be declared to be invalid if they are 
violative of fundamental rights is clear from Article 13 of 
the Constitution. Kania, C.J., in A.K. Gopalan v. State' 
observes: ^^ 'he inclusion of Art. 13(1) and (2) in the Consti-
tution appear to be a matter of abundant caution. Even in 
their absence if any of the fundamental rights was infringed 
by any legislative enactment, the court has always the power 
to declare the enactment to the extent it transgrusses the 
limits invalid'^ 
The doctrine of Judicial review is not revelation to 
the modern world, ^ n India the concept of judicial review is 
founded on the Rule of Law which is the proud heritage of the 
ancient Indian culture and traditions. Only in the method of 
working of judicial review and its form of application there 
have been characteristic charges, but the basic philosophy 
upon which the doctrine of judicial review hinges is the same. 
In the modern world also where the doctrine of judicial 
1. (1950) S.C.R.88= A.I.R.1950 S.C.27=(1950) S.C.J.174. 
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review hinges is the same. In the modern world also where the 
doctrine of judicial review prevails, the system of its 
working and the method of its application are dissimilar in 
different countries. The basic idea of judicial review is 
that law should be the generator of peace, happiness and 
harmony the rule has no legal authority to inflict pain, 
torture and tyranny on the ruled and to usurp the basic rights 
of freedom and liberty of the people which are rooted in the 
ancient Indian civilization and culture. The fundamental 
object of judicial review is to assure the protection of 
rights, avoidence of their violation, socio-economic uplifts 
and to alert the legislature to be in conformity with the 
constituion. In ancient India such spirit was prevalent. 
The ancient Indian concept of law is that law is the 
king of kings and nothing can be higher than law by whose aid 
even the weak may prevail over the strong. The vedic concept 
of sovereignty was that the state was trust and the monarch 
was the trustee of the people. The address of the people to 
the monarch at the time of coronation and the reply of the 
conseerated king to his people on the occasion of Abhishekha 
(coronation) embodied in the Yayurveda reveals the concept of 
ideal kingship and the democratic concept of law and order 
which is enshrined in the doctrine of judicial review. Thus 
the spirit of judicial review can be drawn from the funda-
mer^tal concept of law and goverance which required ancient 
India. 
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In all history no republic had as rich a heritage of 
the system of judicial review as in India. The nascent Repub-
lic of India possessed enormous sources, materials and prece-
dents from its own as well as from several other countries 
which afforded it magnificent opportunity to build up a unique 
tradition for a new democracy based on constitutional super-
macy. The roots of judicial review go long back into ancient 
India, ancient and medieval Europe, pre-Revolution England, 
and into Colonial and Post-Constitution regimes in the United 
States of America and of certain other countries which had a 
heritage of judicial review from United States, such as Canada 
Australia, Ireland, Japan etc. 
In ancient India the Rule of Law had a firm stand 
which meant that the law was above the ruler and that the 
government had no constitutional authority to enforce any 
arbitrary or tyrannical law against the governed. Thus the 
people of ancient India visualised and cherished the supermacy 
of law and not the supermacy of the king. 
In the colonial courts the legality of law in several 
instances, was vehemently challenged on the basis of the 
principle enunciated by Chief Justice Coke. Subsequently, the 
United States of America not by any specific and clear provi-
sion in the Constitution but by judicial precedents created 
before the world a new pattern of democracy and demonstrated 
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to the world that judicial review could act as a potent and 
powerful check on democracy against degenerating into auto-
cracy and submitting to a rule of tyranny. India was wiser in 
incorporate into the Constitution itself the provision of 
judicial review and by this method India has established a 
Constitution which has its individuality and uniqueness in so 
far as it lays down new standards of constitutional rule in 
the modern ' world. Chief Justice Patanjali Sastri of the 
Supreme Court of India remarked- "while the court naturally 
attaches a great weight to the legislative judgement it can 
not desert its own duty to determine finally constitutionality 
of an impugned statute^. 
The Indian Courts had authority to determine consti-
tutionality of legislative acts. In Empress v. Burah and Book 
2 
Singh the Calcutta High Court held that a particular 
legislative enactment of the Governor-General in Council was 
in excess of the authority given to him by the Imperial 
Parliament and therefore invalid. The Privy Council held on 
appeal that the enactment was within the legal power of the 
council and therefore valid, but the jurisdiction of the High 
Court of Calcutta to consider whether the legislation of the 
Governor— General was or was not constitutional was not . 2 questioned by the Privy Coucnil . 
1. Empress v. Burah and Book Singh, I^.L.R. 3 Cal.63 (1877). 
2. The Queen v. Burah 1878, 3 App. Cases 889. 
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A historical interpretation of constitutional evolu-
tion of India becomes necessary in order to appreciate the 
growth, functioning and practical operation of judicial 
review. The system of judicial review in India is not an 
event of sudden emergence but it has a gradual evolution which 
predominantly depended on the constitutional thoughts and 
ideas in the different stages of the constitutional evolution 
in India. The enactment of Government of India Act, 1858 to 
the Government of India Act 1935, the Indian legislature was 
subordinate to the English Parliament and any legislative Acts 
in India in contravention of the Parliamentary directions and 
restrictions were void. By the Government of India Act of 
1935 federalism was introduced which led to the expansion of 
the concept of judicial review in India. From 1885, when the 
Indian National Congress was established, to the inauguration 
of the Indian Republic there were constant and vigorous agita-
tions for the establishment of federalism and for the state 
recognition of fundamental rights. India which had the 
heritage of the Rule of Law from ancient India acted strenu-
ously and assiduously towards establishing the judicial 
control of the legislative powers. As a result the provisions 
for judicial review were incorporated in the Constitution 
itself. 
The various stages of evolution of judicial review in 
India are as fllows:-
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(i) 1858 :- Government of India Act of 1858 imposed some 
restrictions of the powers of the Governor-General in Council 
in enacting laws, but such power only by implication. 
(ii) 1861 :-The Indian Councils Act of 1861 provided that 
the measures passed by the Governor-General legislative 
council were not to become valid unless the assent of the 
Governor-General was received. It also contained constitu-
tional restrictions against the making of any law or regula-
tion which might have the effect of repealing or in any way 
affecting the provisions of the Indian Council Act. The 
provision to Section 22 of the Indian Council Act 1861 lays 
down constitutional restrictions in framing laws which reads: 
"Provided always that the said Governor-General 
Council shall not have the power of making any 
law or regulations which shall repeal or in any 
way affect any of the provisions of this act.... „1 
(iii) 1877;- The case of Emperor v. Burab and Book Singh 
ILR^ Cal.63(1877) was decided in the Calcutta High Court in 
which it was held that the aggrieved party had right to 
challenge the constitutionality of a legislative Act enacted 
by the Governor-General in Council in excess of the power 
given to him by the Imperial Parliament. 
1. A.C. Benerjee, Indian Constitutional Document, volume Two, 
p.41. A Mukherjee & Co.Private Ltd., 1961. 
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(iv) 1913;- Lord Haldane in 1913 in a Privy Council case 
laid dovm that the Government of India can not by legislation 
take away the right of the Indian subject conferred by the 
Parliament Act i.e. Government of India Act of 1858^. 
(v) 1918 :- Abdur Rahim, officiating Chief Justice of 
the Madras High Court relying on the Privy Council case 
decision observed in 1918 in a Special Bench case of Madras 
High Court that there was a fundamental difference between 
the legilslative powers of the Imperial Parliament and the 
authority of the Subordinate Indian legislature. Any enact-
ment of the Indian legislative in excess of the delegated 
powers or in violation of the limitation imposed by the 
2 Imperial Parliament will null and void . 
(vi) 1930: - Col. K.N; Haskar and K.N. Pannikar wrote in 
their book 'Federal India' that the Supreme Judicial autho-
rity in India should be invested with the power to declare 
ultra vires, measures which would go against the Constitu-
tion^ . 
(vii) 1935; - Government of India Act of 1935 which came 
into operation on December 6, 1937 embodied a federal Consti-
tution. It was impliedly empowered to pronounce judicially 
1. Secretary of State v. Moment, ILR 40 Cal.391 (1913). 
2. Annie Besant v. Government of Madras A.I.R. 1918 Mad.1210 
at pp.1232-1233. 
3. Colonel K.N. Hasker & K.M. Pannikkar, Federal India, 
Martin Hopkinson Ltd, London, 1930, p.147. 
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upon the validity of the Statues, though there was no speci-
fic provision for the same. Sir Brojender Mitter, Advocate-
General of India in his address to the judges of the Federal 
Court on the occasion of its inauguration said that the func-
tion of the Federal Court would be to expound and define the 
provisions of the Constitution Act, and as guardian of the 
Constitution to declare the validity or invalidity of the 
Statutes passed by the legislatures in India . 
The Federal Court of India vigorously worked for more 
than a decade wisdom and dignity and by various constitu -
tional decisions, it developed and brightened the constitu-
tional atmosphere of the country from which the makers of 
Present Constitution received abundant inspiration and light. 
M.C. Setalvad, the first Attorney-General of India spoke on 
January 28, 1950, on the occasion of the inauguration of the 
Supreme Court of India . "The main function of the Court 
(Federal Court) was the interpretation of the constitution 
Act of 1935 and the resolving of the constitutional dis-
putes"^. 
The Federal Court treated the Constitution of India 
as a living organism. The Federal Court through various 
constitutional decisions created a congenial constitutional 
atmosphere in India which developed a background for the 
1. (1939) Federal Court Reports, p.4. 
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growth of the constitutional jurispedence in the present set-
up of the constitutional Government. 
The British Parliament introduced Federal Constitu-
tion by enacting the Government of India Act of 1935. The 
Central as well as the State Legislatures were given plenary 
powers in the sphere allotted to them. Wide legislative 
power to the Central as well as State Legislatures were 
provided. The legislatures under the Government of India Act 
were not the delegates of the British Parliament. They were, 
in their subjects alloted to them, as supreme as the British 
Parliament. 
The Federal Court was introduced by the Government of 
India Act of 1935 to function as an arbiter in the Central 
and State relationship and to scrutinise the violation of the 
constitutional directions regarding the distribution of the 
powers on the introduction of federalism in India. It was 
highly essential to have an independent and impartial supe-
rior court to maintain balance between the centre and the 
provinces. The powers of judicial review were not 
specifically provided in the constitution, but the constitu-
tion being federal, the federal court was entrusted impliedly 
with the function of interpreting the constitution and to 
determine the constitutionality of legislative Acts. A large 
number of cases cropped up involving the question of the 
validity of the legislative Acts. The question of repugnancy 
6 2 
was one of the main topics of decision before the Federal 
court and the Privy Council. Maurice Gwyer C.J. of the 
Federal Court of India observed. "We must again refer to 
the fundamental proposition ennuciated in (1878) 3 A.C. 889 
(Reg. V. Burah) that Indian Legislatures within their own 
sphere have plenary powers of legislation as large and of 
the same nature as those of Parliament itself. It it was 
true in 1878, it cannot be less true in 1942"^. But the 
court's power to examine the constituionality of a statute 
under the Government of India Act of 1935 became rather 
very much widened. The Rt. Hon'ble Sir Lyman Duff, Chief 
Justice of Canada in his message to the inauguration of the 
Federal Court of India said- "while in exercising one of ' 
its great primary functions, the interpretation of the 
Indian Constitution the court will pronounce judicially 
upon the validity of the statute as well as of administra-
tive act".^ 
During the span of a decade of their career as cons-
titutional interpreters the Federal Court and the High 
Courts of India reviewed the constitutionality of a large 
number of legislative Acts with fully judicial self-restra-
int insight and ability. The Supreme Court of India as the 
successor of the Federal Court intented the great traditions 
built by the Federal Court^. Thus though there was no speci-
1. Bhola Prasad v. Emperor,A.I.R.1942 FC17,At P 20, Col.2. 
2. 1939 F.C.R., Message to the Inauguration of the Federal 
Court of India by Rt.Hon'ble Sir Lyman Duff, Chief 
Justice of Canada, p.2. 
3. M.V.Pylee, The Federal Court of India, P.C.Manaklal & 
Sons Pvt.Ltd., Bombay, 1966, p,327. 
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fic provision for judicial review in the Government of India 
Act of 1935 the constitutional problems arising before the 
court necessitated the adoption of judicial review of legis-
lative Act in a wider perspective. This is a natural pheno-
menon where the sovereignty of legislature is not absolute. 
(viii) 1950;- The Republican Constitution of India, adopted 
in 1950, which has specifically provided for judicial review 
regarding the infringement of fundamental rights and the 
Indian Courts have powers of judicial review regarding cons-
titutional violations of the distribution and seperation of 
powers and other constitutional restrictions. Art 13, 32 and 
226 expressly provide for and envisage judicial review. 
Under the Constitution of India, 1950, the scope of 
judicial review has been extremely widened. The Courts in 
India, in the present democratic setup, are the most powerful 
organ for scrutinising the legislative lapses. The spirit of 
protection of individual liberty and freedom yielded a great 
influence on the constitutional agitationists in India. The 
ancient Indian heritage is rooted in the constitution of 
India, 1950, in which are enshrined the various provisions of 
individual liberty and freedom against the state. Under the 
impact of ancient Indian heritage the constitution of India 
of 1950 evolved a unique system of judicial review. 
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The Constitution of India envisage a very healthy 
system of judicial review and it depends upon the Indian 
Judges to act in a way as to maintain the spirit of democracy^ 
In the present democratic set up in India, the court cannot 
adopt a passive attitude and ask the aggrieved party to wait 
for public openion against legislative tyranny, but the 
Constitution has empowered it to play an active role and to 
declare a legislation void and may refuse to enforce it, if 
violates the Constitution. Glanville Austin's historical 
analysis regarding the introduction of the provisions of 
judicial review in the Constitution of India of 1950 is note-
worth . 'the judiciary was to be an arm of the social revolu-
tion upholding the equality that Indians had longed for 
during colonial days, but had not gained not simply because 
the regime was colonial, and perforce repressive, but largely 
because the British had feared that social change would 
endanger their rule .... The courts were also idealized 
because as guardians of the Constitution they would be 
expression of the new law created by Indians for Indians.... 
judicial review. Assembly members believed, was an essential 
power for the courts of a free India, with a federal consti-
tution"^. *The word of the constitution is supreme in India 
1. Glanville Austin, The Indian Constitution-Cornor Stone of 
a Nation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1966, pp.164-165. 
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and the legislative and executive Acts to be valid will have 
to conform to it. The only agency capable of upholding the 
supermacy of the Constitution being the national judiciary, 
the process of judicial review is expected to play a no mean 
J 
role in the working and development of the Constitution^. 
The remark is amply justified. The Indian Judges have enough 
power under the Constitution to declare a legislation void if 
it is in 'violation of the Constitution or if the law is 
highly tyrannous and arbitrary against the intention of the 
Constitution and the sovereign people. Much depends upon the 
way the court approaches the matter and the degree of self-
restraint the court exercise. The Constitution does not 
limit the powers of the Indian' Court in the matter of judi-
cial review but the constitution has left the matter entirely 
on the dignity and rational thinking of the courts. 
1. Girdhari Lai, A Critical Study of the Constitution of 
India, The Indian Press (Publications Ltd.,Allahabad,1954) 
p.10. 
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JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE CONSTITOTION OF INDIA 
Judicial review is the process applied by the court 
to determine the constitutionality of legislative Act, Ordi-
nance or customs having the force of law if enacted or having 
come into existence against the consitutiional directions 
intention, prohibitions and limitations. The court has right 
to declare such law, ordinance or custom void and to refuse 
its enforcement. The legislature has to work under consti-
tutional limitations. The legislature may not be able to 
decipher its own lapses free from bias and as such it is the 
constitutional policy that the court being an independent and 
impartial body is the best legal authority to scrutinise the 
validity of any legislative Act. 
The Indian Constitution of 1950 is a unique institu-« 
tion and a model in itself, which might be a matter of emula-
tion for other nations in framing their constitution. India 
has a written constitution with specific provisions for judi-
cial review. The fundamental rights have been specifically 
guaranteed in Part-Ill of the Constitution, and in Part IV 
the Directive principles of the state policy have been enume-
rated in fifteen articles. Article 37, which is in Part IV 
lays down that the provisions contained in Part-IV shall not 
be enforceable by any court, but the principles embodied 
therein are nevertheless fundamental in the goverance of the 
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country and it shall be the duty of the state to apply these 
principles in making laws. The articles of Part IV are very 
helpful in the interpretation of the Articles on the 
fundamental rights. Judicial review is the corner-stone of 
liberty and freedom and so the constitution-makers have 
incorporated specific provisions for judicial review in the 
conscitution of India. 
The nation grows with a good constitution and a good 
constitution envolves a good and effective system of judicial 
review. The relationship between the democratic written 
constitution and judicial review is inseparable. In the 
democratic federal state the nation prospers because of an 
efficacious system of judicial review. Since the existence 
of the system of Judicial review has an intensive and benefi-
cial impact on the evolution of a good constitution, recipro-
cally the existence of a good constitution has similar impact 
on the growth of a better and efficient system of judicial 
review. 
In India, judicial review is a process having the 
explicit sanction of the Constitution. Underlining this 
aspect of the matter, the Supreme Court stated in Madras v. 
Row that the constitution contains express provisions for 
judicial review of legislation as to its conformity with the 
Constitution and that the courts "face up to such important 
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and none too easy task" not out of any desire "to tilt at 
legislative authority in a erusader's spirit, but in dis-
charge of a duty plainly laid upon them by the constitu-
tion"^. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Gopalan. "In 
India it is the Constitution that is supreme" and that 
"statute law to be valid, must in all cases be in confirm!ty 
with the constitutional requiremencs and it is for the 
judiciary to decide whether any enactment is constitutional 
or not" and if a legislature transgresses any constitutional 
limits,the court has to declare the law unconstitutional "for 
2 
the court is bound by its oath to uphold the constitution." 
Therefore, the courts in India cannot be accused of usurping 
the function of constitutional adjudication, it is a function 
which has been imposed on them by the constitution. It is a 
delicate task, the courts may even find it embarrassing at 
times to discharge it, but they cannot shirk their constitu-
tional responsibility. 
Just after the Constitution of India of 1950 came 
into force the Calcutta High Court in a Special Bench case 
gave a memorable decision by which the entire Bengal Criminal 
Amendment Act of 1930 was declared void. The court held-
"The legislatures in his country have only those powers of 
legislation which are bestowed upon them by the Constitution 
1- A-I-R. 1952 S.C. 196, 199. 
2. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, A.I.R., 1950,SC 27 
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Act. If they pass an Act in excess of these powers, the Act 
becomes void to that extent. Under our constitution, the 
court i.e., the judiciary is to decide this and no body else. 
We recognise that great powers necessarily involve grave 
responsibilities but we are not dismayed. Amidst the student 
clamour of political strife and the tumult of the clash of 
the conflicting classes we must remain impartial. This court 
is no respector of persons and its endeavour must be to 
ensure that above this clamour and tumult, the strong Calan 
voices of justice shall always be heard".^ This view of the 
Calcutta High Court has been echoed in the several decisions 
of the Supreme Court and the High Courts of different states. 
In 1958 even the law commission adopted the same view - "The 
constitution in express terms requires the courts to act as a 
supervisory body in the matter of laws alleged to encroach 
upon the exercise of fundamental rights. The line as to how 
far a law shall go in derogation of the citizens fundamental 
rights is, according to the constitution, to be drawn by none 
2 other than the judiciary". 
The judiciary in free India thus showed a great 
promise in its constitutional career in preserving the 
liberty and freedom of the people. But in subsequent years a 
perceptible change in the judicial thinking came which was 
1. Sunil Kumar v. West Bengal Government, A.I.R.1950 Calcutta 
SB, Paras 3,4 and 33, p.274. 
2. Law Commission Report, Dated 26.9.1958, para 7, volume II, 
p.b/4. 
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noticed by the eminent jurists with great concern. M.C. 
Setalvad, Ex-Attorney General of India has observed- "The 
history of the court's attitude in regard to the interpreta-
tion of Article 14 seems to present a reserve picture"^. 
Having started in Anwar Ali Sarkar's case with a bold asser-
tion of the doctrine of equality, later decisions have, in 
the guise of geographical and other kinds of classification, 
greatly diluted the citizen's right under Article 14. 
A similar tendency has been apparant in the interpre-
tation of Articles 32 and 226. The right to approach the 
court guaranteed by Article 32 received recognition in the 
amplest measure in early decision of ,the court. Later, the 
decisions in Daryao's case and in Ujjambai's case have sought 
to restrict the scope of both the articles 32 and 226 of the 
constitution. But again by the majority decision of Golak-
2 
nath's case the Supreme Court has resurrected partially the 
fundamental rights of the citizen of India which were eclip-
sed by the constitutional amendments. In judicial review the 
Judges have to maintain balance between Union or State autho-
rity on the one hand and the liberty and prestige of the 
citizen on the other and also between the rule of the 
majority and the rights both relational and fundamental of 
the individuals. 
1. M.C. Setalvad, Foreward to N.C. Chatterjee's Judicial 
Review and Fundamental Rights under the Constitution of 
India, Bhardwaj Publication, Gandhinagar, Banglore 9,1965. 
2. Golaknath v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1967, S.C.1643, 
pp.85-86. 
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Under the Constitution of 1950 judicial review 
assumed an important role in Indian democracy. Its working 
under the present Constitution of India, is a real protection 
of liberty and freedom of the people. Some Indian writers 
have observed that the scope of judicial review in India is 
very limited and the Indian Courts do not enjoy as wide 
jurisdiction as do courts in America. In their openion it is 
due to the,'Due Process' clause that the American Courts have 
wider rope^ in India the scope of judicial review in narrower^ 
But it does not appear to be in consonance with the spirit of 
the Indian Constitution. The Chapter on fundamental rights 
itself is so vast that fresh avenues of judicial review shall 
always continue to emerge. The changing social and economic 
standards and ideals generate new openings for judicial review 
under the constitutional working and it is very difficult to 
assign a limit to its exhaustion. 
The Indian Constitution is a federal structure. 
Sovereignty is distributed between the Union and the states 
2 
with greater weightage in favour of the Union . The super-
macy of the Constitution is protected by the authority of an 
independent judicial body to act as an interpreter of a 
1. (i) M.C.J.Kagzi, The Constitution of India, Metropolitans, 
Delhi, 1958. 
(ii)M.V. Pylee, Constitutional Government in India, Asia 
Publishing House, Bombay, 1965. 
(iii) Umakant Tewari, The Making of the Indian Constitu-
tion, Central Book Dept.,Allahabad,1967, p.501. 
2. State of West Bengal v. Union of India, A.I.R.1963, S.C. 
124, paras 26 and 31, Simla C.J. 
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scheme cf distribution of powers. It is the fundamental 
principle of a federal state that the centre should be strong 
and not feeble. But the centre should not be autocrat having 
unlimited powers to swallow up the authority of the states. 
About the Indian federalism, K.R. Bombell remarks "The 
detailed and carefully spilled out distribution of powers of 
judicial review vested in the Supreme Coutt provide the 
ncessary guarantee that such subversion cannot occur 
Political , social and economic conditions of India 
after 1935 urged and necessitated a new pattern of new cons-
titution having combination of the concept of federalism, 
seperation of powers with checks and balances, guarantee of 
fundamental rights and various other restrictions and limita-
tions on the powers of the Government. The drafters of the 
Indian Constitution on the basis of their wide experiences 
and knowledge of the American and other Constitutions tried 
to avoid confusion and complexity by evolving quite a new 
system of federalism, conferring upon the court power of 
judicial review. In this connection G.N. Joshi observed:-
Dicey says federalism means legalism and this is 
practically true of the Indian Constitution. Its 
most outstanding feature is the faith it places 2 in law, in judicial process and judicial review" . 
1. K.R. Bombwall, The Foundations of Indian Federalism, Asia 
Publishing House, Bombay, 1967, p.352. 
2. G.N. Joshi, The Constitution of India, Macmillan & Co., 
London, 1961, p.35. 
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The Indian Constitution also intended to enlarge and 
preserve freedom by introducing the process of judicial 
review. The theory of social contract has thus been reno-
vated by the introduction of judicial review in the Indian 
Politico-constitutional system. It is the moral obligation 
on the part of the people to subject themselves only to the 
valid law and not to the arbitrary and invalid law. The 
aggrieved f)erson has right to challenge in the Law Court the 
validity of a particular law. In Indian federalism the 
system of judicial review has been introduced under Art. 226 
read with Articles 245 and 246 and Schedule VII where the 
Federal and State powers have been demarcated. But regarding 
the remedy in respect of legislative lapses concerning dis-
tribution of powers, there is great lacuna in the Indian 
Constituion as there is no provision in the Constitution to 
approach the Supreme Court direct. The founding fathers of 
the Indian Constitution could not envisage this lacuna then, 
but it deserves to be ractified by a suitable constitutional 
amendment incorporating an article in the Constitution like 
Art.32 enabling the party concerned to move the Supreme Court 
direct. It is for the Indian Parliament to rectify this 
lacuna by a suitable amendment. But in India unlike America, 
the amending power has been misused to curbing the power of 
judicial review. The judiciary must be given a free hand in 
judicial decisions as by its sound and analytical reasonings 
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and prudent view the judiciary can best harmonise the con-
flicting interest in different walks of life. The guarantee 
of relief by judicial review is a moral assurance to the 
nation. Without morality no nation can sustain its vitality. 
Therefore, curbing the power of judicial review is wholly 
unethical and the courts in India shall have to assert their 
exisLence in discharging the constitutional obligations. xn 
any view of the case, constitutional amendments in any degree 
curbing or extinguishing the power of judicial review, are 
ultravires and the judiciary has to ignore such constitu-
tional amendments. Judicial review is founded on the natural 
and eternal rights which are even above the constitution 
itself. 
The growth of Commerce and enterprise and the deve-
lopment of an interdependent economy and nationalism are 
considered to be the factors in the evolution of co-operative 
federalism. In Co-operative federation the question about 
the scope of judicial review is a pertinent one. Any undue 
leniency in the spirit of judicial review by tolerating 
unconstitutionality of laws on a plea of co-operative 
federalism iray seriously affect the centre-state and inter-
state relationship and the social and economic structure of 
the country. In India the residuary powers vest in the Union 
Parliament and, as such, in India there is greater fear of 
interference from the side of the union. The Indian judiciary 
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has to keep this aspect in view while dealing with the cons-
titutionality of the law violating the mandates of the cons-
titution regarding distribution of powers. The Chairman of 
the Indian Constituent Assembly Drafting Committee had said -
"A Federal Constitution means a division of the law of the 
Constitution between the federal Government and the States, 
with two necessary consequences: 
(a) That any invasion by the Federal Government in 
the field assigned to the States and vice-versa 
is breach of the constitution, and 
(b) Such breach is a justiciable matter to be decided 
by the judiciary only^.' 
But inspite of the fact that the founders of the 
Indian Constitution had intended unrestricted power of 
judicial review, certain constitutional amendments have begun 
to make serious inroads on the power of judicial review. 
India is a welfare state. Indian in its wake of 
nationalism is attending to evolve a socio-economic philoso-
phy for the reconstruction of the society and for the pros-
perity of the nation. The Constitution of India contains 
various provisions for the social and economic reconstruction 
1. C.A.I. Debates, Volume VII, p.35, also quoted by R.L.Watts 
in New Federation. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1966, p.292. 
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of the society and judicial review has been provided to help 
in this pursuit- The courts in India have often joined hands 
with the legislatures in their activities of agriculture 
reforms, and development of rural economy. As for instance, 
by the Bombay Laws (Amendment Act 1956) which amended Bombay 
Act LXVII of 1948, the legislature sought to distribute equi-
tably the lanvis between the landlords and the tenants by way 
of compulsory purchase of surpluslands from tenants in posse-
ssion thereof. N.H. Bhagwati J. of the Supreme Court of 
India upholding this Act observed "with a view to achieve the 
objective of establishing a socialistic pattern of society in 
the State within the meaning of Articles 38 and 39 of the 
Constitution, a further measure of 'agrarian reform was 
enected by the State Legislature being the impunged Act 
herein before referred to, which was designed to bring about 
such distribution of thfe ownership and control agriculture 
lands as best to subserve the common good, thus eliminating 
concentration of wealth and means of production to the common 
detriment^. M. Hidayatullah J. (as he then was) following 
the said view observed in another case "The scheme of rural 
development today envisage not only equitable distribution of 
land so that there is no undue unbalance in society resulting 
in a landless class on the one hand and a concentration of 
land in the hands of a few, on the other, but envisages also 
the raising of economic standards and bettering rural health 
1. Shri Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1959, 
S.C. 459. 
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and social conditions".^ 
The courts in India had all along been vigilent in 
safeguarding the fundamental rights and realising the social 
needs but they have not recognised the claims which in fact 
were unrighteous but were pressed under the pretence of 
fundamental rights. In the case of state of Uttar Pradesh v. 
2 
Kartar Singh the respondent claimed fundamental right to 
carry on business in adulterated food but the Supreme Court 
denounced it and held that a person cannot assert funda-
mental right of carrying cn business in adulterated food. 
Another respect of the matter is that though the courts in 
India have always tried to respect the wishes and policies of 
the legislature yet, on many occasions realising that the 
legislative Acts are sometimes so discriminatory and 
violative of the guaranteed rights of the citizens of India, 
that instead of developing the social and economic wellbeing 
of the people they may positively destroy it. The courts in 
India have been always alert in declaring such unsocial and 
uneconomic laws void as to relieve the people of hardship and 
worries and to maintain social standard and dignity. In a 
democratic India legislature has no constitutional authority 
to enact discriminatory laws which might lead to legislative 
1. Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1965, S.C. 532, 
para 13. 
2. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kartar Singh A.I.R.1964,STcTillS 
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tyranny The present prevelent concept of judicial review 
in India the basis of decleration of unconstitutionality is 
the violation of the express provisions of the constitution. 
The fundamental rights are the conscience of the 
Constitution of India. The insertion of fundamental rights 
in the Constitution of India is the result of constant 
struggle for freedom and the fundamental rights guaranteed in 
Part III are the manifestations and recognition of the 
cravings of the people for the blessings of liberty and 
freedom. The constitution-makers considered it necessary to 
recognise the right of judicial review in order to control 
the legislative actiorts of the state to take away the guaran-
teed rights without jurisdiction. The constitution-makers of 
India could not at the time of framing foresee and visualise 
all the aspects of the constitution mechanism which they were 
laying down. Although the Indian Constitution is elaborata, 
all the necessary provisions to saveguard the individual 
freedoms and rights could not expressly be made in the 
constitution. As such the courts is the only legal body to 
help the nation in reading the constitution into life and 
give a practical application of it through judicial interpre-
tations . 
In India, so long as the constitutional democracy 
prevails, judicial review is sure to have a firm stand. The 
Indian Judiciary, specially the Supreme Court, is the great 
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organ to protect individual rights and to operate as a balan-
cing force between the individual rights and the social 
interests. The Indian courts have to interpret the 
constitution in Judicial review not always within a rigid 
frame, but they have to rise to the need of the hour and 
encounter new circumstances in order to relieve the citizens 
of India of the legislative impositions v^hich are against the 
national spirit. 
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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
The Amendment of the Constitution is made with a view 
to overcome the difficulties which may encounter infuture in 
the working of the constitutions. No generation has monopoly 
of wisdom nor has it a right to place fetters on future 
generations to mould the machinery of Government according to 
their requirements. If no provision were made for the 
amendment of the constitution, the people would have recourse 
to extra-constitutional method like revolution to change the 
Constitution^. 
"It has been the nature of the amending process 
itself in federation which has led political scientists to 
classify federal constitution as rigid. A federal constitu-
tion is generally rigid in character as the procedure of 
amendment is unduly complicated. The procedure of amendment 
in American Constitution is very difficult. It is a common 
criticism of federal constitution that is too conservative, 
too difficult to alter and that is consequently behind the 
times''.^ 
The framers of the Indian Constitution were keen to 
avoid excessive rigidity. They were anxious to have a docu-
1. Keshavanand Bharti v. State of Kerala, .A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 
1461. 
2. K.C. Wheare: Federal Government, 1963 cd, p.209. 
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ment which could grow with a growing nation, adapt itself to 
the changing need and circumstances of a growing people. The 
nature of the 'amending process' envisaged by the framers of 
our constitution can be best understood by referring the 
following observation of the late Prime Minister Pt- Nehru, 
^Vhile we want this constitution be as solid and permanent as 
we can make it, there is no permanence in the constitution. 
There should be a certain flexibility. If you make anything 
rigid and permanent you stop the nation's growth, of a living 
vital, organic people .... In any event, we could not make 
this constitution so rigid that it cannot be adopted to 
changing conditions. When the world is in a period of 
transition, what we may do today may not be wholly applicable 
tomorrow". 
But the framers of Indian Constitution were also 
aware of the fact that if the constitution was so flexible it 
would be a plaything of the whims and caprices of the ruling 
party. They were therefore, anxious to avoid flexibility of 
the extreme type. Hence, they adopted a middle course. It 
is neither too rigid to admit necessary amendments, nor 
flexible for undesirable changes. The machinery of amendment 
should be like a safety value, so devised as neither to 
operate the machine with too great facility nor to require, 
in order to set in motion, an accumulation of force suffi-
cient to explode it. The Constitution-makers have, therefore 
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kept the balance between the danger of having non-amendable 
constitution and a constitution which is too easily amendable 
Under the American Constitution, the courts have 
stayed away from deciding upon the validity of constitu-
tional amendments. The Supreme Court of America has time and 
again declared that the court is not a proper forum for 
deciding political questions. The constitutional amendments 
involve political question and, therefore, the court applying 
the doctrine of judicial review abnegation has consistently 
refused to employ the power of judicial review in relation to 
amendments to the Constititon. In India also in the beginn-
ing the position was the same. The question whether funda-
mental rights can be amended under Article 368 came for 
consideration of the Supreme Court in Shankari Prasad v.Union 
of India^. The Supreme Court was faced with the constitu-
tional validity of the constitution (First Amendment) Act, 
1951. This Amendment had made various changes throughout the 
length and breadth of the constitution including those in the 
2 
area of fundamental rights . Not the whole but those parts 
of this Amending Act which interfered with fundamental rights 
particularly the right to private property in Article 31, 
were challenged. The amendment was challenged on the ground 
that it purpoted to take away or abridge the rights conferred 
1. A.I.R. 1951 S.C.455 at p.458. 
2. Articles 31-A, 31-B and Schedule IX were added by this 
Amendment. 
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by Part III which fell within the prohibition of Article 
13(2) and hence was void. It was argued that the "state" in 
Article 12 includes Parliament and the word "law" in Article 
13(2), therefore, must include constitutional amendment. The 
Supreme Court, however, rejected the above argument and held 
that the power to amend the constitution including the 
fundamental rights was contained in Article 368, and that the 
word 'law' in Article 13(8) include only an ordinary law made 
in exercise of the legislative powers and does not include a 
constitutional amendment which is made in exercise of consti-
tutent power. Therefore, a constitutional amendment will be 
valid even if it abridged or takes any of the fundamental 
rights. This judicial pronouncement made by Supreme Court as 
early as 1951 remained unchallenged and undisturbed for 
fourteen long years. In 1965 the Supreme Court was once 
again invited to reconsider its opinion in Sajjan Singh v. 
State of Rajesthan^ and once again the court reiterated its 
earlier view that constitutional amendments made under 
Article 368 are outside the purview of judicial review of the 
courts . In this case the Constitution (Seventeenth Amend-
ment) Act, 1964 was challenged and upheld. 
1. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 845. 
2. Unlike Shankari Prasad's case, this was not a unanimous 
judgement. Only three out of five judges who constituted 
the Bench for the purpose held that Shankari Prasad's case 
was rightly decided. The remaining two judges (Justice 
Madhokar and Hidayatullah did not express any openion). 
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Within a short period of two years the same Seven-
teenth Amendment Act, 1964 was once again challenged in Golak-
Nath V. State of Punjab^ and the Supreme Court once again 
invited to reconsider its decision in the earlier two cases. 
The Supreme Court by a majority of 6 to 5 prospectively 
overruled its earlier decisions in Shankari Prasad and Sajjan 
Singh case and held that Parliament had no power, from the 
date of the' decision to amend Part III of the Constitution so 
as to take away or abridge the fundamental rights ensured 
therein. Subha Rao, C.J., supported his judgement on the 
following reasonings: 
(a) The Chief Justice rejected the argument that 
power to amend the constitution was a sovereign power and the 
said power was supreme to the legislative power and that it 
did not permit any implied limitations and that amendment 
made in exercise of that power involve political question and 
that therefore they were outside of judicial review. 
(b) The power of Parliament to amend the constitution 
is derived from Article 245, read with Entry 97 of list I of 
the Constitution and not from Art. 368. Art. 368 only lays 
down the procedure for amendment of constitution. Amendment 
is a legislative process. 
1. A.I.R. 1967 S.C.1463, decided by S.C. on Feb.27, 1967. 
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(c) An amendment is a 'law' within the meaning of 
Article 13(2) included every kind of law. Statutory as well 
as constitutional law and hence a constitutional amendment 
which contravened Article 13(2) will be declared void. 
The Chief Justice said that the fundamental rights 
are assigned transcendental place under our constitution and 
therefore they were kept beyond the reach of Parliament. The 
majority held that the (17th Amendment) was void in as much 
as it took away or abridged the fundamental rights under 
Article 13(2) of the constitution. The Chief Justice applied 
the doctrine of Prospective overruling and held that this 
decision will have only prospective operation and therefore, 
the 1st, 4th and 19th Amendments will continue to be valid. 
The majority did not express any final opinion on the 
question whether the word 'amendment' in Article 368 included 
the power to destroy the basic structure of the constitution 
or abrogation of the constitution or the complete rewriting. 
The majority view of five out of eleven judges was 
the word 'law' in Article 13(2) refers to only ordinary law 
and not a constitutional amendment and hence Shankari Prasad 
and Sajjan Singh cases were rightly decided. According to 
them, Article 368 dealt with only the procedure of amending 
the constitution but also contained the power to amend the 
constitution. 
8 6 
Hidayatullah and Madholkar, J.J., however, by a 
seperate judgement doubled the correctness of the majority 
view, as to whether fundamental rights were really 
fundamental and should be amended under Article 368. 
Mudholkar, J., posed a further question, whether making a 
change in a basic feature of the constitution can be regarded 
as merely as amradment or would it, in effect be rewriting a 
part of the Constitution, and if the latter would, it be 
within the purview of Article 368. 
It was, therefore, held that if a constitutional 
amendment had the effect of abridging or taking away any of 
the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the consti-
tution it would be struck down by the court as unconstitu-
tional. The Seventeenth Amendment which was in challenge 
before Supreme Court in Golaknath's case, however, was vali-
dated by resorting to the American doctrine of 'Prospective 
overruling' which the Supreme Court applied in this country 
for the first time. The net result of the Supreme Court 
decision in Golaknath's case was that Parliament was deprived 
of its power to amend the fundamental rights so as to abrid-
ged or take them away with effect from February 27, 1967 the 
date of decision of the case. 
The Supreme Court decision in Golaknath's case came 
as a stumbling block and prevented the Government and the 
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Parliament from proceeding further with socio-economic 
measures because the Government argued that nothing worth in 
this direction could be attempted without interfering with 
the fundamental rights particularly the right to property. 
With a view to obtaining mandate from the people for impor-
tant and pressing amendments in the Constitution (including 
those in the area of fundamental rights) Smt. Indira Gandhi, 
the then Prime Minister of India went to the polls by getting 
the Lok Sabha dissolved on December 21, 1970. She returned 
to power with record majority and plunged headlong and rushed 
through a series of constitutional amendments beginning with 
the Twentyfourth Amendment in 1971 remodelling Article 368 
which provides for Amendment of the Constitution. 
In order to remove difficulties created by the 
decision of Supreme Court in Golak Nath's case Parliament 
enacted the Twentyfourth Amendment Act, 1971. The amendment 
added a new clause(4) to Article 13 which provides that 
"nothing in this Article shall apply to any amendment of this 
constitution made under Article 368. In all the amendment 
has made four changes in Article 368, (1) It substituted a 
new marginal heading to Article 368 in place of the old 
heading "Procedure for amendment of the Constitution". The 
new heading is "power of Parliament to amend the constitu-
tion and Procedure therefore". (2) It inserted a new sub-
section (1) in Article 368 which provide'that "notwithstand-
ing anything in this constitution. Parliament may,in exercise 
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of its constitutent power amend by way of addition variation 
or repeal any provision of this constitution in accordance 
with the procedure laid down in this Article". (3) It subs-
tituted the words, "it shall be presented to the President 
who shall give his assent to the Bill and thereupon" for the 
words" it shall be presented to the President for his assent 
and upon such assent being given to the Bill". Thus section 
3(c) makes'its obligatory for President to give his assent to 
the Amendment Bill. (4) It has added a new clause (3) to 
Article 368 which provides that nothing in Article 13 shall 
apply to any amendment made under this Article". Thus the 
Twentyfourth Amendment not only restored the amending power 
of the Parliament but also extended its scope by adding the 
words" to amend by way of the addition or variation or repeal 
any provision of this constitution in accordance with the 
procedure laid down in this Articles". 
The flood-gate having been declared open fresh 
onslaughts on fundamental rights were effected ;through the 
twentyfifth, twentysixth and the twentyninth amendments. The 
constitutionality of all these Amendments were challenged in 
Supreme Court in the famous case, Kesvanand Bharti v. State 
of Kerala^, popularly known as the Fundamental Rights case, 
decided by Supreme Court on April 24, 1973. The question 
involved was, what is the extent of the amending power 
1. A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461. 
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conferred by Article 368 of the constitution? On behalf of 
the Union of India it was claimed that amending power is 
unlimited and short of repeal of the constitution any change 
may be effected. On the otherhand, the petitioner contended 
that the amending power was wide but not unlimited. Under 
Article 368, Parliament cannot destroy the 'basic feature' of 
the constitution. A Special Bench of 13 judges was consti-
tuted to hear the case. Out of the 13 judges 11 judges 
delivered seperate judgement. The Twentyfourth Amendment was 
upheld and Golaknath expressly overruled. The Supreme Court, 
however, laid down a much complex, complicated ;and vague 
doctrine of basic structure. According to the court, the 
power of the Parliament to amend the constitution under 
Article 368 did not extend to abrogating or destroying the 
basic features or framework of the constitution. What fea-
tures were considered by the Supreme Court as 'basic' were 
not speltout or enumerated consistently in the various open-
ions given in this case^. The majority held that Article 368 
1. It would be interesting to note that largest ever Bench 
consisting of 13 out of 14 judges in Supreme Court was 
constituted in this case and the decision in the case was 
in a way worse than that in Golaknath for six judges held 
one view, six others held the opposite view and the judge-
ment of the 13th Judge, Mr.Justice H.R. Khanna, was in no 
way clear as to whom he sided with. The Judgement ulti-
mately was not 7-6 but 6.6 and 1. The judgement of 
Mr.Justice Khanna was verycrucial for determining the 
exact ratio of the case. 
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even before the Twentyfourth Amendment, contained the power 
as well as the procedure of amendment. The 24th Amendment 
merely made explicit what was implicit in the unamended 
Article 368-A. The 24th Amendment does not enlarge the 
amending power of the Parliament. The amendment is declara-
tory in nature. It only declares the true legal position as 
it was before that amendment hence it is invalid. 
Delivering the leading majority judgement Sikri C.J. 
said: "in the Constitution the word 'amendment' or 'amend' 
has been used in various places to mean different things. In 
some articles, the word 'amendment' in the context, has a 
wide meaning and another context it has a 'narrow meaning'. 
In view of the great variation of the phrases used all though 
the constitution it follows that the word "amendment" must 
derive its colour from Article 368 and the rest of the 
provisions of the constitution. Reading the Preamble, the 
fundamental importance of the freedom of the individual, its 
inalienability and the importance of the economic, social and 
political justice mentioned in the Preamble, the importance 
of directive principles, the non-inclusion in Article 368 of 
Provisions like Articles 52, 53 and various other provisions, 
an irresistable conclusion emerges that it was not the inten-
tion to use the word 'amendment' in the widest sense. It was 
the common understanding that the fundamental rights would 
remain in substance as they are and they would not be amended 
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out of existence. It seems also to have been a common under-
standing that the fundamental features of the constitution 
namely, secularism, democracy and the freedom of the 
individual would always subsits in the welfare state. In 
view of the above reasons a necessary implication arises on 
the power of Parliament that the expression 'amendment of 
this constitution' has consequently a limited meaning in our 
constitution and not the meaning suggested by the 
Attorney-General. The expression 'amendment' of this 
constitution in Article 368 means any addition or change in 
any of the provisions of the constitution within the broad 
colours of the Preamble and the constitution of carry out the 
objectives in the Preamble and the Directive Principles 
applied to fundamental rights' it would mean that while 
fundamental rights, cannot be abrogated reasonable abridge-
ments of fundamental right can be effected in the public 
interest". If this meaning is given, the Chief Justice said, 
"it would enable Parliament to adjust fundamental rights in 
order to secure what the Directive Principles direct to be 
accomplished, while maintaining the freedom and dignity of 
every citizen". The Chief Justice said, that the concept of 
amendment within the contours of the Preamble and of consti-
tution cannot be said to be a vague and unsatisfactory idea 
which Parliamentarians and the public would not be able to 
understand. He said that the argument that because something 
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cannot be cut and dried or nicely weighed or measured and 
therefore doesnot exist is fallacious. There are many con-
cepts of law which are not capable of exact definition, but it 
does not mean that it does not exist. It was also argued that 
every provision of the constitution is essential, otherwise it 
would not have been put in the constitution. The Chief 
Justice further said, "But this does not place every provision 
of the constitution in the same position. The true position is 
that every provision of the constitution can be amended 
provided in the result, the basic foundation and structure of 
the constitution remains the same" . The right to property 
was held not to be a basic feature and, therefore, could be 
freely amended. The Supreme Court had no objection of even if 
it were to be completely wiped off from part III by a consti-
tutional amendment. It is for this reason that the constitu-
tional Twentyfifth Amendment which made various amendments in 
the area of fundamental right to property was upheld. The 
constitution Twenty Sixth Amendment, which abolished the Privy 
Purses and consequently interfered with right to property was 
similarly upheld. 
Applying the basic structure doctrine enunciated 
above, the Supreme Court for the first time in the Constitu-
tional History of India struck down as unconstitutional a part 
of Article 31-C introduced by the Twentyfifth Amendment. The 
portion which was struck down had provided for exclusion of 
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judicial review in respect of a particular matter^, even by 
the Supreme Court of India, The Kesvanand Bharti doctrine was 
subsequently applied by the Supreme Court in IndiraNehru 
Gandhi v. Raj Narain^(The Prime Minister's Election Case). In 
this case the Supreme Court applied the theory of basic struc-
ture and struck down CI.(4) of Article 329-A, which was 
inserted by the Constitution (39th Amendment) Act 1975^, as 
unconstitutional and beyond the amending power of Parliament 
as it destroyed the 'basic features' of the constitution. The 
amendment was made to validate election of the Prime Minister 
which was declared void by the Allahabad High Court. Khanna 
J., struck down the clause on the ground that it violated the 
free and fair elections which in an essential postulate of 
democracy which in turn is a part of the basic strucutre of 
the constitution, Chandrachud, J,, struck down cls(4) and (5) 
as unconstitutional on the ground that they are outright 
negation of the right of equality conferred by Art.14, a right 
1. Article 31-C reads as follows: Notwithstanding anything 
contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy 
of the state towards securing the principles specified in 
clause(b) or clause(c) of Article 39 shall be deemed to be 
void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes 
away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14, 
Article 19 or Article 31; and no law containing a declera-
tion that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be 
called in question in any court on the ground that it does 
does not give effect to such policy". The underlined 
portion was struck down in K.Bharti's case and Article 31-C 
has further been amended by 42nd amendment in 1976. 
2- A.I.R.1975 S.C,2299 decided by Supreme Court on Nov.7,1975. 
3. The Presidencial assent to this Amendment was given on Aug. 
1975. 
which is a basic postulate of our constitution. He held that 
these provisions are arbitrary and are calculated to damage 
or destroy the Rule of law. The Supreme Court thus has added 
few features as basic features of the constitution to the 
list of basic features laid down in the Keshavananda Bharti's 
case are Rule of law. Judicial Review and Democracy, which 
implies free and fair Election. It has been held that the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32, is the 
basic feature of the Constitution. 
In Minerva Mills Case^, the Supreme Court held that 
the following are the basic features of the constitution: 
(a) limited power of Parliament to amend the Consti-
tution. 
(b) harmony and balance between fundamental rights 
and directive principles. 
(c) Fundamental rights in certain cases. 
(d) Power of judicial review in certain cases. 
Dr. P.K. Tripathi, Member Law Commission of India has 
pointed out that the Supreme Court of India is the only court 
in the world which has taken upon itself the power to judi-
cially review constitutional amendments. This, according to 
him is a great responsibility of India has undertaken and it 
should proceed with due care and caution in handling consti-
tuitional amendments. Dr.Tripathi is of the view that there 
ought not to be any limitations whatsoever on the power of 
1. A.I.R. 1980 S.C.1789-
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Parliament to amend a Constitution. He has expressed doubt 
as to whether the so-called basic structure doctrine alleged 
to have been laid down by the Supreme Court in Kasavanand 
Bharti's case has at all taken firm roots and has become 
firmly established in Indian constitutional law. He emphati-
cally contends that the Supreme Court in Kesavanand Bharti 
did not lay down the doctrine of basic structure and in the 
Prime Minister's Election case the fact that the Supreme 
Court had laid down the doctrine of basic structure in Kesa-
vanand Bharti's case was not at all argued but the court 
proceeded to apply it because the learned Attorney-General 
and others appearing on behalf of the Union of India had 
conceeded without argument that the Supreme Court in Kesava-
nand Bharti case had laid down the basic structure doctrine. 
This question of law being accepted and applied by the 
Supreme Court without arguments leaves the law in a state of 
flux. 
The doctrine of basic structure has been vehemently 
criticised. It has been said that the court has not pre-
cisely defined as to what are the essential features of the 
basic structure, and if this doctrine is accepted every 
amendment is likely to be challenged on the ground that it 
effects some or the other essential features of the basic 
structure. In other words, the amending power of the Parlia-
ment cannot be subjected to this vague and uncertain doctrine 
If the historical background, the Preamble, the entire scheme 
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of the constitution and the relevant provisions thereof 
including Art. 368 are kept in mind then there can be no 
difficulty in determining what are the basic elements of the 
basic structure of the constitution. These words apply with 
greater force to the doctrine of the basic structure, because 
the federal and democratic structure of the constitution, the 
seperation of powers, the secular character of our state are 
very much more definite than either negligence or natural 
justice^. 
Forty-Second Amendment and Article 368 : -
Lastly, we may consider the impact of the latest 
Amendment in Article 368 introduced by the Constitution (42nd 
Amendment) Act, 1976. The Amendment added two new clauses, 
namely, cl.(4) and cl.(5) to Art.368 of the constitution. The 
new clause(4) provided that "no constitutional amendment 
(including the provision of Part III) or purporting to have 
been made under Art.368 whether before or after the commen-
cement of the constitution(42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 shall be 
called in any court on any ground. Clause(5) removed any 
doubts about the scope of the amending power. It declared 
that there shall be no limitation whatever on the consti-
tuent power of Parliament to amend by way of addition, varia-
tion or repeal of the provisions of the constitution under 
1. H.M. Seervi: Constitutional Law of India, 2nd ed., Vol.11, 
p.1568. 
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this Article. Thus by inserting clause(5) it makes it clear 
that even the "basic feature" of the Constitution could be 
amended. 
This amendment would, according to Mr.Swaran Singh, 
the Chairman, Congress Committee on Constitutional Amendments 
put an end to any controversy ac to which is supreme. Parlia-
ment or the Supreme Court. Clause(4) asserts the supermacy 
of Parliament. Parliament represents the will of the people 
and if people desire to amend the constitution through 
Parliament there can be no limitation whatever on the exer-
cise of this power. 
This amendment removes the limitation imposed on the 
amending power of Parliament by the ruling of the Supreme 
Court in Kesavanand Bharti's case. It was said that the 
theory of 'basic structure' as invented by the Supreme Court 
is vague and will create difficulties. The amendment seeks 
to rectify this situation. It was, however, not pointed out 
clearly as to what were the difficulties faced by Parliament 
due to the basic structure theory. 
Thus,the amended Article provides that constitutional 
amendments shall not be challenged in any court on any 
grounds. The Amendment has not to pass judicial scrutiny at 
the hands of the Supreme Court of India, although many cons-
titutional experts have expressed their view that the change 
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effected by the 42nd Amendment in Article 368 is meaningless 
and redundant and they shall continue to exercise its power 
of judicial review over constitutional amendments in the same 
way as before the 42nd Amendment. They projected the view 
that the constitutional amendments made under Article 368 can 
still be challenged on the ground that they are distructive 
of any of the essential elements of the basic features of the 
constitution. In Kesavananda's case the Supreme Court has 
held that Parliament cannot alter the "basic structure" of 
the constitution exercise of amending power under Article 368 
of the constitution. The 24th and the 42nd amendments were 
intended to bat the judicial review of constitutional amend-
ments. But so long as the ruling in Kesavanand Bharti's case 
stands constitutional amendments can be challenged on the 
ground that they destroy some of the basic features of the 
constitution. 
In Minerva Mills v. Union of India^ the Supreme Court 
by 4 to 1 majority (Mr.Chandrachud, C.J. and Gupta, Untawalia 
and Kailasam, JJ for majority and Bhagwati, J. dissenting) 
held that section 55 of the 42nd Amendment 1976 which 
inserted sub-sections (4) and (5) in Art.368 is beyond the 
amending power of the Parliament and is void since it removes 
all limitations on the power of Parliament to amend the 
1. A„I.R. 1980 S.C.1789. 
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constitution and confers unlimited amending power which is 
distructive of its basic or essential features or its basic 
structure. Applying the principles laid down in Kesavanand 
Bharti's case the court struck down sub-clauses(4) and (5) of 
Art.368 of the Constitution as unconstitutional and void and 
declared that the Parliament cannot have unlimited power to 
amend the constitution. "Limited amending power" is the basic 
feature of'the constitution. 
The order of the Supreme Court thus declares in cate-
gorical terms that the constitution- not Parliament- is 
supreme in India. This is in accordance with the intention 
of the framers who adopted a written constitution for the 
country. Under the written constitution there is a clear 
distinction between the ordinary legislative power and the 
constituent power (amending power) of Parliament. Parliament 
cannot have unlimited amending powers so as to damage or 
destroy the constitution to which it owes its existence and 
also derives its power. The Parliament elected for a fixed 
period of five years is ment for certain specific purposes 
and cannot be vested with unlimited amending power. The 
Court, however,- held that the doctrine of basic structure is 
to be applied only in judging the validity of amendments to 
the constitution and it does not apply for judging the 
validity of ordinary laws made by legislatures. 
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Forty-Fourth Amendment Act, 1978: 
This Amendment seeks to remove the destortions that 
the 42nd Amendment had brought about in the constitution 
during the Emergency. Beside, the Amendment has considerably 
modified the emergency provisions of the Constitution so as 
to ensure that it is not abused by the executive in future. 
Article 71 "as originally enacted" gave jurisdiction 
to the Supreme Court to decide election disputes of the 
President and the Vice-President. The 42nd Amendment took 
away the jurisdiction of the Court in this respect. The 44th 
Amendment has restored the original. 
The 44th Amendment Act has amended Article 132, 133 
and 134 relating to appeals in the Supreme Court from the 
decisions of the High Courts. The 44th Amendment has inser-
ted a new Article 134A under which the High Court can now 
grant a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court under 
Article 132, 133 and 134(1)(c) either suo motu or on an oral 
application by the aggrieved party immediately after the 
delivery of the judgement, decree, final order or sentence. 
It has also omitted clauseO) of Article 132 relating the 
grant of Special leave by Supreme Court in cases where the 
High Court refuses to give a certificate cases of special 
leave to appeal by Supreme Court will thus be left to be 
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regulated exclusively by Article 136 of the Constitution. 
This Amendment is intended to avoid delay in matters of 
appeal to the Supreme Court from High Courts. 
Article 139-A, which was added by the 42nd Amendment 
gives power to the Supreme Court in certain circumstances to 
withdraw cases fr^ m^ the High Courts and decide them itself. 
This Articleis retained subject to some modification. Prior 
to 44th Amendment, the court could take action under this 
Article only if an application was made by the Attorney-
General. The 44th Amendment enables the court to do so also 
on the application of a party to any such case. Thus the 
court may do so either sup motu or on the application of the 
party to any such case. 
The Amendment omits sub-clause(c) of clause (e) of 
Article 217 which was inserted by the 42nd Amendment. This 
clause made provision for appointing distinguished jurists as 
judges of the High Court. 
The Proviso to Article 225, as originally existed, 
gave original jurisdiction to the High Courts in revenue 
matters. The 42nd Amendment omitted this proviso and took 
away jurisdiction of the High Courts in revenue matters. The 
44th Amendment now restores the said proviso to Article 225 
and again given original jurisdiction to the High Courts on 
revenue matters. 
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Subject to a modification this amendment restores 
Article 226 as it existed prior to the 42nd Amendment Act, 
1976. The provisions relating to the issue of an interim 
order as introduced by the 42nd Amendment was very cumbersome 
and detrimental to litigantsc Instead of this, 44th Amend-
ment introduces a simple provision in new clausesO) and (4). 
Clause{3) provides that when an interim order is passed 
against a party ex parte (without giving him opportunity of 
being heard) that party may make an application to the High 
Court for the vacation of such order and the High Court must 
dispose of such an application within two weeks. If the High 
Court does not dispose of the application within two weeks, 
the interim order shall stand vacated after the expiry of two 
weeks c 
The Amendment restores Article 227 to the form in 
which it was prior to the 42nd Amendment Act, and this gives 
their power of superintendence over the tribunals. The 42nd 
Amendment has taken away this power of the High Courts. 
C H A P T E R 
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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS ; 
THROUGH WRITS 
The Constitution of India assured greater protection 
of individuals rights and afforded larger freedom to the 
court to look into executive lapses. The judiciary showed a 
great promise in its constitutional career in preserving the 
liberty and freedom of the people. In India the court is an 
arbiter between the people and the executive. Each citizen 
of India has inherent right to challenge the constitutiona-
lity of any executive enactment passed by any executive 
authority if his interest is affected by it. By judicial 
interpretations the fundamental rights, distribution of 
executive powers and other constitutional restrictions and 
limitations were provided a new meaning. The fundamental 
object of judicial review is to infuse life in the dry and 
abstract postulates of the constitution enabling it to be a 
living organism so as to satisfy the needs of the time. 
Articles 32 and 226 of the Indian Constitution makes 
provisions for the system of writs in the country. Under 
clause (2) of Article 32 the Supreme Court is empowered to 
issue appropriate direction, orders or writs, including 
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writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition 
quo-warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any 
fundamental rights guaranted by Art III of the constitution. 
By this article the Supreme Court has been constituted as a 
protector and guarantor of the fundamental rights and once a 
citizen has shown that there is infringement of his funda-
mental right the court cannot refuse to entertain petitiolns 
seeking enforcement of fundamental rights.^ Article 226(1) 
empowers every High Court, notwithstanding anything in 
art.32, throughout the territories in relation to which it 
exercises jurisdiction to issue any person or authority, 
including appropriate cases any government, within those 
territories directions, orders or writs including writs in 
the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, prohi-
bition and certiorari for the enforcement of Fundamental 
Rights or for any other purpose. 
Article 32 and Article 226 are expressed in broad 
language. The Supreme Court, nevertheless, ruled that in 
reviewing administrative actions, the courts would keep to 
broad and fundamental principles underlying the preprogative 
writs in the English law without however importing all its 
2 technicalities. The result of this approach has been that 
1. Ramesh Thapper V. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124 at 
p.126. 
2.-Basappa V.Nagappa, A.I.R. 1954 S.C.440. 
10 5 
by and large the scope of judicial review in India under 
arts. 32 and 2 26 is similar to what it is in England under 
the prerogative writs. But there are a number of cases 
where the Supreme Court has deviated from the English 
approach.^ 
Under articles 32 and 226, the courts enjoy a broad 
discretion , in the matter of giving proper relief if 
warranted by the circumstances or the case before them. The 
courts may not only issue a writ but also make any order, or 
give any direction, as it may consider appropriate in the 
2 
circumstances, to give proper relief to the petitioner. It 
can grant declaration or injunction as well if that be the 
proper relief.^ It would not throw out the petitioner's 
petition simply on the ground that the proper writ or 4 
direction has not been prayed for. In practice it has 
become customary not to pray for any particular writ in the 
petition filed before the court, but merely to make a 
general request to the court to issue appropriate order, 
direction or writ. In making the final order, the court may 
not mention any specific writ but merely quash^ or pass 
1. For example, see Gujrat Steel Tubes V. Mazdoor Sabha, 
A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1896. 
2. K.K.Kochunni V.Madras, A.I.R.1859: SC 725; P.J.Irani, V. 
Madras, A.I.R. 1961S.C. 1731. 
3. The Kochunni as Ibid. Also see Sudarshan Kumar Kalra V. 
India, A.I.R. r974 Del.119. 
4. Charanjit Lai v.India, A.I.R. 1951S.C.41. 
5. R.L.Arora V. Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R.1962 S.C.764. 
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1 2 declaratory order or give any other appropriate order . There 
thus exists a good deal of flexibility in the matter of choice 
of remedy to suit the specific circumstances of each case. 
Scope of Article 32; 
Article 32 provides a guaranteed, quick and summary 
remedy for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. An^ person 
complaining of infraction of any of his Fundamental Rights by 
an administrative action can go straight to the Supreme Court 
for vindication of his right, without being required to undergo 
the dilatory proceddings from the lower to a higher court as 
one has to do in any ordinary litigation. The Supreme Court 
has thus been constituted, as the protector and guarantor of 
Fundamental Rights. 
Article 32 is itself of a Fundamental Rights and cannot 
therefore , be diluted or whittled down by legislation, and can 
be invoked over when a law declares a particular administrative 
action as final. The implications of this positions can be 
appreciated by reference to one or two cases. Section 14 of 
the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 prevented a detenue on pain 
of prosecution, from dislosing to snv couirt tlis j^roiirivaS of nxs 
detention communicated to him by the detaining authority. 
1. B.B.L. and T.Merchants• Association v Bombay A.I.R.1962 S.C. 
486. 
2. Himmat Lai v. Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 403. 
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Though the provisions did not formally deprive the detenu of 
the right to move the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus 
under art.32 to challenge his detention, still it rendered the 
court's power somewhat nugatory and illusory, for, unless the 
court could look into and examine the grounds on which the 
detention order was based, it could not decide whether detenu's 
Fundamental Rights under articles 21 and 22 were infringed or 
not. Therefore, the court declared sl4 as unconstitutional^. 
2 
In Prem Chand v. Excise Commissioner , the Supreme Court struck 
down one of its own rules, requiring furnishing of a security 
to move a writ petition before the court under art.32, as 
unconstitutional on the ground that it retarded the assertion 
or vindication of the Fundamerital Rights under art.32. But a 
rule requiring deposit of security for filing a petition of 
review of an order made earlier by the court dismissing a 
petition under art.32 has been upheld as valid as it does not 
restrict the right to move the court under art.32.^ 
A notable aspect of art.32 is that it can be invoked 
only when there is an administrative action in conflict with a 
Fundamental Right of the petitioner. It cannot be invoked if 
no question of enforcing a Fundamental Right arises. While 
dealing with a petition under art.32, the court would confine 
1. Gopalan v. Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27. 
2. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 996. 
3. Lala Ram v. Supreme Court of India, A.I.R.1967 S.C. 847. 
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itself to the question of infringement of Fundamental Rights 
and would not go into any other question.^ Article 32 cannot 
be invoked even if an administrative action is illegal unless 
petitioner'sFundamental Right is infringed. Thus a petition 
merely against an illegal collection of income tax is not 
maintainable under art.32, for the protection against imposi-
ion and collection of taxes except by authority of law falls 
2 
under art.265 which is not a Fundamental Right. But when an 
illegally levied tax infringes a Fundamental Right, then the 
remedy under art 32 would be available.^ In Tata Iron and 4 
Steel Co. V. S.R. Sarkar , the company paid tax under the 
Central Sales Tax Act to the State of Bihar. The State of West 
Bengal also sought to levy the tax under the same Act on the 
same turnover. In such a fact situation, a petition under art. 
32 was entertained by the Supreme Court because the Act in 
question imposes only a single liability to pay tax on inter-
state sales. The company having paid the tax to Bihar (on 
behalf of the Central Government), the threat by west Bengal to 
recover sales tax (again on behalf of the Central Government) 
in respect of the same sales primafacie infringed the 
Fundamental Right to carry on trade and commence guaranteed by 
art.19(1)(g). 
1. Khyerban Tea Co. v. I.T.O., A.I.R. 1964 S.C.925. 
2. Ramjilal v. I.T.O., A.IR.1951 S.C. 97 
3. Bombay v. United Motors, A.I.R.1953 S.C.252. 
4. A.I.R. 1961 S.C.65. 
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The question whether a particular administrative action 
infringes a Fundamental Right or not and, therefore, whether a 
petititon under art.32 to challenge it is maintainable or not, 
does at times raise complex issues. The classic case on the 
point is Ujjam Bai v. Uttar Pradesh.^ A petition was filed in 
the Supreme Court under art.32 on the ground that a sales tax 
officer by misconstruing a provision in a taxing statute had 
imposed sales tax on the petitioner and thereby affected his 
Fundamental Right under art.l9(l)(g). The Supreme Court held 
that since the order of assessment was made by the officer 
concerned within his jurisdiction, a mere misconstruction of a 
statutory provision by him would not justify a petition under 
art.32, even though a Fundamental Right may be involved. The 
court stated under art.32, it would quash an order of a quasi-
judicial body affecting a Fundamental Right if it acts under an 
ultra vires law or without jurisdiction,or if it wrongly 
assumes jurisdiction by committing an error on a collateral 
fact, or if it fails to follow the principles of natural 
justice, or to observe the mandatory procedural provisions 
presented in the relevant statute. But a mere error of law 
committed by a quasi-judicial body cannot be cured under art. 
2 32. This ruling has come in for a good deal of criticism as 
1. A.I.R. 1962 S.C.1621-
2. The Ujjam Bai case has been followed in Coffee Board v. 
C.T.O, A.I.R. 1971 S.C.870; J. Fernadez Co. v. Dy. Chief 
Controller of Imports and Exports, A.I.R. 1975 FS.C. 1208. 
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it dilutes the efficacy of art.32, and is rather difficult to 
justify. Ordinarily, as will be seen later, a 'patent' error 
of law by a quasi-judicial body can be quashed by a writ of 
certiorari which the Supreme Court can issue under art.32. It 
is, therefore, difficult to comprehend as to why the court 
should refuse to give relief in a case of misconstruction of 
law when a Fundamental Right is involved. The ruling becomes 
all the more uncomprehensible when it is remembered that while 
the Supreme Court would issue a writ under art.32 if a 
quasi-judicial body does not follow principles of natural 
justice, it refuses to give relief in the case of misconstruc-
tion of law by it. Further, the court probably would have 
quashed the order if the authority had been administrative and 
not quasi-judicial. This indulgence towards quasi-judicial 
bodies can be explained on the basis of the judicial view that 
an order made by the courts does not infringe Fundamental 
Rights^, but the analogy between a court and a quasi-judicial 
body is misleading for such a body, unlike the court, consists 
of administrators rather than judges. 
Thus the main purpose of Article 32 is to protect the 
individual against the infringement of his fundamental rights. 
The threat to fundamental rights may arise from various sources. 
1. Naresh v. Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1967 S.C.I. 
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Judicial openion is clear that the authorities falling under 
the Government and Parliament of India, Government departmental 
undertakings and Agencies incorporated by statutes are 
amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and are 
included within the definition of state in Article 12.^ 
Agencies falling under the registered statutes e.g. 
public or private companies, government companies registered 
societies may be included within the term 'State' and, 
therefore, are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, if such authorities are instrumentalities or agencies of 
2 the Government. 
Courts of law are not mentioned as such in Article 12 
but they may pose a threat to the Fundamental Rights of the 
people in exercise of their administrative powers. In Prem 
Chand Garg v. Excise Commissoner^, the Supreme Court struck 
down certain rules framed by it as violative of Fundamental 
Rights. 
Some of the Fundamental Rights given under Articles 
15(2), 17, 23(1) and 24 can be claimed against private indivi-
duals also. The judicial opinion is that these rights though 
1. Rajsthan State Electricity Board v. Mohal Lai, A.I.R. 1967, 
S.C. 1857. 
2. R.D.Shetty v.International Airports Authority(1979) 3SCC 489 
3. A.I.R. 1963 S.C.996. 
112 
belong to private individuals cannot be enforced by private 
individual. Therefore, as the law stands today, such private 
individuals and bodies are not amenable to the jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court, no matter they violate Fundamental Rights.^ 
There seems to be no valid reason for this kind of a judicial 
exclusion. 
The approach of the court in the area of F undamental 
Rights must not be whether the authority is 'State' within the 
meaning of Article 12. The correct approach should be that 
every authority or person who poses a threat to a Fundamental 
Right should be amenable to the jurisdiction of the court. 
Therefore, not the type of agency but the threat to the Funda-
mental Rights must be the determining factor for the issue of 
writs under Article 32. 
Writ Jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226; 
The writ jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts by 
art.226 can be invoked to enforce not only a Fundamental Right 
but a Non-Fundamental Right as well. The jurisdiction con-
ferred on the High Courts under art.226 is broader in range 
than that conferred on the Supreme Court under art.32, for 
while Supreme Court acts only when there is an infraction of a 
1. Writ of Habeas corpus being the exception. 
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Fundamental Right, a High Court may act when a Fundamental 
Right or any other legal right is violated. For example, when 
a tax levied without authority of law infringes a Fundamental 
Right, action against it can be taken both under art.32 as well 
as under art.2 26; but when it does not infringe a Fundamental 
Right, only art. 226 can be taken recourse to.^ Thus the High 
Courts have a wider power to issue writs against 'any person or 
authority' for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights and any 
other legal right. As regards the 'person and authority' 
against whom such writs can be issued, the law seems to be in a 
thicket of inconsistencies. There is no controversy about the 
writs of habeas corpus and quo warranto which can be issued 
against private individuals and public office respectively. 
Therefore, the discussion will mainly concentrate on writs of 
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. 
It is gratify to note that the area for the operation 
of the writs has been extended, and rightly so, to cover 
various administrative agencies exercising multifarious 
functions. 
There is a no dispute that all constitutional and 
administrative authorities are amenable to the jurisdiction of 
the courts. Therefore a writ can be issued against public acts 
1. Bombay v. United Motors, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 252. 
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of the President of India, Governors, Union and State 
Governments, ministers, government officers and departments, 
and other bodies given in the Constitition i.e. Union Public 
Service Commission, Election Tribunal, Finance Commission, 
Water Dispute Authority and Advocate General of India.^ In 
2 
Election Commission of India v. Venkata Rao , the Madras High 
Court had issued a writ against Election Commission having it 
permanently located at New Delhi. The Court held that the 
Madras High Court had no power to issue a writ against Election 
Commission which is outside its jurisdiction. The mere fact 
that the effect of the order of a person or authority are 
produced within the territory of the High Court if the cause of 
action arises within its jurisdiction is not sufficient to 
insist the High Court with jurisdiction under Art.226 to issue 
a writ.^ The Punjab High Court can only issue a writ to 
central authorities which are located in Delhi. As a result of 
the Supreme Court decision relief against the Central 
Government could only be sought in Delhi. 
The Law Commission expressed the view that these limi-
tation had reduced the utility of Art. 226 and, in fact, they 
had defeated the very purpose of this Article. Commission, 
1. Madhav Rao Sindia v. Union of India(1971) ISCC 85; Mohinder 
Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr.,(1978) ISCC 405. 
2. A.I.R. 1975 S.C.434. 
3. H.Esmail v. Competent Officer, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1244. 
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therefore, recommended the removal of these limitations on a 
person seeking relief under Art.226.^ Accordingly, the Consti-
tution was amended by the Constitution(15th Amendment) Act, 
1963. Article 226 now permits High Court within whose 
jurisdiction the cause of action in whole or in part arises to 
issue directions, orders or writs to any Government or autho-
rity notwithstanding that the authority or the Government is 
located in Delhi if the cause of action in whole or in part 
arises in its jurisdiction. 
The law relating to the amenability of registered 
agencies i.e., companies registered under the Indian Companies 
Act and Societies registered under the Societies Registration 
Act, is still in a developing state and has not reached the 
state of maturity. The Government companies, no matter wholly 
controlled by the government, are not considered as public 
authorities amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High 
2 
Court. The law seems to rest on the ground that the remedies 
available under the Companies Act, labour laws and the ordinary 
law of the land are sufficient to meet the ends of justice. 
However, some High Courts have taken the view that not 
only the government companies but private companies also are 
1. Law Commission Report XIV, p.66. 
2. Praga Tool Corpn. V.C.A. Immanual,(1969) ISCC 585. 
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amenable to writ jurisdiction because their bye-laws have the 
force of law. Standing orders made by the companies under the 
Industrial Employment (standing orders) Act, 1946 were consi-
dered as having the force of law.^ The Kerala High Court also 
issue a writ against the Cashew Corporation of India, a govern-
ment company, on the ground that it was performing a statutory 
function, under the Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947 and 
Import Control Order, 1955 of controlling import and export of 
2 
cashewnuts. Similalrly, the various High Courts have issued 
writs against societies registered under the Societies Regis-
tration Act on the ground that their bye-laws have statutory 
force.^ However, the view of the Supreme Court in Co-operative 4 
Central Bank Ltd. v. Addl. Industrial Tribunal does not favour 
this approach. 
In a move recent decision of the Supreme Court in R.D. 
Shetty V. International Airports Authority^, the court has 
rightly extended its reach in matters of issuing writs by 
1. Borhan Kumar v. Indian Oil Corpn., A.I.R.1971 Pat.174 
Prafulla Chandra v. Oil India Ltd., A.I.R.1971 A & N 19; 
Abani Bhusan v. Hindustan Cables Ltd., A.I.R.1968 Cal.124. 
2. K.L.Mathew v. Union of India, A.I.R.1974 Ker 4. 
3. Ramswarup v. M.P. State Co-op.Marketing Federation, A.I.R. 
1976 MP 152; Nayagarh Co-op.Central Bank Ltd.V.N.Rathi{1977) 
3 see 576. 
4. (1969) 2 see 43: A.I.R.1970 S.e.245 
5. (1979) 3 see 489. 
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liberalizing the test which brings an administrative authority 
within the gravitational orbit of the term 'state' in Article 
12 of the Constitution. The core question in writ jurisdiction 
in India has always been whether an administrative authority is 
included in the category of 'other authorities' as contemplated 
by Article 12 within the definition of the term 'state'. The 
Supreme Court in Son Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India^, held 
that the Bharat Petroleum Corporation a government company 
registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, is 'state' 
within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. By the 
Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertaking in India) Act, 1976, 
the government had acquired the undertakings in India of the 
Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Company and handed 
them over to Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., a government 
company formed for this purpose. A writ petition was filed by 
an employee of the Burmah Shell Company, who had retired and 
was entitled to get pension from the Bharat Petroleum 
Corporation for the restoration of cut in his pension. A pre-
liminary objection was taken against the writ that no writ 
could be against Bharat Petroleum Ltd. since it being a company 
registered under the Indian Companies Act, was not 'state' 
within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Overru-
ling the objection the Supreme Court held that the time test 
for classifying a body as 'State' within the meaning of Article 
1. (1981) ISCC.449. 
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12 is not whether it is created by a statute or under a statute 
but whether besides discharging the functions or doing business 
as the proxy of the state, there must be an element of ability 
to affect legal relations by virtue of power vested in it by 
the law. 
Discretionary Remedyr-
The remedy provided for in Article 226 is a 
discretionary remedy and the High Court has always the discre-
tion to refuse to grant any writ if it is satisfied that the 
aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief 
elsewhere.^ This remedy cannot be claimed as a matter of 
right. The High Court must exercise its discretion on judi-
cial considration and on well-established principles unless the 
High Court is satisfied that the normal statutory remedy is 
likely to be too dilatory, or difficult to give reasonable, 
quick relief, it should be loath to act under Art.226. The 
High Court should be careful to be extremely circumspect in 
granting these reliefs especially during the pendency of crimi-
nal investigations. The investigation of a criminal case is a 
very sensitive phase where the investigating authority has to 
collect evidence from all odd corners and anything that is 
likely to thwart its cause may inhibit the interests of 
1. Rashid Ahmad v. Incometax Investigation Commission, A.I.R. 
1954 see 207. 
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justice.^ But the rule that it may refuse to grant any writ 
where alternative remedy is available is only a rule of direc-
tion and not a rule of law^, and instances are numerous where a 
writ had been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved 
party had other adequate legal remedy.^ 
The existence of an alternate adequate remedy is, 
however, no b^r to the exercise of writ jurisdiction where the 
relief is involved in case of infringement of fundamental 
4 5 rights , or where there is complete lack of jurisdiction or 
where the order has been passed in violation of natural justice 
by the subordinate court.^ Existence of alternative remedy is 
also no ground to refuse to issue writ where the action is 
being taken under any invalid law or arbitrarily without 
sanction of a law.^ 
g 
In V. Vellaswamy v. I.G. of Police, Madras , the 
petitioner challenged the validity of his compulsory retirement 
1. Asssistant Collector, Central Excise v. J.H. Industries, 
A.I.R.1979 S.C.1889. 
2. A.V.Venkateswaram v. R.S.Wadhwani, A.I.R.1961 S.C.1506. 
3. State of U.P. v. Mohd.Nooh, A.I.R.1958 S.C. 86. 
4. Himmat Lai v. State of U.P., A.I.R.1954 S.C. 403. 
5. A.V.Venkateswaram v. R.S.Wadhswani, A.I.R.1961 S.C. 1506. 
6. State of U.P. V. Mohd.Nooh, A.I.R.1958 S.C. 86. 
7. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. v. Assistant Commission-
er, Commercial Taxes, A.I.R.1967 S.C. 1401. 
8. A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 82. 
120 
The High Court dismissed his writ-petition on the ground that 
an alternative remedy by way of review petition against the 
compulsory retirement order was available to him under R.15-A 
of Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Discipline and Appeal 
Rules, 1980. On the facts the Supreme Court found that the 
review petition was not an alternative efficacious remedy and 
therefore held that the High Court was wrong in dismissing his 
petition on the ground that an alternative remedy was available. 
The High Court will not go into the disputed question 
of fact in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.^ It has been 
held that the High Court should not dispose of in summary 
manner important question of law raised in a petition under 
Article 226. The Supreme Court directed the High Court to 
decide the case on merits.^ 
Because of its broad ambit. Article 226 serves as a big 
reservoir of judicial power to control administrative action 
and hundreds of writ petitions are moved in the High Courts 
every year challenging this or that action of the administra-
tion. Being a constitutional provision, the ambit of art.226 
cannot be curtailed or whittled down by legislation, and even 
1. Burmah Construction Co. v. State of Orissa,A.I.R.1962 S.C, 
1320. 
2. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab A.I.R.1980 S.C. 1355. 
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if a statute were to declare an administrative action as final, 
art.226 could still be invoked to challenge the same.^ This is 
an aspect of some significance. For while in the modern 
administrative age, the legislature is rather easily persuaded 
to make the powers of the administration immune from being 
questioned in the courts, article 226 (and art. 32 as well) 
would still provide a means to restore to courts against any 
action of the administration. From this point of view, it may 
be worthwhile to point out the judicial review stands on a much 
firmer ground in India than Britain, for while in Indian the 
constitutional provisions guaranteeing judicial review are 
immune from any legislative action, in Britain it is not so and 
the jurisdiction of the courts to issue writs can always be 
regulated or entailed by legislation. 
Under article 226, the jurisidction of the High Court 
to issue writs etc., extends to the state over which it has 
jurisdiction, and also to territories outside that state, if 
the government, authority or person is within those 
territories and if the cause of action in relation to the 
government etc., wholly or in part, arises within the State. 
For exercising such outside jurisdiction, it is not necessary 
that the whole of the cause of action should arise within the 
1. Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, A.I.R.1955 S.C.425; 
Haryana v. Haryana Coop. Transport, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 237. 
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state, it is sufficient if only a part of the cause of action 
has arisen within the state. It depends upon the facts of each 
case whether part of the cause of action has arisen within the 
state or not.^ 
Alternative Remedy : 
The alternative remedy is that the Supreme Court and 
High Courts cannot refuse relief under Articles 32 and 226 on 
the ground of alternative remedy if the person complains of 
violation of his Fundamental Rights. But if the person invokes 
the jurisdiction of the High Court for any other purpose, in 
exercise of its discretion the High Court may refuse relief. 
The law was laid down' with sufficient clarity by the Supreme 
2 Court in A.V. Venkateswaran V.R.S. Wadhwani. 
Where no Fundamental Right is involved, it has been 
ruled that, normally speaking, a High Court would not exercise 
its jurisdiction under art.226 when an alternate, adequate and 
efficacious legal remedy is available and the petitioner has 
not availed of the same before coming to the High Court. ^  
1. India v. Hindustan Aluminium Corp.Ltd., A.I.R. 1983 Cal.307. 
2. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1506. 
3. Rashid v. I.T.I. Comm., A.I.R. 1954 S.C.207; Rajiv Bhai v. 
Chief Officer, A.I.R. 1982 Guj.163. 
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Art. 226 is silent on this point; it does not say in so many 
words anything about this matter, but the courts have them-
selves evolved this rule as a kind of self-imposed restriction 
on their writ jurisdiction under article 226. The rule has 
been justified on the ground that persons should not be encou-
raged to circumvent the provisions made by a statute providing 
for a mechanism and procedure to challenge administrative 
action taken thereunder. The courts have also stressed the 
point that the remedy under art.226 being discretionary, the 
High Court could refuse to grant a writ if it is satisfied that 
the petitioner could have an adequate or suitable relief 
elsewhere. For example in Prafulla Chandra v. Oil India Ltd.^, 
the High Court dismissed a writ petition filed for staying the 
implementation of an order dismissing some of the employees of 
Oil India on the ground that an alternative remedy existed 
under the Industrial Disputes Act. In Tilaghur Paper Mills Co. 
2 
Ltd. V. Orissa , it was held that the petitioners were not per-
mitted to approach the High Court, without exhaution of the 
alternative remedy, to get redress for an alleged illegal order 
of the sales tax authority. Under the Act, there is a 
hierarchy of authorities before which the petitioners can get 
redress against the wrongful acts complained of. 
1. A.I.R. 1971 Assam 9. 
2. A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 603. 
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But this not an absolute rule and some flexibility is 
practised by the courts in this matter depending upon the cir-
cumstances of the case in which the writ jurisdiction is 
invoked. The High Courts emphasize repeatedly that existence 
of an alternative legal remedy does not affect their writ 
jurisdiction as such, it is only a factor to be taken into 
consideration by them in the exercise of their discretion. The 
rule of exhaustion of remedy before invoking jurisdiction under 
article 226 has been characterised as a rule of policy, conve-
nience and discretion rather than a rule of law^. Existence of 
an alternative remedy is not regarded per sc a bar to issuing a 
writ, and the court is not obligated, as a rigid norm, to 
always relegate the petitioner to the alternative remedy. This 
is more a matter of self-imposed restriction by the courts on 
themselves. The courts recognise that there could be circums-
tances justifying the issue of a writ without exhaustion of the 
2 
alternative remedy . For example, if the petitioner has lost 
his remedy for no fault of his own, the High Court could take 
cognisance of the matter under article 226, but would not do so 
when he has lost his remedy through his own fault^. If the 
alternative remedy is onerous and burdensome, then it could not 
be regarded as adequate and the High Court could take cogni-4 sance of the matter under article 226 . For example, in tax 
* 
1. Uttar Pradesh v. Md.Nooh, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 86. Also Baburam 
V. Zila Parishad, A.I.R.1969 S.C.556. 
2. Municipal Council v. Kamal Kumar, A.I.R.1965 S.C.1321; Zila 
Parishad v. Kundan Sugar Mills,A.I.R.1968 S.C. 98. 
3. Venkateswaram v. Wadhwani, A.I.R.1961 S.C. 1506. 
4. Himmatlal v. Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R.1954 S.C.403. 
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assessment proceedings, where an appeal from the assessing 
officer could be taken to a higher authority only after 
depositing the tax assessed, the assessee could approach the 
High Court under article 226 without exhausting the statutory 
remedy as it was onerous and not adequrate^. Under the Sea 
Customs Act, 1878, an appeal from an order of the collector 
imposing penalty could be taken to the higher authority only 
after deposit' of the amount of penalty imposed. This remedy is 
thus not adequate and, therefore, the High Court could exercise 
2 its writ jurisdiction . 
Normally when the petitioner has availed of the 
alternate legal remedy and the matter is pending before the 
authority, the court will not entertain a writ petition. But 
if a question arises in the course of those proceedings which 
the authority has no jurisdiction to decide, e.g. vires of the 
statute, the alternative remedy will not be a bar to the writ 
petition^. In such a case the alternative remedy is not an 
affective and efficacious remedy. 
The High Court will not go into the disputed question 
4 of fact in exercise of its writ-jurisdiction . The power 
1. Ibid 
2. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. India A.I.R.1982 Goa.26. 
3. India v. Hindustan Aluminium Corp.Ltd., A.I.R.1983 Cal.307 
4.Burmah Construction Co. v. State of Orissa, A.I.R.1962 S.C. 
1320. 
126 
conferred on the High Court by Art.226 cannot be taken away or 
abridged by any law except by an amendment of the Constitution^. 
The words writs, orders or directions in article 32 as 
well as 226 is in the process of evolution. The judicial 
opinion has been undergoing some shifts. The over-all picture 
is that the judiciary has expanded over time the range of 
persons or bodies to whom writs can be issued. The reason 
underlying this judicial approach is that centres of power 
should be restrained from arbitrary application of power 
against individuals. The eternal principle of modern democra-
tic government is: "The governing power wherever located must 
2 be subject to the fundamental constitutional limitations". 
Writs are public law remedies and are generally desi-
ned to redress grievances against public officials or bodies. 
In the modern welfare state, the administration has assumed a 
sprawling and varied character. The state functions not only 
through the traditional government departments, officials, 
boards, administrative bodies and local governmental bodies but 
but also through diversified various other agencies called 
public corporations, government companies, commissions, etc., 
which discharge various types of functions. The state at times 
utilises such structures as companies registered under the 
1. Sangham Singh v. Election Tribunal A.I.R.1955 S.C.425. 
2. Mathew, J., in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram, A.I.R.1975 S.C. 
1331, 1352. 
127 
Companies Act, or Co-operative Societies registered under the 
Co-operative Societies Act and some of these bodies may be 
sponsored by the government itself and some may even be set up 
by private persons. The modern administration has assumed such 
a multifarious character that the question against whom a writ 
may be issued? bristles with difficulties. This state of 
affairs is recognised by the Indian Constitution in article 12, 
which falls ,in Part III of the Constitution. This part 
contains Fundamental Rights of the people. Since writs can be 
issued for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights under articles 
32 and 226, it follows that they can be issued for that purpose 
to all the bodies covered by article 12. As regards writs "for 
any other purpose" under article 226, they can certainly be 
issued to the various bodies covered by art.12, but it is a 
moot point whether this part of the jurisdiction of a High 
Court covers a broader area than that covered by article 12. 
The writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo-warrants, 
Certiorari and Prohibition have been borrowed in India from 
England where they have had a long and chequered history of 
development and, consequently, have gathered a number of tech-
nicalities^. The Supreme Court and the High Court have power 
to issue writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus etc., 
under articles 32 and 226 respectively. The words "in the 
1. Bassappa v. Nagappa, A. I .R. 1954 S.C. 440; Dwarka Nath v. 
Income Tax Officer, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 81. 
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nature of" in the Indian Constitutional provisions are 
significant as they indicate that the courts are not bound to 
follow all the technicalities of the English law surrounding 
these writs, or the changes of judicial openion there from case 
to case and time to time. What the Indian courts have to do, 
therefore, is to keep to the broad and fundamental principles 
underlying these writs in the English law; the courts do not 
have to feel' completely circumscribed by those principles. 
Although the Supreme Court has itself emphasised this front, in 
practice, however, the attitude of the Indian courts is by and 
large conditioned by the English approach and it is not often 
that the courts show a tendency to depart from the technicali-
ties of the English law. The courts have generally been prone 
to follow the principles developed in English with some devia-
tions here and there, except that in recent years some bold ^  
departures have been made from the English position. While the 
administration expands and perfects new techniques to interfere 
with individual freedom under the impulse of the concept of a 
socialist society, the tools of the disposal of courts to 
control the same remain somewhat antiquated. Quite a few 
aspects of administrative functioning fall outside judicial 
scrutiny. The result is the anomalous position that an 
individual aggreieved by administrative action may not always 
get relief through court action. This point will become clear 
after the discus sion on the nature of the writs and the grounds 
on which they can be issued. 
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Writ of Habeas Corpus; 
Habeas Corpus is a Latin term, which may be rendered 
into English in some such form as 'you must have the body' . 
This writ is used primarily to secure the release of a person 
who has been detained unlawfully or without any legal justifi-
cation' . The great value of the writ is tha^ - it enables imme-
diates determination of the right of a person as to his 
freedom^. The writ is issued in form of an order calling upon 
a person by whom another person is detained to bring that 
person before the court and to let the court know by what 
authority he has detained that person. If the cause shown 
discloses that there is no legal justification for detention 
the court will order immediate release of the detained person. 
Thus the main object of the writ is to give quick and immediate 
remedy to a person who is unlawfully detained by the person 
whether in prison or private custody. 
The writ of habeas corpus can be traced thirteenth 
century, the words 'habeas corpus' were a familiar formula in 
the language of civil procedure and it is likely that the 
phrase first appeared much earlier. The words simply repre-
sented a command, issued as a means or interlocutory process to 
have the defendant to an action brought physically before the 
court. The idea of producing the body with the cause of his 
1. Ranjit V. Pepsu, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 843. 
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detention was not present. In fact, there usually had been no 
detention at all^^i^d the purpose of the process was to order an 
officer to bring in the defendant, and not at all to subject 
the cause of a detention to the courts' scrutiny. It has, 
even, been said that the early use of habeas corpus was to put 
people in goal rather than to get them out, but this seems to 
have been a mistaken impression. Habeas corpus was used not to 
arrest and imprison, but to ensure the physical presence of a 
person in court on a certain day. There is some indication 
that 'habeas corpus' was also used to signify a command to the 
Sheriff to bring a person accused of crime before the court. 
Again, this seems to have been merely one way to have the party 
physically brought into face the charges against him where 
other methods had failed. The words 'habeas corpus' at this 
early stage were not connected with the idea of liberty, and 
the process involved an element of the concept of due process 
of law only in so far as it mirrored the refusal of the courts 
to decide a matter without having the defendant present. 
Many of the purposes for which the writ has been utili-
zed in the past are now matters of historical importance. 
Aliens who had been brought to England as slaves had attained 
2 3 freedom by means of habeas corpus . In Hottentot Venus , a 
1. For details see, Pallock & others, The History of English 
I^,[2nd ed.l952] p-593. 
2. Sommer Sett's Case (1972) 20 S.C. T.I. 
3. (1810) 13 East.195 
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rule for a writ of habeas corpus was granted upon the allega-
tion that an ignorant and helpless foreigner has been brought 
to this country and exhibited against her consent by those who 
held her in their custody. The writ was at one time also used 
as a means of securing freedom in cases of illegal imprisonment 
though within certain limits legal as a means of recruiting in 
the case of the navy and based on the royal prerogative, is no 
longer resorted to. During the first world war attempts were 
made to use the writ as a means of escaping from the compulsory 
military service under the provisions of the Military Service 
Acts^. 
In modern times the writ is most frequently invoked to 
test the validity of detention in public or private custody. A 
person who is in custody under a warrant or order of commitment 
may test the validity of the warrant or order under which he is 
detained by means of the writ of habeas corpus irrespective of 
the fact whether he is imprisoned under the sentence of a 
naval, military or ecclesiastical court or interned under the 
authority of some emergency state. The High Court ig qompetept 
to issue a writ of habeas corpus for the production of a person 
illegally or improperly detained in public custody under 
9 executive orders . 
1. R.V. Mornhill Camp (1917) K.B. 176. 
2. Bissewar Roy v. Emperor, 1925, A.I.R. Cal.961. 
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In India, detention may be unlawful if, inter alia, it 
is not in accordance with law, or the procedure established by 
law^ has not been strictly followed in detaining a person, or 
there is no valid authority of law to detain a person, or the 
law is invalid because it infringes a Fundamental Right, or the 
2 
legislature in enacting the law exceeds, its limits . Under 
article 22, a person arrested is required to be produced before 
a magistrate within 24 hours of his arrest, and failure to do 
so would entitled the arrested person to be released. 
However, recent developments of law indicate that in a 
writ of habeas corpus the production of the body of the person 
alleged to be unlawfully detained is not essential. In Kanu 
Sanjal v. District Magistrate. Darjeeling^, the Supreme Court 
however, held that while dealing with the application of writ 
of habeas corpus production of the body of the person alleged 
to be unlawfully detained was not essential. In that case the 
top-ranking Naxalite leader Kanu Sanyal was arrested in 1971 
and was detained without trail in the Visakhapatnam Jail. He 
moved the Supreme Court for a writ under Art.32 of the Consti-
tution challenging the legality of his detention and praying 
1. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. It has been held 
that procedure established by law "in art.21 means" fair and 
reasonable" procedure: Maneka Gandhi v. India, A.I.R. 1978 
S.C. 597; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R.1978 
S.C. 1675. 
2. Makhan Singh v. Punjab, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 27. 
3. A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 510. | 
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for the Courts' order for his production before the court. The 
court issued the rule misi but not the production of the 
detenue. Counsel appearing for the detenue, contended the 
production of the body of person alleged to be illegally 
detained was an essential feature of writ of habeas corpus 
under Art.32 of the Constitution and that the court can dispose 
of the petition only after the petitioner was produced in 
person before' it. Bhagwati, J., held that in writ of habeas 
corpus under Art.32 the production of body of the person 
detained before the court was not necessary for hearing and 
disposing of the writ-petition by the court. The production of 
body of a person illegally detained is not an essential feature 
of the writ of habeas corpus. "Why should we hold ourselves in 
fetters by a practice which originated in England about 300 
years ago on account of certain historical circumstances which 
have ceased to be valid even in that country and which have 
certainly no relevance inour^', his Lordship said. 
Though the traditional function of the writ of habeas 
corpus has been to get the release of a person unlawfully 
detained or arrested, the Supreme Court has widened its scope 
by giving relief through the writ against inhuman cruel treat-
ment meted out to prisoners in jail^. In Sunil Batra II the 
1. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1675 
and A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1579. 
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court stated that; 
the dynamic role of judicial remedies ... 
imparts to the habeas corpus writ a versatile 
vitality and operational utility that makes 
the heating presence of the law line up to its 
reputation as bastion of liberty even within 
the secrecy of the hidden cell^. 
The cburt has thus permitted the use of the writ for 
protecting the various personal liberties to which the arrested 
persons or prisoners are entitled to under the law and the 
Constitution. The general rule is that an application can be 
made by a person who is illegally detained. But in certain 
cases, an application for habeas corpus can be made by any 
person on behalf of the prisoner, i.e. a friend or a relation. 
In an application for a writ of habeas corpus the Supreme Court 
will not follow strict rules of pleading nor place undue 
emphasis as to question as to on whom the burden of proof lies. 
Even a postcard written by a detenue from jail would be suffi-
cient to activise the court into examining the legality of 
detention. The Supreme Court has shown great anxiety for 
personal liberty and refused to throw out a petition merely on 
the ground that it does not disclose a prima facie case. This 
practice marks a departure from that obtaining in England where 
1. A.I.R. 1980 S.C. at 1582. 
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observance of the strict rules of pleading is insisted upon in 
a writ. X)f habeas corpus. : But» in view of peculiar socio-econo-
mic conditions prevailing in this country the court has adopted 
liberal approach where large masses of people are poor, 
illiterate and ignorant and the access to the courts is not 
easy on account of lack of financial resources it would be most 
unreasonable to insist that the petitioner should set out 
clearly and specifically the grounds on which he challenges the 
order of detention. The burden of proof to justify detention 
has always been placed on the detaining authority^. 
Three views have been expressed as to date with refer-
ence to which the legality of detention of a person may be 
examined on a habeas corpus petition. In Gopalan v. Govern-
2 
ment of India , the Supreme Court ruled that the earliest date 
with reference to which the legality of detention may be 
examined is the date on which the application for the same is 
made to the court. In a few earlier cases!^, the view was taken 
that the legality was to be determined at the time of the 
return and not with reference to the institution of the procee-
dings. In another case, the Supreme Court has stated that the 
legality of detention is to be considered as on the date of 
1. Icchu Devi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1981. 
2. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 816. 
3. Narayan Singh v. Punjab, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 106. 
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1 2 hearing . In Kanu Sanyal v. Distt. Magistrare (II), the 
Supreme Court has taken note of these three views and pointed 
out that the second vievr is more in accordance with the law 
and practice in England and largely accepted in India. The 
third view also has some relevance for if the detention at the 
hearing is legal, the court cannot order release of the person 
detained by issuing habeas corpus. In Kanu Sanyal, the court 
did not express any definitive view as to which of the three 
views is correct. In any case, the court has ruled that the 
earliest date with reference to which the legality of detent-
ion could be examined is the date of filing of the petition for 
habeas corpus and the court is not concerned with a date prior 
to that. In the instant case, the court refused to go into the 
validity of detention before the date of petition. 
Writ of habeas corpus provides security against admi-
nistrative and private lawlessness but not against judicial 
'foolishness'. Therefore if a person has been imprisoned under 
the order of conviction passed by a court, writ would not lie. 
The normal procedure in such case is appeal. In exercise of 
its discretion, the court may refuse the petition if there is 
special alternative remedy available. But it is not a rule of 
the limitation of jurisdiction. The court may still grant 
relief in appropriate cases.^ 
1. Talib Husain v. Jammu and Kashmir A.I.R. 1971 S.C.62. 
2. A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 510. 
3. Gopalji V. Shree Chand, A.I.R.1955 All 28. 
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The writ of habeas corpus will lie if the power of 
detention vested in an authority was exercised mala fide and 
is made in collateral or ulterior purposes. In habeas corpus 
writ proceeding not only the fact of detention but the consti-
tutionality of the law can also be challenged. In A.K. 
Gopalan v. State of Madras^, the court examined the constitu-
tionality of the Preventive Detention Act. The legislature 
which depriA^es a person of his personal liberty by law must be 
competent to make that law. If the law is unlawful the deten-
tion will be unlawful. An a^-peal lies against an order of the 
High Court granting or rejecting the application for issue of 
the habeas corpus under Arts.132, 134 or 136. 
1. A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27. 
138 
The Writ of Mandamus; 
The word "mandamus" means "the order". The writ cf 
mandamus is thus an order by a superior court commanding a 
person or a public authority (including the Government and 
public corporation) to do or forbear to do something in the; 
nature of public duty or in ce-rtain cases of a statutory duty. 
For instance a licensing officer is under a duty to issue a 
licence to an applicant who fulfils all the conditions laid 
down for the issue of such licence. But despite the 
fulfilment of such conditions if the officer or the authority 
concerned refuses or fails to issue the licence the aggreived 
person has a right to seek the remedy through a writ cf 
mandamus. Mandamus is thus a command issued by a court to an 
authority directing it to perform a public duty imposed it by 
law. The writ can be issued when the government denies to 
itself a jurisdiction which it undoubtedly has under the law} 
or where an authority vested with a power improperly refuses 
2 to exercise it . The function of mandamus is to keep the 
1. E.A. Co-operative Society v. Maharastra, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 
1449. 
2. Municipal Corporation v. Advance Builders, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 
793; Rampal v. State, A I..R.1981 Raj. 121. 
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public authorities within the limits of their jurisdiction 
while exercising public functions, Mandamus can be issued to 
any kind of authority in respect of any type of function-
administrative, legislative- quasi-judicialjudicial Thus, 
when the telephone of the applicant was wrongfully disconnec-
ted in spite of his paying his dues regularly, the High Court 
directed the telephone authorities to restore the connection 
within a week^• 
In India, mandamus can be issued to undo what has 
already been done in contravention of a statute, or to enforce 
a duty to abstain from acting unlawfully. For example 
Mandamus can be issued to restrain the government from super-
seding a reference made by it earlier of an industrial dispute 
for adjudication to a labour tribunal because under the law 
2 the government has no authority to do so „ 
1. Birendra Kumar v. India, A.I R. 1983 Cal.273. 
2. Bihar v. D N. Ganguly, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 1018, 
It is considered as a residuary remedy of the public 
law. It is a general remedy whenever justice has been denied 
to any person. English writers trace the development of the 
writ from the Norman conquest, however it was only in the early 
part of the eighteenth century that the writ came to be fre-
quently used in the public law to compel the performance of the 
public duties. 
Conditions for the grant of Mandamus; 
(i) There must be public or private duty; 
Untill recently the law was that mandamus would be only 
to enforce a duty which is public in nature. Therefore a duty 
private in nature and arising out of a contract was not enforc-
eable through this writ. It was on this basis that in I.T. 
Commr v. State of Madras^, the court refused to issue mandamus 
where the petitioners wanted the government to fulfil its obli-
gation arising out of a contract. However, recently in Gujrat 
2 
State Financial Corporation v. Lotus Hotel , the Supreme Court 
issued writ of mandamus for the specific performance of a 
contract to advance money. In this case the Gujrat Financial 
Corporation a government instrumentality, had sanctioned a loan 
of Rs.30 lakhs to Lotus Hotel for the construction but later on 
refuse to pay the amount. 
1. A.I.R. 1954 Mad.54. 
2. (1983) 3 S.C.C. 379. 
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A public duty is one which is created either by a sta-
tute, the constitution or by some rule of common law. The 
public duty enforceable through mandamus must also be an abso-
lute duty. Absolute is one which is mandatory and not discre-
tionary. Therefore in Manjula Manjari v. Director of Public 
Instruction^, the court refused to issue mandamus against the 
Director of Public Instruction complelling him to include the 
petitioner's textbook in the list of approved books because it 
was a matter in the complete direction of the authority. Mand-
amus would not lie where the duty is ministerial in nature. A 
ministerial duty is one where the authority has to act on the 
2 
instructions of his superior . In the same manner mandamus can 
not be issued to enforce administrative directions which do not 
have the force of law, hence it is discretionary with the 
authority to accept it or to reject it^. But where the admini-
strative instructions are binding, mandamus would lie to 4 
enforce it . Mandamus would also lie to compel the authority 
to refund the amount of fee it has collected under law which 
has been declared ultra vires by the competent court.^ 
1. A.I.R. 1952 Ori 344. 
2. T.K.Singh v. Extra Asstt.Commr., A.I.R.1956 Mani 1 
3. G.J. Fernandez v. State of Mysore A.I.R.1967 S.C.1753. 
4. Jagjit Singh v. State of Punjab,(1978) 2 S.C.C. 196. 
5..Sliv Shankar Dal Mills v. State of Haryana, (1980) 2 S.C.C. 
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(ii) There must be a specific demand and refusal; 
Before mandamus can be granted there must be a specific 
demand for the fulfilment of duty and there must be specific 
refusal by the authority. Therefore in Naubat Rai v. Union of 
India^, the court refused mandamus because the petitioner who 
was illegally dismissed from the military form never applied to 
the authority for reinstatement. 
To maintain a petition for mandamus, the petitioner 
must show that he has a right to compel the government to act 
in a particular manner. In the absence of any such right, 
mandamus cannot be granted. The existence of such a right is 
the sine qua non for the issuance of the writ^. When the gover-
ning body of a college appointed a new principal after inter-
viewing the candidates and considering their applications, 
mandamus would not be issued on the petition of a unsuccessful 
candidate as he has no legal right to be appointed . 
Formerly, the rule was that only a person having a 
specific legal right to the performance of the duty by the 
concerned public authority had a right to seek mandamus. This 
meant a very strict legal standing rule and laid emphasis on 
individual right rather than public interest. The standing 
rule has now been very much relaxed and emphasis has come to be 
1. A.I.R. 1953 Puni 137. 
2. Mani Subrat v. Haryana, A.I.R.1977 S.C.276. 
3. Shivendra v. Nalanda College, A.I.R.1962 S.C. 1210. 
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shifted from vindication of "individual right" to "public 
interest". The principal has come to be that public authori-
ties should be made "to perform their duties, as a matter of 
public interest, at the instance of any person genuinely 
interested; subject always to the discretion of the count. 
For the issue of mandamus against an administrative 
authority the, affected individual must demand justice and only 
on refusal he has a right to approach the court.^ 
Thus, a party seeking mandamus must show that he demand. 
justice from the authority concerned by performing his duty and 
the demand was refused. In S.I. syndicate, the court refused 
to grant mandamus as there was no such demand or refusal where 
a civil servant approached the court for mandamus against 
wrongful denial of promotion, he was denied the relief because 
of his failure to make representation to the government against 
2 
injustice. The demand for justice is not a matter of form but 
a matter of substance, and it is necessary that a "proper and 
sufficient demand has to be made?'? The demand must be made to 
the proper authority and not to an authority which is not in a 
position to perform its duty in the manner demanded. It is 
suggested that the court should not fossilize this rule into 
1. S.I. Syndicate v. India, A.I.R.1975 S.C.460. 
2. Amrit Lai v. Collector, C.E.C. Revenue, A.I.R.1975 S.C. 538. 
3. The Statesman v. Fact Finding Committee, A.I.R.1975 Cal.l4. 
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something rigid and inflexible but keep it as flexible. Demand 
may also not be necessary "where it is obvious that the respon-
dent would not comply with it and therefore it would be but 
idle formality."^ 
However, express demand and refusal is not necessary. 
Demand and refusal can be inferred from the circumstances also. 
2 
Therefore, in Venugopalan v. Commr. Vijayawada Municipality , 
the court inferred demand and refusal from the situation in 
which the petitioner filed a suit for injunction restraining 
the municipality from holding elections and the suit was conte-
sted by the municipaltiy. 
(iii) There rhust be a clear right to enforce the duty; 
Mandamus will not be issued unless there is, in the 
applicant, a right to compel the performance of some duty cast 
on the authority. Therefore, in S.P. Manocha v. State of M.P.^ 
the court refused to issue mandamus to the college to about the 
petitioner because the petitioner could not establish a clear 
right to admission in the college. The right to enforce a duty 
must subsist till the date of the petition. If the right has 
been lawfully terminated before filing the petition, mandamus 
4 cannot be issued . 
1. Narayan Singh v. Rajasthan, A.I.R.1984 Raj.69. 
2. A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 833. 
3. A.I.R. 1973 M.P. 84. 
4. Kalyan Singh v. State of U.P. A.I.R.1962 S.C. 1183. 
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Mandamus is employed to enforce a duty the performance 
of which is imperative and not optional or discretionary with 
the authority concerned^. Mandamus is used to enforce the 
performance of public duties by public authorities. Mandamus 
2 
is not issued when government is under no duty under the law . 
A state government made a rule taking power to grant dearness 
allowance to its employees. The rule neither conferred any 
right on the government employees to get the dearness allowance 
nor imposed any duty on the government to grant the same. The 
government had merely taken power to grant the allowance in its 
discretion. Accordingly, mandamus could not be issued direct-
ing the government to grant the allowance to its employees^. 
Mandamus cannot be issued directing the state government to 
appoint a commission to inquire into changes in climatic cycle, 
floods in the state etc. The reason being that under the 
commission of Inquiry Act, the power of the government to 
appoint a commission is discretionary except when the legisla-
tive passes a resolution to appoint an enquiry commission . 
Mandamus can be issued on all those courts on which 
certiorari and prohibition can be issued. Therefore, mandamus 
1. Chingleput Betters v. Majestic Bottling Co., A.I.R.1984 
S.C. 1030. 
2. Rajan Dwivedi v. India, A.I.R. 1983 S.C.624. 
3. Madhya Pradesh v. Mandavar, A.I.R.1954 S.C.493; K.V.R.Setty 
v. Mysore, A.I.R.1967 S.C.993. 
4. Vijay Mehta v. State A.I.R.1980 Raj.207; Rajinder Kumar v. 
Punjab, A.I.R. 1983 Punj.285. 
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can be issued for lack of jurisdiction, excess of jurisdiction, 
abuse of jurisdiction, for violation of the principles of 
natural justice and error of law apparent on the face of 
record. Mandamus may be issued not only to compel the autho-
rity to do something but also to restrain it from doing some-
thing. It provides a general remedy in administrative law. 
Like any other extraordinary remedy, the grant of 
mandamus is discretionary. The court may refuse it if there is 
unreasonable delay in filing the petition, or if there is ade-
quate alternative remedy, or if it is premature, or if its 
issuance would be infructuous and futile. Mandamus would also 
not be against the President or Governor of any state for the 
exercise and performance of powers and duties of his office.^ 
In hearing the petition for mandamus, the court does not sit as 
a court of appeal. The court will not examine the correctness 
2 
or otherwise of the decision on merits. It cannot substitute 
its own wisdom for the discretion vested in the authority 
unless the exercise of discretion is illegax^. This is true 
for other writs also. 
There being no Fundamental Rights in England, there 
cannot be any question of the writ of mandamus being used for 
the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. It is used for the 
enforcement of the ordinary legal rights relating to public 
1. Article 361. 
2. V.C., Utkal University v. S.K.Ghosh, A.I.R.1954 S.C.217. 
3. Ibid. 
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matters. In India, the writ is available under Article 226 
not only for the purposes for which it is available in England 
but also for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. It is 
obvious, therefore, that in the matter of enforcement of 
Fundamental Rights, Indian Courts may have to evolve princi-
ples which are different from those which govern the issue of 
the writ in England. For instance, the remedy by means of the * 
writ being guaranted by the Constitution for the enforcement 
of the Fundamental Rights, it becomes the duty of the court to 
issue the writ of mandamus where a Fundamental Right has been 
infringed, in case where the writ might not be available in 
England. 
1A8 
The Writ of Quo Warranto 
The term quo warranto means what is your authority. 
The writ quo warranto is used to judicially control executive 
actions in the matter of making appointments to public offices 
under relevant statutory provisions. The writ is also usea to 
prtotect a qitizen from the holder of a public office to which 
he has no right. The writ calls upon the holder of a public 
office to show to the court under what authority he is holding 
the office in question. If he is not entitled to the office, 
the court may restrain him from acting in the office and may 
also declare the office to be vacant^. The writ lies in 
respect of a public office of a substantive character and not 
a private office such as membership of a school managing 
2 
committee . An appointment to the office- of a public prose-
cutor can be quashed through quo warranto if in contravention 
of relevant statutory rules as it is a substantive public office involving duties of public nature of vital interest to 
public^. The Andhra Pradesh High Court quashed the appoint-
ment of a government pleader as the procedure prescribed in 
1. University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 491. 
2. Amarendra v. Nartendra, A.I.R. 1953 Cal.114. 
3. Mohambaram v. Jayavelu, A.I.R. 1970 Mad.63; Durga Chand v. 
Administration, A I R 1971 Del.73. 
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the relevant rules for this purpose had not been followed^. 
Nomination by the Governor of members to the state legislative 
council, appointment of a Chief Minister in a state, 
nominations or elections to municipal bodies, inter alia have 
2 
been challenged by way of petitiions for quo warranto . Quo 
warranto will not be issued if there is an alternative legal 
remedy provided by the statute. Thus it will not be a proper 
remedy to challenge the election of a Chief Minister to the 
House, as the statutes provides for the remedy of an election 
petition. The office of the Principal of a private college has 
been held to be not a public office^. 
It is a method of judicial control in the sense that 
the proceedings practically review the actions of the adminis-
trative authority which appointed the person. It tunes the 
aministration by removing inefficient and unqualified perso-
1. K. Bheema Raju v. Govt, of A.P., A,I.R. 1981 A.P. 
2. Jogendra Nation v. Assam, A.I.R, 1982 Gau.25. 
3. Niranjan Kumar v. University of Bihar, A.I.R. 1973 
Pat.85. 
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nnel and impostors from public offices. Thus the writ of quo 
warranty gives judiciary the weapon to control the executive, 
the legislative, statutory and non-statutory bodies in matters 
of appointment in the public offices. A.N. Ray, J. (who was 
fourth in order of seniority) was appointed as Chief Justice of 
India superseding his three senior colleagues who immediately 
resigned from the Supreme Court. A petition for the writ of 
quo warranto was moved in the Delhi High Court challenging the 
appointment of Ray, J., as the Chief Justice but the court 
dismissed the petition^. In the first place, the court stated 
that quo warranto was a writ of technical nature and it is 
discretionary for the court to grant it or refuse it according 
2 
to the facts and circumstances of the case . Secondly, the 
court argued that the writ would not be issued if it is futile 
to do so, or where a mere irregularity in the appointment can 
be cured. Thus, even if it were assumed that the appointment 
of the Chief Justice should be on the basis of the rule of 
seniority, Ray J., could immediately be reappointed, if quo-wa-
rranto were issued, for he was by then the senior-most judge of 
the court. It follows from this that if a holder of a public 
office is not qualified to hold the office initially but subse-
quently acquires the necessary qualifications during the 
pendency of the writ petition, the writ quo warrantP will not be 
1. P.L. Lakhanpal v. A.N.Ray, A.I.R.1975 Del.66. 
2. In Jogendra Nath v. Assam A.I.R.1982 Gau.25, the court 
rejected aquo.'warranto, petition challenging the appointment 
of the Chief Minister saying that this question was best 
left to the Assembly as to who should have been appointed to 
this office by the Governor. 
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issued^. Thirdly, the court ruled that malafides of the appoi-
nting authority is not relevant to the question of issuing quo-
warranto as the writ is issued against the usurper of the 
office and not against the appointing authority, quo warrant© 
would not be issued even if the appointment was made for a 
collateral purpose if the appointment did not violate any man-
datory rule. 
* 
An appointment to a public office cannot be challenged 
in a collateral proceeding. However, in Haryana v. Haryana Co-
op. Transport^, the Supreme Court held that a person can chall-
enge an award of a labour court under article 226 by challeng-
ing the appointment of the presiding officer thereof on the 
ground that he was not qualified under the law to hold the 
office. The court rules that the appointment was not being 
challenged collaterally in proceedings taken to challenge the 
award, but directly in substantive proceedings. This is 
artificial logic. The petitioner had not asked specifically in 
so many words that quo warranto be issued, but the court ignored 
the defect by saying that there was no magic in the use of a 
formula In this case the court not only quashed the appoint-
ment of the presiding officer but also set aside the award. 
Originally, quo warranto was a high prerogative writ. 
The essence of the procedure was calling a subject to account 
1. G. Mohapatra v. Chairman, N.A.C., A.I.R.1976 Orissa 181. 
2. A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 237. 
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for an invasion or unsurpation of the royal prerogative or the 
right of franchise or liberty of the Crown. At that period of 
time it was the king's weapon, and the subjects were not 
allowed to use it. The statute of 710 extended this remedy to 
the public. 
Conditions for the issue of Quo warranto? 
A writ of Quo warranto will issue in respect of an 
office only if the office is public^. It will not lie in 
respect of office of a private charitable institution or of a 
private association. Thus, the managing Committee of a 
private school even though a small section of the public, viz. 
the students and guardians are interested in the school, is 
not an office of a public nature for the purpose of Q\io-
2 
Warranto . The test of a public office is whether the duties 
of the office are public in nature, in which the public are 
interested whether it is or is not remunerated. But payment 
of remuneration out of public funds will be a specific test^. 
In Anand Behari v. Ram Sahai"^, the court held that a public 
office is one which is created by the constitution or a 
statute and the duties of which must be such in which public 
is interested. In this case it was held that the office of 
speaker of Legislative Assembly is a public office. 
1. University of Mysore v. Govinda A.I.R.1965 S.C.491(494) . 
2. Niranjan v. Bihar University, A.I.R.1973 Pat.85(Para.3) . 
3. Ramachandran v. Aligiriswani, A.I.R. 1961 Mad.450(455:467). 
4. (1916) 1KB 595. 
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A substantive office is one which is permanent in 
charcter and is not terminable at will. In R.V. Speyer^, the 
word 'substantive' was interpreted to mean an 'office indepen-
dent of title' . Therefore, quo warranto v/ould be granted even 
when the office is held at the pleasure of the state provided 
it is permanent in characrter. In other words, the official 
must be an independent official and not merely one discharg-
ing the functions of a deputy or servent at the pleasure of 
another officer. 
Mere declaration that a person is elected to an office 
or mere appointment to a particular office is not sufficient 
for the issue of quo warranto unless such person actually 
2 
accepts such office . There must be a clear violation of law 
in the appointment of a person to the public office. If there 
is a mere irregularity, quo warranto will not lie. In state 
of Assam v. Ranga Muhammad^, the court found the transfer and 
posting of two district judges contrary to law, but did not 
issue quo warranto as it was a case of mere irregularity that 
did not make the occupation of office wrongful. 
In short. Quo warrant will not issue unless there is 
4 a clear infringement of provisions having the force of law as 
1. (1916) 1KB 595. 
2. Puranlal v. P.C.Ghosh, A.I.R.1970 Cal.118. 
3. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 903. 
4. Statesman v. H.R. Deb, A.I.R.1968 S.C.1495(1500 ) . 
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distinguished from mere administrative instructions or some 
provision of the constitution itself^. The question to be 
determined before issuing quo-warrant) is whether the impunged 
appointment has contravened the binding rule of law and not 
whether it has involved a 'manifest error' which is relevant 
in a proceeding for certorari. 
When Quo-WarrantP may be refused; 
Quo-warranto is a discretionary remedy which the court 
may grant or refuse according to the facts and circumstances 
2 
of each case. The proposition that a writ can be issued on 
the petition of a person whose rights are adversely affected 
has no application to the writ of quo warranto. A petition 
for the writ is maintainable at the instance of any person, 
although he is not personally aggrieved or interested in the 3 
matter . However, he must not be a man of straw set up by 
anyone. For example, in order to challenge a municipal 
office, the person must at least be the resident of the area 
where municipality governs. 
Like any other extraordinary remedy, quo-warranto is 
also a discretionary remedy. It can be refused on the ground 
of unreasonable delay. Therefore, when a person has held 
1. Narayan v. Rathi, A.I.R.1963 M.P.17. 
2. Lakhan Pal v. A.N.Ray A.I.R. 1975 Del.66. 
3. G. Venkateswara Rao v. Govt, of A.P., A.I.R.1966 S.C.828. 
155 
office for a long time without challenge the writ may be 
refused. However, in K. Bheema Raju v. Govt, of Andhra 
Pradesh^, the court remarked that in a matter which involves a 
Fundamental Fight to public office and violation of legal 
procedure to be adopted in the matter of public appointment to 
public office the delay should not deter the court in grant-
ing the relief and rendering justice. 
Normally, acquescence is no ground for refusing the 
remedy in cases of public office 
appointments but it may be a 
2 
relevant factor in cases of election . The writ may also be 
refused if there is an adequate alternative remedy. Therefore 
in V.D. Deshpande v. State of Hyderabad^, the court refused 
the writ against members of legislatures who had become dis-
qualified since they held offices of profit as Article 192 of 
the Constitution provided an adequate remedy. 
1. A.I.R. 1981 A,P. 24, 29. 
2. Ruttonjee & Co. v. State of W.B., A.I.R. 1967 Cal.450. 
3. A.I.R. 1975 Hyd. 36. 
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The Writ of Certiorari; 
Certiorari may be defined as a judicial order operat-
ing in personam and made in the original legal proceedings, 
directed by the Supreme Court or High Court to any constitu-
tional statutory or non-statutory body or person, requiring 
the records of any action to be certified by the court and 
dealt with according to law. It is a remedy operating in 
personam, therefore writ can be issued even where the autho-
rity has become functus officio, to the keeper of the records. 
Our Supreme Court has the power to issue certiorari 
only for the purpose of enforcement of Fundamental Rights, 
under Art.32, while our High Courts have this power under Art. 
226, not only for this purpose but also for other purposes 
where, according to the general principles governing certio-
rari, it would lie. It is to be noted, however, that though 
we have an additional ground in India, namely, the enforcement 
of Fundamental Rights, the use of the writ has so far been 
confused to the purpose of quashing a deirision and not to 
remove a case from an inferior tribunal to be tried by the 
Supreme Court or a High Court itself, for which there are 
statutory provisions. 
'Certiorari' comes from 'certify' (to inform). It was 
the writ by which" the king commanded the judges of any 
inferior court of record to certify the record of any matter 
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in that court with all things touching the same and to send it 
to the kings court to be examined^. 
The object of the writ was thus to remove the record 
of the inferior tribunal to the superior court so that the 
latter may "inform itself upon every subject essential to 
2 decide upon the propriety of the proceedings below" . 
"The ancient writ of certiorari in England is an 
original writ which may issue out of a superior court requir-
ing that the record of the proceedings in some cause or matter 
pending before an inferior court should be transmitted into 
the superior court to be there dealt with. The writ is so 
named because in its original Latin form it required that the 
king should be certified of the proceedings to be investigated 
and the object is to secure by the exercise of the authority 
of a superior court, that the jurisdiction of the inferior 
tribunal to be properly exercised".^ 
The Supreme Court while speaking of the scope of the 
4 
writ of certiorari in the Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas 
case held that whenever any body of persons having legal 
authority to determine questions affecting the rights of 
subjects and having the duty to act judicially, acts in 
excess of their legal'authority, a writ of certiorari lies. 
1. R.V.Northumberland Tribunal(1952) 1 M I E.R.122(128) C.A. 
2. Chitty, General Practice, 3rd Ed., Vol.11, p.353a. 
3. R.V.Northumberland Tribunal{1952) 1 All E.R.122(128) C.A. 
4. A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 22. 
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It does not lie to remove merely ministerial acts or to remove 
or cancel executive administrative acts. For this purpose the 
term "judicial" does not necessarily mean act of a judge or a 
legal tribunal sitting for determination of matters of law, 
but for the purpose of this question a judicial act seems to 
be an act done by competent authority, upon consideration of 
facts and circumstances imposing liability affecting the right 
of others. ' 
Conditions precedent to the issue of Certiorari; 
The writ of certiorari is issued to a judicial or 
quasi-judicial body where there is want or excess of jurisdic-
tion and where there is violation of procedure or disregards 
of principles of natural justice. The writ can also be issued 
where there is error of law apparant on the face of the record 
but not error of a fact. . 
It is a basic principle of administrative law that no 
body can act beyond its powers. This lies at the basis of 
judicial review on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. No 
authority can exceed the power given to it, and any action 
taken by it in excess of its power is invalid^. Thus, when an 
authority is empowered to grant a stage carriage permit for a 
maximum period of three years, it cannot grant the same for 
the five years. The writ of certiorari is issued to a body 
1. Ebrahim Aboobaker v. Custodian General, A.I.R.1952 S.C.319; 
Geeta Bajaj v. State, A.I.R.1982, Raj.49. 
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performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions for correcting 
errors of jurisdiction as when an inferior court or tribunal 
acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it or fails to 
exercise it^. The want of jurisdiction may arise from the 
nature of subject-matter, so that the inferior court had no 
authority to enter on the enquiry or upon some part of it. 
Want of jurisdiction may also arise from the absence of some 
preliminary proceeding or upon the existence of some parti-
cular facts which are necessary to the exercise of court's 
power and the court wrongly assumes that, that particular 
condition exists. 
A writ of ' critiorari also lies against a court or 
tribunal when it acts in violation of the principles of 
natural justice are generally accepted are the court or 
tribunal should be free from bias and interest and audi 
alteram Partem, i.e.; the parties must be heard before the 
decision is given. The principle that the adjudicator should 
not have an interest or bias in the case is that no man shall 
be a judge in his own cause, justice should not be done but 
manifestly and undoubtedly seen to be done. The reason for 
this rule is to enable the tribunal to act independently and 
2 impartially wxthout any bias towards one side or the other . 
1. State of U.P. V. Mohd.Nooh, A.I.R.1958 S.C.86. 
2. A.P.S.R.T Corpn. v. Satya Narayan Transports, A.I.R.1965 
S.C.1303. 
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The writ is also issued for correcting an error of law 
apparent on the face of record. It cannot be issued to 
correct an error of fact. What is an error of law apparent on 
the face record is to be decided by the Courts on the each 
1 2 case . In Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque the Supreme Court 
held that no error could be said to be error on the face of 
the record if it was not self-evident and if it required an 
examination,argument to establish it. Anerror of law which is 
apparant on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ 
of certiorari but not an error of fact, howsoever grave it may 
appear to be^. The reason for the rule is that the court 
issuing a writ of certiorari acts in a supervisory jurisdic-
tion and not appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, it cannot 
substitute its own decision on the merits of the case or give 
direction to be complied with by the inferior court or 
4 tribunal . 
The writ of certiorari cannot be issued against a 
private body. Co-operative Electricity Supply Society Limited 
incorporated under the Co-operative Societies Act, is a 
private body and not a public body discharging public function 
and the writ petition is, therefore, not maintainable against 
such a private society^. 
1. Inder Singh v. Chief Ciommissioner, Punjab, A.I.R.1963 S.C. 
S.C.1581. 
2. A.I.R. 1935 S.C. 223. 
3. Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan A.I.R.1964 S.C. 477. 
4. Hari Vishnu v. Ahmed Ishaque, A.I.R.19553 S.C.223. 
5. A Ranga Reddy v. General Manager Co-op. Electric Supply 
Society Ltd., A.I.R.1977 N.O.C.232(Andhra Pradesh). 
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The Writ of Prohibition; 
A writ of Prohibition is issued primarily to prevent 
an inferior court or tribunal from exceeding its jurisdiction 
or acting contrary to the rules of natural justice. It is 
issued by a superior court to inferior courts for the purpose 
of preventing inferior courts from usurping a jurisdiction 
with which, it was not legally vested or in other words to 
compel inferior courts to keep within the limits of their 
jurisdiction^. It is a writ of right and court cannot refuse 
it in cases of excess of jurisdiction or where jurisdiction is 
2 being exercised in violation of the law of the land . 
The writ of Prohibition is designed to prevent the 
excess of power by public authorities. Formerly, the writ is 
issued only to judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. For 
example, in Brij Khandelwal v. India^, the Delhi High Court 
refused to issue prohibition to the Central Government to 
prevent it from entering into an agreement with Sri Lanka 
regarding a boundary dispute. The decision was based on the 
principle that prohibition does not lie against government 
discharging executive functions and that prohibition is 
intended to control quasi-judicial and not executive, 
functions. But this view is no longer tenable with the 
1 . East India Commercial Co. v. Collector of Custom, 
A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1893. 
2. Isha Beevi v. Tax Recovery Officer(1976) 1 S.C.C.70: A.I.R. 
1975 S.C.2135. 
3. A.I.R. 1975 Del.184. 
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expansion of the concept of natural justice, and the emergence 
of the concept of fairness even in administrative functions, 
the rigidity about prohibition has also been relaxed. The 
writ can now be issued to anybody, irrespective of the nature 
of the function discharged by it, if any of the grounds on 
which the writ is issued is present. Prohibition is now 
regarded as general remedies for the judicial control of both 
quasi-judicial and administrative decisions affecting rights. 
Thus, in England the writ has been issued to a local council 
preventing it from licensing indecent films^ or preventing it 
2 from discharging its administrative functions unfairly . 
Both Certiorari and Prohibition are issued on similar 
groxinds; only the stage at which each writ is issued differs. 
The function of Certiorari is to quash a decision already made 
and so it is issued when the body in question has disposed of 
the matter and rendered a decision. Prohibition is issued 
when the matter has not been disposed of but is being 
considered by the body concerned. The function of prohibition 
is to prohibit the body concerned from proceeding with the 
matter further. A court-martial constituted under the Army 
Act has been held subject to prohibition^. 
1. R.V. G.L.C. Exp. Black buru,(1976) 1 W.L.R. 550 
2. R.V. Liverpool Corpn. exp. Taxi Fleet,(1972) 2 Q.B.299. 
3. Subhash Chandra v. India, A.I.R.1973 M.P. 191. 
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Grounds for the issue of Prohibition; 
Prohibition can be issued on the grounds on which 
ceritorari can be issued except in case of error of law appa-
rant on the face of record. 
In India, Prohibition is issued to protect the indivi-
dual from arbitrary administrative actions. In Mannusamappa & 
1 
Sons V. Custodian Evacuee Property , the custodian, after 
accepting the petitioners as tenants of the evacuee property 
and after accepting rent for five months, purported to proceed 
against them as if they were in permissive possession. Prohi-
bition was issued to forbid him from proceeding further. 
Generally it is an efficacious and speedy remedy where 
a person does not desire any other relief except to stop the 
administrative agency. After nature remedy does not bar the 
2 
issue of this writ . The fact that something must be left to 
be done is necessary for the issue of the writ is not a rule 
of disability. It can be issued even when the agency has 
reached a decision to stop the authority from enforcing its 
decision. It can be issued even in cases where the authority 
has not kept any record. 
1. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 789. 
2. Bengal Immunity Co.Ltd. v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 
661. 
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Generally speaking, the conditions for the issue of 
prohibition are the same as those for the issue of certiorari, 
except as to the stage when the relief is available. It 
follows that the grounds on which prohibition will issue are 
the same on which certiorari will issue (if the Petitioner 
comes to court after the tribunal has already pronounced its 
decision). Thus, prohibition will issue to prevent the 
tribunal from proceeding further, when the inferior court or 
tribunal proceeds to act without or in excess of jurisdiction 
and also when the inferior court or tribunal proceeds to act 
in violation of the rules of natural justice. In India we 
also find that the writ will issue to prevent the tribunal 
from proceeding further, when the inferior court or tribunal 
proceeds to act under a law which is itself ultra vires or un-
constitutional . 
Thus, we saw that judicial review of administrative 
actions through writ is vital to safeguard the civil liberties 
of the people. The progress of a nation, its unity and 
integrity, rule of law and social equality depend on the 
judiciary to a great extent, and the Supreme Court and High 
Courts performance has to be judged on the basis of the degree 
of their success in fulfilling these tasks. In India, these 
goals have not been fully achieved, but it is undeemable the 
Courts have done its job judiciously, despite its limitations. 
C H A P T E R 
SHADES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER PRESIDENT'S RULE 
F 
O 
U 
R 
Proclamation of President's Rule and 
Judicial Review 
Facts of Individual Cases 
Judicial Review of Article 356 
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PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT'S RULE and JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Article 356 envisages proclamation of Presidential 
Rule in case of a break-down of constitutional machinary in 
the states. During the debate on the present article 356, in 
the contituent assembly it v/as realised that the provision is 
a necessary evil and is indespensible for a nescennt 
democracy. But the subsiquent events proved that proclamation 
of Presidential Rule has become more a rule than an 
exception. It was invoked for about 101 times during 47 
years. 
The constitution 38th Amendment (1975) had placed 
proclamations issued under Articles 356 beyond the scope of 
judicial review "in any court on ay ground"/ but the 
constitution 44th Amendment (1978) removed this impediment. 
It is clear that judicial review of a proclamation under 
Article 356 would be on any grounds upon which an executive 
determination v/hich is found on subjective satisfaction can 
be questioned. 
The legal experts say that after deletion of clause 
(5) by 44th Anendment leaves no doubt that judicial 
review is not totally excluded with regard to the question 
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relating to President's satisfaction. It is said that if the 
proclamation has been made upon a consideration which is 
wholly extraneous or irrelevent to the purpose for which the 
power under Article 356, had been confessed, namely, a 
breakdown of constituional machinary in the state, or in 
other words, where there is no "reasonable nexus " between the 
reasons disclosed and the satisfaction of the President in 
such a case it can be said that there has been no 
satisfaction of the President, v^hich is a condition precedent 
to exercise of the power under Article 356. It can also be 
questioned on the ground of malafide because a statutory 
order which lacks bonafides has no existance in lav/. 
The Union Goverment is of the view that it cannot be 
compelled to disclose all the facts and materials leading to 
the saisfaction of the President. Article 74 would be a bar 
and the court would be precluded from going into the same. 
If the goverment does not yive reasons, than the only 
scrutiny which the court can carry out is to examine whether 
the reasons given are wholly extranous to tho formation of the 
satisfaction. 
It is impossible for the court to substitute its 
judgement for that of the Goverment. The satisfaction of the 
President is a subjective one and cannot be tested by 
reference to any objective tests. It is not a "'•"''ision 
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which can be judicially diLscovorablo by naaa'jeabxa standards. 
It can be based on, inter-alia, public reaction, motivation 
and response of different classes of people and then 
anticipated future behaviour, and a host of other 
iconsidera.tion.. This ar<jument. of the Union Government can be 
accepted at the time v/hen Article 356 contained clause (5), 
v;hich v;as inserted by the 38 th Amendment, by which the 
satisfaction of the President mentioned in clause (1) of 
Article 356 was made final and conclusive and that 
satisfaction v/as not open to be questioned in any court. But 
that cannot hold good after the 44th Amendment Legal experts 
say it can be arqued that the 44th constitution Amendment Act 
leaves no doubt that judicial review is not totally excluded 
in regard to the questions relating to the Prsident's 
satisfacticxi.. 
In quasi-federal constitution like ours. Article 
356 sticks out like a sore thumb-it is antifederal in 
character and spirit, and it has been one of the most 
frequently misused provisions of the constitution. The 
framers of our constitution expected that this extraordinary 
provision would be invoked rarely, in extreme cases - and as 
a last resort when all alternative correctives had failed. 
But the Sarkav'a Commission ( on centre-State Relations) 
truefully noted (in its Report in 1988) that "despite the 
hopes and expectations so emphatically expressed by the 
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framers. In the last 37 years, Article 356 has been brought 
into action no less than 75 times." 
The power to declar President's rule has been 
challenged on many occasion for example before Kerela High 
Court in 1965, before Punjab High Court in 1968, before 
Andhra Pradesh and Orissa High Court in 1974 and before 
Supreme Court in 1977, 1989 and 1993. In these cases 
question of justiciability and validity of proclamation were 
involved and answered by he respective courts, this does not 
mean that the court are obliged to upset the declerattion of 
every Presidential proclamation. It merely means that the 
courts are interested to consider the constitutionality of a 
proclamation. Courts were keen to consider many issues arose 
due to president rule e.g. to elucidate what a breakdown of 
the constitutional machinary in the state means, 
determination- of governmental directive and threatened or 
imminent action, validity of proclamation and jurisdiction to 
consider disputes betv/een goverments of the states and the 
union relating to political question doctrine, interpretation 
of Article 356 in presence of 42nd Amendment Act 1976 and a 
part of these pivote issues more important issue of 
jurisdection etc. ConcluRion of these issues might not settled 
legal war but provided an academic satisfaction. 
The first case in the arena of Indian High Courts 
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appeared in 1965 before Korela High Court. On September 10, 
1964, the president assumed the goverance of the state^ 
consequent upon the resignation of the ministry. A general 
election held in March 1965, again resulted in a fragmented 
House, with no prospect of a state goverment. After 
consulting the party leaders, the Governor reported to the 
president that it was not possible to form the council of 
Ministers.- The state legislature was dissolved again and 
President's rule imposed. A v/rit petition challenging the 
central action on the ground that the state legislature could 
net J?ave been dissolved without its meeting at all, was 
rejected by Kerela High Court. The court also rejected the 
contention that the action of President v/as mala fide.^ This 
judgement makes it clear that the learned judge did not want 
to inerfare in political matters. In evitabily, the 
judgement does not really elucidate v/hat a breakdov/n of 
constitutional machinary in the state means. It was merely 
decided that there was a breakdown of the constitutional 
machinary in the state in this case. 
The next case in which a High Court examined the 
propriety of a presidential proclamation arose in Rao 
Birinder Singh Vs. Union of India^ in Haryana. Here the 
president accepted the Governor's recommendation that 
President's rule should be imposed. The politics of the 
I.K.K.Aboo Vs. Union of India A. T .R 1965 Ker. 229. 
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Haryana assembly were torn apart by defections. The 
petitioner had a majority and naturally contended that the 
President's rule could not be imposed as long as he commanded 
a majority. He argued that the action was malafide. 
Cheif Justice Mehar Singh (for Justice Narula and 
himself) founded a rather novel and neat way out of the 
situation presented before him. He argued that the 
president's constitutional powers v/ere not amenable to the 
jurisdictional control of High Court because the President 
did not act on behalf of the "executive" of the Union but in 
a constitutional capacity. 
The approach of the High Courts have been interesting 
The Kerala and Punjab High Courts managed to follow what we 
have called the "total ouster" approach while at the same 
time appearing to approve of the propriety of the action of 
President and Governor. The Orissa High Court in 
Bijiayanand's^case accepted the total . ouster" approach but 
expressed the openion that the Governor may have acted in 
violation of the settled constitutional conventions. This 
was an interesting attempt to have it both ways. In re A. 
2 
Sueeramula/ Justice Chinnappa Ready had to consider the 
validity of a proclamation declaring President's rule in 
Andhra Pradesh. Justice Ready in this remarkable judgement, 
followed the "total ouster" approach and at the same time 
explained the court's helplessness by taking stock of the 
1. Bijayanand Vs. President of India. A.I.R 1974 Ori. 52 
2. A.I.R 1974 A.P. 106 
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realities of the power structure vvith in which the courts 
existed. But he also left upon another approach v/hich is quite 
like what we have called the "Substantive reviev/" approach. 
He took judicial notice of contemporary political events and 
satisfied himself that a presidetial proclamation was 
necessary and proper. While it is true that this argument 
was a secondary and alternative argument* it contains within 
it possibilities of an extremely v/ide pov/er of review. ^ 
None of these cases came before Supreme Court. After 
emergency an important case came before the Supreme Court 
when the newly elected Janta Party wanted to impose 
President's rule on nine states which had Congress ministei^es' 
Not unnaturally, the Supreme Court become the focus of 
attention. Not only had these provisions finally arrived at 
the Suprme Court, but they had arrived with a bang and not a 
v/himper. This was the widest and most political use of the 
President's rule that independent India had ever seen. 
Mass Dissolution Case— 
This case had a lot of political overtones because it 
arose as a result of series of political events. The general 
election which was held in March 1977, resulted in a land 
slide, victory for the nev/ly formed Janta Party in Northern 
1. State of Rajesthan Vs. Union of India, A.I.R 1977 SC 1361. 
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India even though the Congress Party held firm in Southern 
India. Soon after the Janta Goverment came into power, 
Charan Singh, the Home Minister, wrote letter on April 18, 
1977 to the Chief Ministers of the nine northern states which 
had congress Goverments. He advised the congress Chief 
Ministers of these goverments due to Janta victory in their 
states they should seek a fresh mandate from the people of 
those states. Mr. Shai Bhushan, Minister of Law in a radio 
interview widely reported in the newspapers suggested that if 
the states did not comply with this advice President's rule 
would be imposed on there statesand these congress goverment 
would be forced to seek a fresh mandate from the people who 
ihabited their states.^ This interview was given on April 
22, 1977. The various states responded to this in next two 
days filing petitions before Supreme Court under Article 131 
of the constitution which gives the Supreme court the power, 
interalia, to decide disputes "between the Goverment and one 
or more States....if and so for dispute involves any question 
(whether of Law of fact) on which the existance of a legal 
rights depends...."The petitions were further supported by 
three members of legislative assemblies which were threatened 
with dissolution. These members of the 
1. Ibid quoted judgement of Beg C.J, at pr. 22, p-1373 
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legislative assemblies aryued that they had a right to 
property in the salaries they received as members of their 
legislative assembly. The threatened dissolution. they 
argued, interfered v/ith their right to property v/hich was 
guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (f)of the constitution. 
All this had to making of drama. Nine states had 
filed applications along v;ith three members of the 
legislative assembly and several interveners. The presence 
of multiple appeals and interveners, invariably widen the 
issues in a case before Supreme Court. 
There v/as only one embarassing factor in all this. 
The threatened Presidential proclamation had not yet been 
declared. The Supreme Court was thus being asked to consider 
a hypothetical question. The relief the petitioners wanted 
could be paraphrased as follows: 
If the President were to pass a proclamation for the 
reasons suggested by Mr. Charan Singh in his letter and the 
law minister in his interview, such an action would be 
unconstitional and an injunction even a permanent injunction^ 
Should be granted to restrain the President from considering 
such an action of the Council of Ministers to give him 
advice to follow such a course of action. 
In the Dissolution case, there was only a threat that 
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some action might be taken. The Supreme Court had judicially 
found that the Charan Singh's letter x/as not a formal 
govermental directive. That being the case the court was not 
really considering an actual action of the yoverment bat a 
threatened or even imminent action. 
The Supreme Court's v/illingness to hear a case in 
\7hich the impunget^ govermental action had yet to be taken 
can be interpreted in various ways. The first and least 
generous interpretation is that the Supreme Court v/as used by 
states for symbolic litigation. Thus all the parties in the 
case were trying to get political mileage out of court. The 
second interpretation was that the Supreme Court was being 
used as a testing ground in order to show to people that the 
new Janta goverment was willing to deal v/ith constitutional 
problems in a legal way. Not surprisingly, the proclamation 
was declared on April 30,1977 - one day after the Supreme 
Court had agreed to dismiss the case. Thirdly, it would be 
argued that the Supreme Court had not really heard the case, 
but merely discussed some preli-ninary issues and found them to 
be not justiciable before the court. Fourthly, it would have 
been quixotic for the Supreme Court is that there was no 
issue before the court. Clearly, the common man would be 
baffled by such esoteric legal jugglery. This was certainly 
the view taken by justice Chandrachud v^ ho, writing his 
judgement after the proclamation had been issued, said! 
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But the proclamation having since been issued, it 
would be hypertechnical to discuss the writ petitions 
on the ground that there was no invasion of the 
petitioner's rights on the date when the petitions 
filed were in this court^. 
It does, however, seem strange that the court was 
prepared to adjudicate on the validity of a proclamation 
which petitioner's available for discussion when the court 
heard and dismissed the case. 
A common sense view of the Supreme Court's stand 
would be that it was not willing to be seen to stay away from 
a problem presented to it simply because the problem had a 
political face to it. And so the Supreme Court assumed 
jurisdiction in this case. But it is clear as to what was the 
basis on which they assumed jurisdiction. 
Quite apart from the hypothetical case argument, 
there was another jurisdictional question that the court did 
not wholly resolved. It was argued that the Supreme Court did 
not have jurisdiction to consider disputes between two gover-
nments of the states and the union but only disputes were 
between states and the union. Accordingly this case, it was 
alleged, was a dispute between the governments.The Janata government at 
the centre and various congress government in the states. Itwas 
not a dispute between the states and Union. This argument 
1. Ibid at pr. 94 pp- 1393 - 4. 
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was accepted by three judges^ and rejeced by another three 
judges . Chief Justice Beg assumed that the jurisdiction of 
Article 131 was very wide . It was a question as to whether 
Chief Justice Beg admitted jurisdiction in tthis case or not. 
It he did not, much of what was written in this case was 
clearly obiter dictum. 
In many ways one of the crucial question which the 
court had to answer related to the 'Political question' 
doctrine. The real question was when can the court interfere 
in and adjudicate upon a political question? This question 
had never been discussed fully by he supreme Court. Chief 
Justice Subha Rao in some extrajudicial remarks had taken the 
view that the real clue to the problem was that the court was 
concerned with constitutional matters and could deal with 
political questtions only on the basis that they raised 
constitutional issues. 
Supreme Court's credibility would be very seriously 
affected if it declared what the Justice Bhagwati called a 
'Judicial hands of whenever a political question came up 
before the court. Though courts cannot enter what was called 
a political 'Prohibited a r e a o r Political thicket* they 
State of Rajesthan Vs Union of India, A.I.R.1977 Sc 1361, 
at pr. 164, p. 1419(per Justice Goswami) pr.l75, p-1421 
(per Justice Untwalia) per.191,p.1431 (Per Justice Fazal 
Ali). 
Ibid. At para.142 p.1413. 
3. Ibid. At para.144 ,p.1414. 
4. Ibid. At para.351 A, p.1377-8. 
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must adjudicate on all constitutional questions even though 
they may have a political complexation to them. 
The real question in 'Dissolution Case' was how the 
Supreme Court would approach the interpretation of the Article 
356. This was all the more important because the 42nd Amend-
ment to the constitution added a clause to Article 356 which 
read: 
'Nothwithstanding anything in this constitution 
the satisfaction ofthe President mentioned in 
clause (1) shall be final and conclusive and shall 
not be questioned in any court on any ground. 
The judges chose to ignore this clause. But in many 
ways the clause merely re-stated what has already been said in 
a lot of Privy Council decisions and by House of Lords. The 
import of these decisions was that the executive, and not the 
courts, would determine whether or not a particular emergency 
was justified or not. The court accepted the import of these 
rulings. 
But this does not mean that the judges totally 
abondened the idea that the exercise of these powers could be 
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subject to judicial review. The judges suggested that the 
review could take place on the following basis: 
(a) Where the order was malafide. 
(b) Where the authority passing the order took into account 
extraneous or irrelevent considerations. 
(c) Where the authority passing the order failed to take into 
accout relevent cosideratios. 
To these Chief Justice Beg added a fourth restriction: 
(d) The order should not be used for any purpose which was 
inconsistent with the provisios of the constitution. 
But there was still one question which the Supreme 
Court did not tackle. The question v;as: v/hat did the words 
"....the Goverment of a state cannot be carried on in 
accordence with the provisions of the constitution" in 
Article 356 of the constitution mean? Could they cover any 
thing and everything? Could President's rule be declared in 
the situation where it would apear that the President's rule 
was being imposed in the states simply because the party in 
power in these states had suffered a severe set-back ingeneral 
elections to the Lok Sabha? Most of the judges in the Supreme 
Court clearly did not answer this question fully. These 
matters were left to the sa.tisfaction of the executive. At 
the same time it is clear that some of the judges appeared to 
approve of the constitutionality of the moves made.^ 
1. Ibid at pr. 170, p-1420, 1441, 1416-7. 
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Now let us turn to the petition of the Legislators that 
their fundamental rights were being taken away. This was not 
fully discussed by the judges. Chief Justice Beg and Justice 
Utwalia took the view that the petitioners had not made out a 
case without explaiing why. Justice Chandrachud, Bhagwati, 
Gupta and Goswami did not even decide whether the legislators 
had a Fundamental Right to property in their salaries. They 
argued thatt the 'dessolution' had too remote an effect on 
their right such as it was. 
The judgements of Supreme Court in the 'Dissolution 
case' are bound to give rise to some dismay. The court 
examined a hypothetical question. In that action complained 
was imminent and had not been taken. The court did not come 
to a clear rulig on whether it had jurisdiction to hear the 
case under Article 131. The court did ot spell out the 
implica, ions of the ouster clause in Article 356 (5) which 
had been introduced by the 42nd Amendment. But at the same 
time, the 'Dissolution case* did wake a significant 
contribution. It made clear the courts have a role to play 
even when they are cofrented with political questions. At the 
same time, it spelled out that the courts would interfere of 
the provisions of Article 356 were being used for unproper 
purposes. 
S.R. Bommai Vs Union of India . 
After the Dissolution case the next case was decided by 
he constitution bench of nine judges headed by Justice 
1. 1994 (2) Scale pp - 37 - 228 
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Ratnavel Pandian on March 11, 1994 which upheld he validity of 
the proclamation of the President's rule in the states of 
Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan in the wake of 
Ayodhya incidents of Dec. 6, 1992. 
Hov/ever, the bench which also comprised Justices 
AJ1 . Ahmadi, Kuldip Singh, J.S. Verma, P.B. Savvant, K. 
Ramaswamy, S.C. Agarwal, Yoyeshtfar Dayal and Jeevan Raidy 
hold that similar impositions of President's rule in Nay a land 
(1988)J Karnataka (1989) and Meghalaya (1991) were 
unconstitutional. 
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FACTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL CASES 
(i) KARNATAKA;- Taking first the challenge to the 
proclamation issued by the President on 21.4.1989 dismissing 
Goverment of Karataka. The facts were that the Janta Party 
being the majority party in the state legislative had formed 
goverment under the leadership of Mr. S.r Bommai on 
30.8.1988 'following the resignation on 1.8. 1988 of the 
earlier Cheif Minister, Mr. Ram Krishna Hegde. In September 
1988 the Janta Party and Lok Dal (B) merged into a nev/ party 
called Janta Dal. On 17.4.1989 one Mr. K.R. Molakery, a 
legislator of Janta Dal defected from the party and presented 
letter to the Governor withdrawing his support to the 
ministry. On the next day he presented to the Governor 19 
letters allegedly signed by 17 Janta Dal legislators, one 
independent but associate legislator and one legislator 
belonging to BJP who was supporting the ministry, withdrawing 
their support to this ministry. On 19.4. 1989 the Governor 
sent a report to the President stating therein that there 
v/ere dissensions and defections in newly formed Janta Dal. 
In Support of his case, he referred to the 19 letters 
received by him. He further stated that in view of the 
v/ithdrawl of the support by the said legislators, the Cheif 
Minister Mr. S.R. Bommai did not command a majority in the 
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Assembly. He also added TxO other party was in a position to 
form the Goverment; He, therefore, recommended to the 
President that he should exercise power under Article 356 (1), 
On 24.4.1989 seven out of nineteen Cegislators who had 
allegedly written the said lottor?!to the Governor sentletters 
to him complaining that their signatures v/ere obtained on 
earlier letters by misrepresentation and affirmed thir 
support to the ministry. The state cabinet met o the same 
day and decided to convene the session of the Assembly within 
a week i.e. on 27.4.1989. The Governor however, sent yet 
another report to the President on the same day i.e. 
20.4.1989, in particular, referring to the letters of seven 
members pledging their support to th-eministry and withdrawing 
their earlier letters. He, however, opined in the report 
that the letters from the seven legislatures were obtained by 
Cheif Minister by pressuring them and added that the 
horse-trading was going on and atmosphere was getting 
vitiated. In the end^ he roitnr-te'' hii opinion that the 
Chief Minister had lost the confidence of the majority in the 
House and repeated his ealier request for action under Article 
356 (1). On that very day, the President issued the 
Proclamation in question. The Proclamation was, thereafter 
approved by the Parliament as required by Article 356 (3). 
Mr. Bommai and "ono other members of the council and Ministers 
challenged the validity of Proclamation before Karnataka High 
1 8 3 
Court. A three- Judge Bench of High Court dismissed the 
petition holding, among other things, that the facts stated 
in Governor's report could not held to be irrelevent and that 
the Governor's satisfaction was based upon reasonable 
assessment of all tthe relevent facts. The court also held 
that recourse to floor-test was neither compulsory nor 
obligatory and not was a pre-requisite to sending th report 
to the President. It was also held that Governors report 
could not' be challenged on the ground of legal malafides 
since the Proclamation had to be issued on the satisfaction 
of the council of Ministers. Court further relied upon the 
test laid down in state of Rajesthan V. Union of India— and 
held that on the basis of material disclosed, the 
Satisfaction arrived at by the President could not be 
faulted.^ 
(ii) MEGHALAYA;- The facts ar that the writ petitioner 
G.S.Masser belonged to a Front Known as Meghalaya united 
Parliamentary Party (MUPP) which had a majoritty in the 
Legislative Assembly and had formed in March 1990, a 
Goverment under the leadership of Mr. B.B. Lyndoh. On 
27.7.1991, one Mr. Kyndish Arthree who was at the relevent 
1. A.I.R 1977 S.C. 1361. 
2. 1994 (2) Scale at pp - 87 - 88. 
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time, the speaker of the House, was elected as leader of the 
opposition group known as United Meghalaya Parliamentary 
Forum (UMPF). The majority in this group belonged is the 
Congress Party. On his election Mr. Arthree claimed support 
of majority of the members in the Assembly and requested to 
the Governor o ivite him to form the Goverment. Thereupon 
Governor asked the then Chief Minister Mr. Lyndoh to prove 
his majority on the floor of House. Assembly was convened on 
7.8. 1991 and a Motion of confidence was moved. Thirty 
legislators supported the Motion and 27 voted against it. 
Instead of announcing the result, the speaker declared that 
he had received a complaint against five independent MLAs of 
he ruling coalition frot alleging that they were disqualified 
as legislators under the anti-Defection Law and since they 
had become disentitled to vote, he was suspending their right 
to vote. On 11.8. 1991, the speaker issued show cause notices 
to the alleged defectors, the five independentt MLAs. The 
five MLAs replied to the notice denying that they had 
continued to be independent. On recipt of the replies, the 
speaker passed on order on 17.8. 1991 disqualifying he five 
MLAs on the ground that the four of them were ministers in 
the then ministry and one of them was the Deputy Goverment 
Chief whip. Assembly was summond secon time for of 
confidence but speaker did not send notices to 
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five MLAs and made arrangements to prohibit their entry in 
the Assembly. On 6.9. 1991/ the five MLAS/ approached Supreme 
Court. The Court issued interiTtt order staying the operation 
of the Speaker's orders. The Governor proroqued the 
Assembly indefinately by his order dated 8.9.1991. 
Indpendent MLAs moved a contempt petition against Speaker in 
Supreme Court. On 8.10.1991 Court passed anotJier o'.der 
directing that all authorities of the state should ensur«the 
compliance of the Courtis interim order of 6.9.1991. After 
this order five independent MLAs received invitation to 
attend he session of the Assembly convened on 8.10. 1991. 
After the Motion of Confidenc tne ministry v/as put to vote, 
the Speaker declard that 26 voted for the^ Motion and 26 
against it and excluded the votes of four independent MLAs. 
Thereafter, declaring thatthere was a tie in voting, he cast 
his vote against the Motion and declared' that the Motion had 
failed and adjourned the House sine die. The thirty MLAs 
sent a letter to the Governor sta ting that they had voted 
against the favour of the ministry and had also passed a 
Motion of No-confidence against the Speaker. However, on 
9.10. 1991, the Governor wrote a letter to the Chief Minister 
asking to resign in view of what had transpired in the 
session on 8.10. 1991. The Chief Minister moved the Supreme 
Court against the letter of the Governor. Court on 9.8. 
1991, among other things asked the Governor to take into 
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consideration of the orders of the court and votes cast by 
the four independent MLAs before taking any decision on the 
question whether the Goverment had lost the Motion of 
confidence. In spite of this, the President on 11.10. 1991 
issued Proclamation under Article 356 (1). The Proclamation 
stated that the President was satisfied on the basis of the 
report from the Governor and other information rceived by him 
that the situation had arisen in which the Goverment of state * 
could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of 
the constitution. The Goverment was dismissed and Assembly 
was dissolved. Both Houses of Parliament met and approved 
the Proclamation issued by the President.^ 
(iii) NAGALAND;- The President Proclamation dated 7.8. 1988 
was issued under Article 356 (1) imposing President's rule in 
the state of Nagaland. At the relevant time, in the Nagaland 
Assembly consisting of 60 members, 34 belonged to Congress 
(I), 18 to Naga National Democratic Party, one belonged to 
Naga Peoples Party and seven were independent. Mr. Set'a the 
leader of ruling party was the Chief Minister. On 28th July, 
1988, 13 of the 34 MLAs of the ruling Congress (I) party 
informed the speaker of the Assembly that they had forn'^d a 
party separate from Congress (I) ruling party and requostt^d him 
for allotment of separate seats for them in the House. 
1. 1994 (2) Scale at pp - 91-92 
187 
The session was to commence on 28.8. 1988. By his decision of 
30.7. 1988, the Speaker held that here v/as a split in the 
party within the meaning of the Tenth Sc/nedule of the 
constituttion* (hi 31.7. 1988 Mr. Vamuzo, one of th 13 
defecting iMLAs \;ho had formed separate party informed the 
Governor that he commanded the support of 35 out the then 59 
members in assembly and was in a position to form the 
Goverment. Allegation was made against the VamuzO for 
confinement of the MLAs. fir. Vamuzo dented the said 
allegation and asJ^ed the Chief Socratary to verify the truth 
from the members themselves. On varification the membrs told 
the Chief Secretary that none of them was confined. On 
6.8.1988, the Governor sent a report to the President of 
India about the formation of a nev/ party by 13 MLAs. He also 
stated that the said MLAs were allured by money. He further 
stated that the said MLAs were kept in forcible confinement 
of Mr. Vamuzo and one other person, and that the story of the 
split in the ruling party v/as not true. He added that the 
Speaker was hasty in according recognition to the new group 
of the 13 members and commented that horse-trading was going 
in the state. He expressed the apprehension that if the 
affair v/ere allowed to continiuC: as they were, it v/ould 
affect the stability of the state. In the mean time Chief 
Minister submitted his resignation to the Governor and 
recommended the imposition of President's rule. The 
188 
President thereafter issued the impugned Proclamation and 
dismissed the Goverment and disolved the Assembly. Mr. 
Vamuzo, the leader of the nev/ group challenged the validity 
of the Proclamation in the G'^uhati High Court. The Petition 
v/as heard by a Division Banch which differed on the effect 
operation of Article 74 (2) and hence the matter was 
referred to third judge. But before the third judge could 
hear the matter, the Union of India moved the Supreme Court 
for grant s^p»ecialleave which was granted and the proceedings 
in the High Court Stayed.^ 
Now let us mition the facts of the Madhya Pradesh, 
Rajesthan and Himachal Pradesh. The elections were held to 
the legislative Ass«jnt)lies in the stntos along vi?ith legislative 
Assembly of Utter Pradesh, in Feburary, 1990. The BJP 
secured majority in the Assemblies of all the four states and 
formed Goverments there. 
Follov/ing appeals of some organisation including the 
BJP, thousands of KarSevaks from Utter Pradesh as well as from 
otherstates including M.P., Rajesthan and Himachal Pradesh 
gathered near the Babri Masjid on 6th December^ 1992 and 
eventually some of them demolished the disputed structure. 
Following the demolition, on the same day the U.P. Goverment 
1. 1994 (2) Scal-ntpp - 92 -93 
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resigned. Thereafter on the same day the President issued 
Proclamation under Article 356 (1) and dissolved the 
legislative Assembly of the state. The said Proclamation is 
not challenged. 
Demolition in turn created further reaction in the 
country resultig violence and destruction of the property. 
The Union Goverment tried to cope up with the situation by 
taking several steps including a ban on several organisations 
icluding RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal which had along with BJP 
given a call for Kar Sevaks to march towards Ayodhya. The 
ban order was issued on December 10, 1992 under the lawful 
Activities (prevention) Act, 1967. The d-israissals of the state 
Goverments in M.P., Rajesthan and Himachal Pradesh were 
admittedly a consequance of these developments and were 
effected by the issuance of Proclamation under Article 356 (l)j 
all on the 15th December. 
(iv) MADHYA PRADESH;- The Proclamation was a consequence of 
three reports sent by Governor to the President on December 
8, 10 and 13, 1992. Reports referred to the fast 
deteriorating law and order situation in the wake of wide 
spread acts of violance, .?rr.on and looting expressed his 
"lack of faith" in the ability of the state Goverment to 
-t-^n the tide primarily because of the political 
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leadership' overt and covert support to the associate 
communal organisations" which seemed to point out that there 
v/as a break-down of the administrative machinary of the 
state. The Governor also referred to the statement of the 
Chief Minister of M.P. Mr. Sunder Lai Patwa describing the 
ban of RSS and VHP as unfortunate. The Governor expressed 
his doubt about the credibility of the state Goverment to 
implement sincerely the Centre's direction to ban the said 
organizations. He recommended that considering the said 
facts a tH-^fact that the RSS was contemplating a fresh strategy 
to chalk out its future plan, and also the possibility of the 
leaders of the banned organisations going under ground, 
particularly with the convenienceof the State Administration, 
the situation demanded immediate issuance of the 
Proclamation. Hence President on December 15, 1992 issued 
the proclamation.^ The proclamation was challenged before 
M.P. High Court. The court in a historic judgement by 2-1 
majority held that th Presidential order imposig President's 
rule in the state was invalid and unconstitutional as being 
beyond the scope of Article 356 of the constitution. The 
goverment at the Centre filed appeal against judgement in the 
Supreme Court^. 
1. Ibid at pp - 94-95 
2. Pandey J.N. ;Constitutional Law of India,' 26th Ed.(1994) 
at p - 545. 
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(v) HIMACHAL PRADESH:- The proclamation issued by the 
Pre^dent succeeded the report of Governor which was sent to 
him on 15.12. 1992. In his report Governor has stated/ among 
other things that the Chief Minister and his Cabinet had 
instigated Kar Sevaks from Himachal Pradesh. The report of 
Governor was almost similar to the report of Governor of M.P. 
It v;as on the basis of this report that the Proclamation in 
question w&s issued. 
(VI) RAJASTHAN;- The Presidential Proclamation was pursuant* 
to the report of Governor sent to President that Goverment of 
Rajasthan had played "an obvious role" in the episode at 
Ayodhya. Ohe of the Ministers had resigned and along with 
him, 22 MLAs and 15500 BJP workers has participated in Kar 
Seva at Ayodhya. They were given royal send - off and 
welcome. Report of Governor was identical as mentioned above 
in case of Himachal Pradesh. 
The validity of the three Proclamations v^ as 
challenged ]py writ petitions in their repective state High 
Courts. Proclamations in respectof the Goverments and the 
legislative Assemblies of Rajesthan and Himachal Pradesh 
which were pending in the respective High Courts transferred 
to the Supreme Court^. 
1. 1994 (2) Scale at p - 96 
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JUDGEMENT;- In this case six judgements were delivered 
by Mr. Justice S.R. PanJian/ Mr, Justice Ahmadi, Mr. Justice 
J.S. Verma on his behalf and on behalf of Mr. Justice 
Yogeshv7ar Dayal, Mr. Justice P.B. Sawant for himself and Mr. 
Justice Kuldip Singh, Mr. Justice K. Ramaswamy and Mr. 
Justice S.C. Agarwal. 
The separate judgements were delivered on various 
grounds fdr example the judicial review of Article 356, 
Secularism, scope of reinduction of dismissed Goverments etc. 
Let us discuss Seperate judgements on these grounds. 
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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARTICLE 356 
The following main question arises in this case:-
(i) Is Presidential Proclamation issued under Article 356 of 
the constitution subject to Judicial Review? 
(ii) If so what are the parameters and scope of Judicial 
Review 
Justice Pandian held that since many learned brother 
have elaborately dealt with the constitutional provisions 
relating to the issue of the Proclamation and as I am in 
agreement with the reasoning given by B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. 
it is not necessary for me to make further discussion on this 
matter except saying that I am of the firm opinion that the 
power under Article 356 should be used very Sparingly and 
only when President is fully satisfied that situation has 
arisen where the Government of the state cannot be carried on 
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution^. 
Justice Ahmadi in his judgement held that a political 
party with an ideology different from the ideology of the 
political party in power in any state comes to power in the 
centre, the Central Government would not be justified in 
exercising power under Article 356 (1) unless it is shown 
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that the ideology of the political party in pov/er in the 
state is inconsistent with the constitutional Philosophy and 
therefore, it is not possible for the party to run the 
affairs of the state in accordence with the provisions of the 
constitution. But where a State Goverment is functioning in 
accordence with the provisions of the constitution and its 
ideology is consistent with the constitutional Philosophy, 
the Central Goverment would not be justified in resorting to 
Article 356 (1) to get rid of the state Goverment 'Solely' on 
the ground that a different political party has come to power 
at the centre with a landsxide victory. Such exercise of 
po\«r would be clearly ir.alafide. The decision of this court 
in state of Rajasthan V. Union of India^ to the extent it is 
in consistent with the above discussion does not^ my humble 
view, lay down the law correctly. 
The decision to issue a proclamation is based on the 
subjuctive satisfaction of the President i.e. Council of 
Ministers, but the court would hardly be in a position to 
X - ray such a subjective satisfaction for want of expertise 
in regard to fiscal matters 
Justice Ahmadi further stated that the marginal note 
of Article 356 indicates that the power conferred by the 
A.I.R 1977 S.c. 1361. 
195 
provision is exercisable 'in case of failure of 
constitutional nachinary in the state While the text of the 
said article does not use the same phraseology, it empowers 
the President, on his beiny satisfied than, 'a situation has 
arisen in which the Goverment of the states 'cannot' be 
carried on in accordence v/ith the provisions of the 
constitution. This action he must take on receipt of a 
report from the Governor of the concerned state or 
'otherwise' if he is satisfied therefrom about the failur of 
the constitutional machinery. The expression 'otherwise' is a 
very wide term and cannot be restricted to material capable of 
being tested on principles relevant to admissibility of 
evidence in courts of law. It v/ould be diffiavlt to predicate 
the nature of material v/hich may be placed before the 
Pr.esident. Since the President is not expected to record 
his reasons for his subjective satisfaction, it would be 
equally difficult for the court to enter the Political 
thicket' to ascertain v/hat weighed v/ith thePresident for the 
exercise of power cinder tlB said provision. Therefore in my 
view the court cannot interdiet the use of the constitutional 
power conferred on the President under Article 356 unless the 
same is shown to be iralafide. In other v/ords it can be 
challenged on the limited ground that the action is maLafide 
or ultra vires Article 356 itself. 
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Justice Verna in his judgement and on behalf of Justic 
Yogeshv/ar Dayal said that there is no dispute that the 
proclamation issued under Article 356 is subject to judicial 
Reviev/. The question now is of the test applicable to 
determine the siuation in which the power of judicial review 
is copable of exercise or, in other words, the controversy is 
justiciable. The deeming provision in Article 356 is an 
indication that cases falling v/ithin its ambit are capable of 
judicial Scrutiny by application of objective standards.^ 
Justice Sav^ant on behalf of Justice Kuldip Singh and 
himself held that the validity of the proclamation issued by 
the President under Article 356(1) is judicially rviev;able to 
the extent of examining whether it was issued on th basis of 
any material at all or v/hether the material was relevant or 
whether the proclamation v/as issued in the mnlafide exercise 
of the power« v/hen a primafacie case is made out in the 
challenge to the proclamation, the burden is on the union 
Goverment to prove that the relevent material did infact 
exist and such material may either the report of Governor or 
other than the report. 
Article 74(2) is not a bar against the scrutiny of 
tho material on the basis of which the President had arrived 
at his satifaction. The acts of state Goverment which are 
1. Ibid at pp-53-54 
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calculated to subvert or sabotage secularism as enshrined in 
our constitution, can lawfully be deemed to give rise to a 
situation in which the Goverment of the state cannot be 
carried on in accordence v/ith the provisions of the 
constitution. 
The proclamation dated 21.4.1989 and 11.10.1991 and 
action taken by the Prosi'iont in removing the respective 
Ministries ' and Legislative Assemblies of the state of 
Karnataka and Meghalaya are unconstitutional. The 
proclamation dated 7.8. 1988 in respect of state of Nagaland 
is also held unconstitutional. 
The proclamation dated 15th December 1992 and actions 
taken by the President renovingr the Ministriar, and dissolving 
the legislative Assemblies in the state of M.P./ Rajesthan 
and Hinachal Pradesh pursuant the said proclamations are not 
unconstitutional^. Justice K. Ramaswamy in his separate 
judgement held that Article 74(2) is not a barrier for 
judicial reviev;. It only places limitations to examine 
v/hether any advice and if so v;hat advice was tendered by 
council of Ministers to the President. Article 
74(2) receive only this limited protective canopy from 
disclosure, but the material on the basis of which the advice 
v/as tendered by the council of ministers is subject to 
judicial scrutiny 
1. Ibid at pp - 107-108. 
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Judicial reviev/ is a basic feature of the 
constitution. This court/High Courts have constitutional 
duty and responsibility to exercise judicial reviev/ as 
centinel <^uevive. Judicial reviev/ is not concerned with the 
merits of the decision but v/ith the manner in v/hich the 
decision was taken. This court as final arbiter in 
interpreting the constitution, declares v/hat the law is. 
Higher judiciary has been assigned the delicate task to 
determine what powers the consttitution has conferred on each 
brance of the Goverment and v/hether the actions of that 
branch transgress such limitations, it is the duty and 
responsibility of this court/High Courts to lay down the lav/. 
The judicial reviev/, therefore extends to examine the 
constitutionality of the ^ jroclamation issued by the President 
under Article 356. It is a delicate task, though loaded 
with' political overtones, to be exercise v/ith circumspection 
and great care. In deciding finally the validity of the 
proclamation there cannot be any hard and fast rules or fixed 
set of rules or principles as to when the President's 
satisfaction rn Justiciablo and valid. The decision can be 
tested on the ground of legal malafides or high 
irrationality in the exercise of the discretion to issue 
Presidential proclamation^. 
1. Ibid at pp-153-156. 
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Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy on behalf of Justice S.C. 
Agarwal and himself said on the point of judicial rview of 
Artice 356 that the power conferred by Article 356 upon the 
President is a conditioned power. It is not absolute power. 
The existence of material which may compose of or include the 
report of the Governor is a precondition. The satisfaction 
may be formed on relevant ^^ ^^ cci^ .-jI Article 74(2) merelybars 
an enquiry , into the question whether any and if so, v;hat 
advice ;/as tendered by the ministers to the President. It 
does not bar the court from calling upon the union council of 
ministers (Union of India) to disclose to the court the 
notorial upon which the President had formed the requisite 
satisfaction. The proclamation under Article 356(1) is not 
immune from judicial review. The Supreme Court or the High 
Court can strike dovm the proclamation if it is found to be 
malafide or based on v/holly irrelevant or extraneous grounds. 
The deletion of clause(5) (which was introduced by 38th) 
Amendment Act/ by the 44th (Amendment) Act, removes the cloud 
on the revivality of the action. When called upon the union 
of India as to produce the material on the basis of which 
action is taken* It cannot refuse to do so, if it seeks to 
defend the action. The court will not go into the 
correctness of the material or its adequacy. It'seniuiry is 
limited to see whether the n.Ttorial ^ ;as relevant to the 
action. Even if part of the material irrelevant, the court 
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cannot interfere so long as there is some material which is 
relevant to the action^. 
There was no difference of openion among the judges 
that the Presidential proclamation under Article 356 was 
subject to judicial reviev/. 
ROLE OF THE,GOVERNORI-
The apex court held that the key actor in the 
centre-state relations is the Governorj a bridge between the 
union and the state. The founding fathers deliberately 
avoided election to the office 'of the Governor. The 
President has been empowered to appoint him as excutive head 
of the state under Article 155. The executive power of the 
state is vested in him by Article 154 and exercised by him 
with the aid and advice of the council of ministers, the 
Chief Minister as its head. Under Article 159 the Governor 
shall discharge his funnctions in accordance \7ith the Oath 
"to protect and defend the constitution and the Law.". The 
office of the Governor therefore, is intended to ensure 
protection and sustenance of the constitutional process of 
the working of the constitution by the elected executive and 
given him an l-^pire's role. When a Gandhian economist m-^nber 
of the constituent Assembly wrote letter to Gandhiji of his 
1. Ibid at pp. 227-8 
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plea for abolition of the office of the Governor, Gandhiji 
wrote to him for its retention, thus: "The Governor had been 
given a very useful and necessary place in the scheme of the 
team. He would be an arbiter when there was a constitutional 
dead lock in the state and he would be able to play an 
impartial role. There would be administrative mechanism 
through which the constitutional crises would be resolved in 
the state", ' 
The Governor thus should play an important role. In 
his dual undivided capacity as an head of the state should 
impartially assist the President. As a constitutional head of 
the state Government in times of constitutional crisis he 
should bring about sobereiety. The link is apparent when we 
find that Article 356 would be put into operation normally 
passed on Governor's report. He should truthfully and with 
high degree of constitutional responsibility, in terms of 
path, inform the President that a situation has arisen in 
which the constitutional machinery in the state has failed and 
the state cannot be carried on in accordance with the provi-
sions of the constitution, with necessary detailed factual 
foundation. The report normally is the foundation to reach 
the satisfaction by the President. So it must furnish 
material with clarity for later fruitful discussion by the 
Parliament. When challenged in a court it gives in sight into 
the satisfaction reached by the President. The governor 
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therefore/ owes, constitutional duty and responsibility in 
sending the report with necessary factual details and it does 
require approv^il of the council of Ministers nor equally 
with theiraid and advice^. 
SECULARISM;-
It xs contended in this case that the imposition of 
President's rule in the states of M.P., Rajasthan and 
Himachal Pradesh was malafide/ based on no satisfaction and 
was purely a political act. Mere fact that communal 
disturbances and or instances of arson and looting, took 
place is no ground of imposing President's rule. Indeed, 
such incidents took place in several Congress(I) ruled states 
as well as in the particular, in the state of Maharashtra on a 
much larger scale and yet action was taken to displace 
those goverments whereas action was taken only against BJP 
goverments. 
Justice Sawant on behalf of Justice Kuldip Singh and 
himself held that in view of the content of secularism 
adopted by our constitution, the question that poses itself 
for our consideration in these matter is whether the three 
goverments could be trusted to carry on the goverance of the 
1. Ibid at p-117. 
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State in accordance with the provisions of the constitution 
and the President's satisfaction based on the said acts could 
be challenged in law. To recaptulate, the acts were (i) the 
BJP manifesto on the basis of which election were contested 
and pursuant to which elections of the three ministries came 
to power stated as " hence party is committed to Shri Ram 
Mandir at Janmasthan be relocating superimposed Babri 
structure with due respect", (ii) Leaders of the BJP had 
consistently made speeches thereafter to the same effect, 
(iii) Some of the Chief Ministers and Ministers belonged to 
RSS which was banned organization at the relevant time 
(iv) The Ministers in the Ministries concerned exhorted people 
to join Kar Seva in Ayodhya on 6th December, 19 92. One MLA 
belonging to ruling BJP in Himachal Pradesh made a public 
statement that he had actually participated in the destruction 
of the mosque, (v) Ministers had given public send off to Kar 
Sevaks and also welcomed them on their return after the 
destruction of mosque, (vi) At least in two states. Viz, 
Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan there were atrocities against the 
Muslim and loss of lives and destruction of propoerty. 
Religious tolerance and equal treatment of all 
religious groups and protection of their life and property 
and of places of their worship are an essential part 
of secularism enshrined in our constitution. Any profession 
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and action v/hich go counter to the aforesaid creed are prima-
facie proof of the conduct in defei.^nco of the provisions of 
our constitution. We are therefore of the viev/ that the 
Pren'dent had enough naterialin the form of the aforesaid 
professions and acts of the responsible section in the 
political set up of the three states including the Ministries 
to form his satisfaction that the goverments of the three 
states could not be carried on in accordence v/ith the 
provisions of the constitution. Hence the proclamations 
issued could not said to be invalid. In shorty secularism is 
part of the 'basic structure of the constitution'. Th acts of 
the state goverment vi?hich are calculated to subvert or 
sabotage secularism as enshrined in our constitution, can 
lav/fully be deemed to give rise a situation in which the 
goverment of the state cannnot be carried on in accordence 
with the provisions of the constitution.^ 
Justice K. Ramaswamy abserved that the satisfaction 
reached by the Prsident in issuing presidential proclamation 
and dissolving the legislative assemblies of M.P., Rajasthan 
and Himachal Pradesh cannot be faulted as it v/as based on the 
fact of violation of the secular features of the constitution 
which itself. a ground to hold that a situation has arisen in 
V 7 h i c h the goverment of the concerned states cannot be carried 
on in accordence with the provisions of the constitution. 
1. Ibid at pp-105-107 
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Therefore^ the satisfaction cannot be said to be unv/arranted^ . 
He said that religion has no place in politics. No political 
party can simultaneouly be a religious party. Any state 
goverment v/hich pursues unsecular policies or unsecular 
course of action, acts contrary to the constitutional mandate 
2 and renders itself amenable to action under Article 356. 
Justice Ahmadi said that I am in agreement v;ith the 
views expressed by my learned collea^ ues Sawant, Ramaswamy 
and Re ddy » JJ/ that secularism is a basic feature of our 
constitution. They have elaborately dealtv/ith this aspect 
of the matter and I can do not better than express my 
concurrance but I have said these few words merely to 
complement their views by pointing out how this concept was 
understood immediately before the constitution and till the 
42nd Amendment. By the 42nd Amendment what was implicit was 
made explicit.^ 
ROLE OF PARLIAI4ENT: . 
The Bench without di cference of openion held that it 
is necessary to interpret claused) and(3) of Article 356 
1. ^bid at p. 157 
2. Ibid at pp-175-179,228 
3. Ibid at p.48 
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harmoniously since the provisions of clause (3) are obviously 
meant to check by Parliament ('v/hich also consist of members 
from the concerned states) on the powers of the President 
under clause (1). The check v/ould become meaninyless and 
renders in effective if the President takes irreversible 
actions while exercising his powers under sub-clause (a),(b) 
and (c) of clause (1) of the said Article. The dissolution 
of the Assembly by exercising the powers of the Governor 
under Article 174 (2) will be one such irreversible action. 
Hence it will have to held that in no case, the President 
shall exercise the Governor's power of dissolving the 
legislative Assembly till at least both the Houses of 
Parliament have approved the Proclamation issued by him under 
clause (1) of the said Article. The dissolution of Assembly 
prior to the approval of Parliament under clause (3) of the 
said Article v/ill be invalid. The President however may have 
the power of suspending the legislature under sub-clause (c) 
of clause (1) of the said Article. 
Conclusion of the court, firstly, is that the 
President has no power to dissolve the Legislative Assembly of 
the state by using his pov/er under sub-clause (1) of Article 
356 till the Proclamation is approved by both Houses of 
Parliament under clause (3) of the said Article. He may have 
pov7er only to suspend the Legislative Assembly under 
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sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of the said Article. Secondly, 
the Court may invalidate the Proclamation whether it is 
approved by parliament or not. The neccssary consequence of 
the invalidation of the proclamation \/ould be to rstore the 
status quo ante therefore tD restore the council of ministers 
and the Legislature Assambly as they stood on the date of 
issuance of the Proclamation,^ 
* 
SCOPE OF RE-INDUCTION OF DISMISSED GOVERNMENTS : 
The question arises is whether the council of 
ministers and Legislative Assembly can be restored by the 
court when it declares the proclamation invalid? Justice 
Sawant replied in affermative and held that there is no 
reason why the council of ministers and the Legislative 
Assembly should not stand restored as a consequence of the 
invalidation of the proclamation, the same being thf? normal 
legal effect of the invalid action. In the context of the 
constitutional provisions and in view of the power of the 
judicial review rested in the court such a consequence is 
also neccssary constitutional fall-out. Unless such resultis 
read, the power of judicial review rested in the judiciary is 
rendered nugatory and meaningless. To hold otherwise is 
1. Ibid at p - 86. 
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also tentamount to holding that the proclamation issued under 
Article 356 (1) is beyond the scope of judicial review. For 
when the validity of the proclamation is challenged, the 
court will be powerless to give relief and would always be 
met with the fait accompti. Article 356 would then have to 
read as an exception to judicial review. Such an 
interpretation, is neither possible nor permissible. Hence to 
necessary o^ f the invalidation of the proclamation would be 
restoration of the ministry as well as Legislative Assembly, 
in the state. In this connection, we may refer to the 
decision of Supreme Court of Pakistan in Mian Mohammad Nawaz 
Sharief Vs. President of Pakistan and others.^ The court held 
that the impuged order of dissolution of National Assembly 
and dismissal of the Federal Cabinet were without lawful 
authority and, therefore, of no legal effect. As a 
consequence of the said decleration, the court declared that 
the National Assembly, Prime Minister and the Cabinet stood 
restored and entitled to function as immediately before the 
impugned order was passed. The court further declared that 
all steps taken pursuant to the impugned order including the 
appointment of care-taker cabinet and care-taker Prime 
Minister were also of no legal effect. 
Justice Sawant concludes in following words "if 
proclamation issued is held invalid, then notwithstanding 
1. 1993 PLD Sc 473. 
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the fact that it is approved by both Houses of Parliament^ it 
will be open to the Court to restore the status quo ante to 
the issuance of the proclamation and hence restore the 
Legislative Assembly and Ministry. 
Justice K. Ramaswamy observed that there is no 
express provision in the constitution to revive the Assembly 
dissolved under the Presidential Proclamation or to reinduct 
the removed goverment of the state. In interpreting the 
constitution of the working of the democratic institutions set 
up under the constitution, it is imper-missible to fill the 
gaps or to give direction to revive the dissolve Assembly and 
to reinduc;t the dismissed goverment of the state into 
office.^ 
Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy held that if the court 
strikes down the proclamation, it has the power to restore 
the dismissed goverment to office and revive and reactivate 
the Legislative Assembly whenever it may have been dissolved 
or kept under suspension.^ 
The key operative part of the Supreme Court's 
landmark judgement on the use of Article 356 lies in the 
majority agreement reached on the following specific points! 
1. Ibid at p - 157 
2. Ibid at p - 228. 
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(a) The validity of the proclamation issued by the President 
under Article 356 (1) is "judicially reviewable to the extent 
of examining whether it was issued on the basis of any 
material at all or whether the tnaterial was relevant or whether 
the proclamation was issued in the malafide exercise of 
power" when a primafacie case is made out in the challenge to 
the proclamation, "the burden is on the union goverment to 
prove tha't the relevant material did in fact exist." The 
material may be either the report of the Governor or something 
otherthan the report/ but it must meet the new test. 
(b) Article 74 (2), which bars judicial review so 
for as th advice given by the ministers to the President is 
concerned, is "not a bar against the scrutir^ of the material 
on the basis of which the Prsident had arrived at his 
satisfaction." 
(c) The constitution places a check on executive power 
exercised in the name of the Presj. dent by requiring 
parliamentory approval of a Presidential proclamation issued 
under Article 356. Therefore, "it will not be permissible 
for the president to exercise powers under sub-clauses(a),(b) 
and (c) of Article 356 (1) and to "take irreversible actions 
antill. at least both the Houses of parliament have approved 
of the proclamation." In other words, the Legislative 
Assembly of a state connot be dissolved untill" at least" 
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both the Houses of parliament approve the executive action. 
(d) If the Presidential Proclamation is held invalid, "then 
not withstanding the fact that it is approved by both Houses 
of Parliament it will be open to the court to restore the 
Gtatus quo ante" and bring back to life the Legislative 
Assembly and the Ministry. 
(e) While the Court 'will not interdict the issuance of a 
Presidential Proclamation or the exercise of any other power 
under the proclamation, in appropiate cases it will have the 
power by an interim injunction to restrain the holding of 
fresh elections to the Legislative Assembly pending the final 
disposal of the challenge to the validity of the 
proclamation. This it can do to avoid a fait accompli and to 
prevent "the remedy of judicial review (from) being rendered 
fruitless." 
The most far-reaching aspect of the Supreme Court's 
judgement lies in its splandidly uncompromising championing 
of secularism as a basic and inalienable feature of the 
constitution a feature nobody has any right to work against. 
The majority agreement on the secular imperative is contained 
in conclusion in the judgement delivered by Justice Sawant 
(on behalf of himself and Justice Kuldip Singh):" Sacularism 
is a part of the bar.lc structure of the constitution. The 
acts of a state goverment v/hich are calculated to subvert or 
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sabotage secularism as ensharined in our constitution can 
lawfully be deemed to rise to a situation in which the 
goverment of the state cannot be carried on in accordence 
v/ith the provisions of the constitution." 
An excellent exposition of secularism is offered in 
Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy's judgement (for himself and 
justice S.C. Agarwal): "While freedom of religion is guaranteed 
to all persons in India/ from the point of the view of the 
state, the religion, faith or blief of a person is immaterial 
To the state, all are equal and are entitled to be treated 
equally. In matters of state, religion has no place. No 
political party can simultaneously be a religious party. 
Politics and religion cannot be mixed." 
In this powerful exposition of secularism as 
something permanently embeded in the constitution. Justices 
Reddy and Agarwal demolish every one of the building blocks 
of Hindutva (and every other type of communal) ideology: 
It is "absolutely erroneous to say the secularism is 
a 'Vacuous v/ord' or a *phantom concept'." The Indian 
constitution has several provisions which strongly express 
its commitment to secularisim. This means equality, non 
discrimination and justice for all its citizens and no one 
can be permitted to be less or more equal liberty of 
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conscience. It is imipermissible to treat minorities as 
"Second-Class citizens." 
Secularisra dcesnot mean a hands-off state policy 
tov/ards religion, but it certainly means the state has no 
religion and it is unconstitutional for it to tilt in favour 
of any religion. "In short, in the affairs of the state (in 
its widest connotation) religion in irrelevant; it is 
strictly a personal affair." 
The founding father read the concept of equality 
fairness-and -justice-based secularism into the constitution" 
not because it was fashionable but because it was an 
imperative in the Indian context". 
Above all, it is constitutionally illegitima-te for 
either that state, or any political party, to mix up religion 
and politics; to use communalism as a political mobilisation 
strategy; and to fight elections "on the basis of a plank 
which has the proximate effect of eroding the secular 
philosophy of the constitution." A party or Organisation 
which "acts or behaves by word of mouih print or in any other 
manner" to bring about the effect of mixing up religion and 
politics will certainly be "guilty of an act of 
unconstitutionality". It v/ill "have no right to function as 
a political party". 
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CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
Judicial review is an integral part of the Constitu-
tion of India^. The scheme of the present constitution of 
India is based on the structure of judicial review. If one 
part of it is extricated the other part cannot be sustained. 
In India, the majority which governs the country quickly 
changes and the public opinion is also not very progressive 
and efficacious. In such circumstances it is not always 
possible for the majority in power to correctly fathom the 
needs and urgency of law which is enacted and the executive 
enactments in the state of tension, haste and varity of power 
do not represent the free will of the sovereign people. In 
such circumstances,, judicial review has a great necessity. 
The legislature and executive cannot only act through a 
majority . "The majority goes on changing from time to time 
on the swing of the Pendulum of public opinion. The changing 
majority cannot be easily expected to render a consistent 
interpretation of the Constitution"^. This is why the people 
of India are in favour of strengthening the doctrine of judi-
cial review in the Indian Democracy to protect the right 
liberty and freedom of the individual to have socio-economic 
development in the right way and to avoid executive tyranny. 
1. See, Keshvananda Bharti v.State of Kerala, A.I.R.1973,S.C.1641. 
2. Shriram Sharma, How India is Governed ?, Central Book 
Depot, Allahabad") p. 146 . 
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The courts in India and specially the Supreme Court 
has assumed a unique position by discharging the function of 
judicial review and giving constitutional decisions of wider 
irr^rtance to the nation. The court in India has to shape the 
destiny of the nation by its constitutional decisions which 
have great impact on the individual and the social life. 
"The tendency to view the court as unique and relatively 
isolated body is largely the result of its power of judicial 
review".^ The court in order to give relief to the aggrieved 
party through judicial review has to visualise the will of 
the sovereign people in relation to the liberty and freedom 
of the individual. The court alone is competent to determine 
the nature and extent of the good or evil effect, on the 
fundamental rights of administrative action. The function of 
the court is to make the Executive realise its Limitations. 
In this connection S.A. de Smith also remarks- "To the extent 
that court do justice to the individual citizen while giving 
due weight to the requirements of the public interest they 
act as a major instrument of social equilibrium and with 
their sphere of jurisdiction fulfil function that cannot 
2 adequately be performed by any other organ of Government". 
1. Martin Shapiro, Law and Politics in the Supreme Court. The 
Free Press of Glencoe, Collcer Macmillan Ltd., London,1964 
p. 3. 
2. S.A.De Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 
Stevens & Sons Ltd., London, 1959, p. 3. 
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The court in India has larger problems to solve 
through judicial review. It should work as a social service 
instrument. An awakened court is a desiderata. One of the 
difficult problem is regarding fundamental rights. Rights 
guaranteed to the citizens of India by the constitution 
cannot be violated by the executives and when the executive 
actions are violative of fundamental rights, the court has to 
strike a jnjst balance between social justice and rights of 
citizens. In India, the majority which governs the country 
quickly changes and the public opinion is also not very 
progressive and efficacious. In such circumstances it is not 
always possible for the majority in power to correctly fathom 
the needs and urgency of law which is enacted and the legis-
lative enactments in the state of tension, haste and vanity 
of power do not represent the free will of the soverign 
people. In such circumstances, judicial review has a great 
necessity. The people of India are in favour of strengthen-
ing the doctrine of judicial review in the Indian Democracy 
to protect the right, liberty and freedom of the individual, 
to have socio-economic development in the right way and to 
avoid executive tyranny. The age through which India is 
passing is the age of fluidity of life which is surrounded 
with extreme complexities and multitudinous diversities. 
India has evolved an indigenous system of constitutional 
polity, v^ich has adopted judicial review of administrative actions as a 
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weapon of effective censor over constitutional lapses by the 
executive. 
Article 356 of our constitution which was expected 
by our founding fathers to remain a dead letter has been 
indiscriminately utilised by the President of 
India to extinguish the lives of 101 state assemblies and 
every party at centre has yielded to this temptation. Power 
conferred by Article 356 can be exercised only when a situa-
tion has arisen in which the government of the state cannot 
be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Cons-
titution. What is that situation? The Supreme Court has 
ruled that President's rule cannot be imposed in situation 
which can be remedied or do not create an impasse, or do not 
disable or interfere with the goverance of the state accord-
ing to the constitution. The Supreme Court further held 
that, except in urgent situations which cannot brook delay^ 
a warning should be issued to the errant state and the 
President should use all other measures to restore the cons-
titutional machinery in the state before having recourse to 
his drastic power. The majority consisting of Justices 
Pandian, Sawant, Kuldip Singh, Jeevan Reddy and Agarwal, 
enlarged the scope of judicial review. It held that the 
validity of the Presidential proclamation is judicially 
reviewable to the extent of examining whether it was issued 
on the basis of any material at all or whether the material 
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was relevant or whether the proclamation was issued mala fide 
or was based on wholly irrelevant and extraneous grounds. 
The role played by the governor of Karnataka in recommending 
dissolution of the Karnataka assembly in 1989 on the basis of 
unverified information about defections from the ruling Janta 
Dal and his refusal of the Chief Minister, Mr.Bommai's 
request for proving his majority within a week on the floor 
of the House has been severely criticised. The court held 
that all canons of propriety were breached by the governor 
and his undue haste in inviting President's rule "clearly 
smacked of mala fide ... . A duly constituted ministry was 
dismissed on the basis of material which was neither tested 
or allowed to be tested and was no more than the ipse dixit 
of the governor". The court laid down that a ministry's 
strength should be tested on the floor of the House which 
"alone is the constitutionally ordained forum" and not by 
private opinion of any individual be the governor or the 
President". Applying this principle the presidential procla-
mations dissolving Karnataka and Nagaland assemblies were 
declared unconstitutional by the majority. However, since 
fresh elections had taken place in both the states and new 
legislative assemblies and governments had come into exis-
tence no further relief was granted and which was not prayed 
for before the Supreme Court. 
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The courts have invalidated what appeared to them to 
be genuinely arbitrary conferrals of discretionary power, 
although it must be said that in a very large number of 
situations vast conferral of discretionary powers have also 
been sustained^. But in these situations courts have 
attempted to maintain strict invigilation over the exercise 
of discretionary power. A malafide exercise of discretion-
ary power i« not to be countenanced. The stringent standards 
of proof and the refusal to invoke the doctrine of judicial 
notice has led to many difficulties in proving malafides; 
naturally, there are very few cases in this category and 
those which have upheld charges of malafide throw much light 
2 
on how far power can be abused . Exercise of discretionary 
power can be struck down if it is based on 'irrelevant con-
siderations'^. There is an emerging requirement that admi-
nistrative action must be reasonable. The Indian courts 
have held, after some initial hesitation, that a law may be 
valid as reasonable against the test of fundamental rights 
and yet a discretionary exercise of power under the law may 
not be valid being reasonable- Persons invested with dis-
cretionary powers may not transfer these to some other 
persons; they may not act under dictation or mechanically 
and without due care or without proper application of mind. 
1. State of Punjab v. Khan Chand (1974) 1 S.C.C. 549. 
2. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R.1964 S.C. 72. 
3.. Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, A.I.R.1967 
S,C. 295. 
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In the area of discretionary, judicial energies appear to be 
more dedicated to control over actual exercise of discre-
tionary powers rather than on the validity of conferral of 
vast discretionary powers without adequate guidelines or 
standards. 
It is an accepted axiom that the real Kernel of 
democracy lies in the courts enjoying the ultimate authority 
to restrain the exercise of absolute and arbitrary power. 
Without some kind of judicial power to control administra-
tive authorities, there is a danger that they commit exce-
sses and degenerate into arbitrary bodies, and such a deve-
lopment would be inimical to a democratic constitution. 
Articles 32 and 226 of the Indian Constitution make provi-
sions for the system of writs in the country. The writs are 
in the nature of habeas corpous, mandamus, quo warranto, 
prohibition and certiorari. Articles 32 and 226 are expre-
ssed in broad language. The Supreme Court, neverthless, 
ruled that in reviewing administrative action, the courts 
would keep to broad and fundamental principles underlying 
the prerogative writs in the English law without however 
importing all its technicalities^. Under these articles the 
courts enjoy a broad discretion in the matter of giving 
proper relief if warranted by the circumstances of the case 
1. Bassapa v. Nagappa, A.I.R.1954 S.C.440, 
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before them. The courts may not only issue a writ but also 
make any order, or give any direction as it may consider 
appropriate in the circumstances, to give proper relief to 
the petitioner^. 
Article 32 provides a guaranteed quick and summary 
remedy for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. Any 
person complaining of infraction of any of his Fundamental 
Rights by an administrative actions can go straight to the 
Supreme Court for vindication of his right without being 
required to undergo the dilatory proceedings from the lower 
to a higher court as one has to do in any ordinary litiga-
tion. The writ jurisdiction conferred op the High Court 
by article 226 can be invoked to enforce not only a Funda-
mental Right but a non-fundamental right as wellc Under 
this article the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue 
writs extends to the sta'te over which it has jurisdiction 
and also to territories outside that state, if the govern-
ment, authority or person is within those territories, and 
if the cause of action in relation to the government etc., 
wholly or in part, arises within the state. 
The High Court recently has widen its jurisdiction 
by bringing the Indian Army Act under the subject to judi-
cial review. The High Court brought the Indian Army's 
1- P.J. Irani v. Madras, A.I.R. 1961 S,C.1731. 
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termination policy under judicial review by holding that 
Army personnel cannot be dismissed without an inquiry or 
trial in cases where malafide was obvious a A full Bench 
of Justice Sunanda Bhandare, Justice Arun B. Saharya and 
Justice C.M. Nayar held that Section 18 of the Indian 
Army Act, hitherto treated as a holy cow by the judici-
ary is subject to judicial review. 
Section 18 of the Army Act, "the judges said, 
provides that every person subject to the Act shall hold 
office during the pleasure of the President Undoubtedly, 
the section does not provide for procedures to be 
followed while passing an order under the said section. 
However, it does not permit the passing of an order 
which is arbitrary, malafide and illegal". Legal 
experts term the Judgement "historic". They say that 
till now Section 18 of the Army Act was not put to 
judicial review by any court in the country. 
The doctrine of judicial review, as it is 
obvious from the above discussion, helps the courts to 
perform creative functions, a legal order where human 
beings matter. It also enables the courts to ring out 
old values and ring in new values. However, in the name 
of judicial review, the court should not block progre-
ssive legislations^. Law and life should go hand in 
glove. Law should not be allowed to stand independent 
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of social changes. As has been aptly observed, "law is 
not a brooding omnipotence in the sky but a flexible 
instrument of social order dependent upon the political 
values of the society it purports to regulate . 
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